The Basics: Weekly Payment of Wages

Finishing up the summer series of some of the basics of Connecticut employment law, I turn back to a wage & hour topic that comes up much more than you might think.

Connecticut's wage payment laws (including Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-71b) are quite clear: Employees must be paid wages on a weekly basis.  In addition, the employees must be paid within 8 days of the close of a pay period.

In practice, this means that employers typically have a pay period that runs either Sunday to Saturday or Monday to Sunday.

Upon the close of the pay period, the employer collects the time sheets, calculates overtime, and then "runs" the payroll.  For many employers, they can they make payments on Thursday or Friday (for the prior week.)

While that is the general rule, the law also allows employers to apply for a waiver of that requirement with the Department of Labor (Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-71i)

For approval of a bi-weekly payroll system, the Department has an easy online form that employers can fill out here

For anything further, a letter is required.  Semi-monthly and monthly payment of wages are not looked on favorably by the Department of Labor so employers must make a fairly compelling reason for that request.  

And what is you're one of those employers that hasn't been following the rules to date? Work with an attorney or the Department of Labor to get into compliance as soon as possible.  That may mean asking for approval retroactively or changing the system of pay that you already have.

Top 25 Business Law Blog? Only If You Say So

As I approach the three-year anniversary of this blog (stay tuned for more details), it's certainly touching to receive accolades for this blog. 

Each year, LexisNexis “honors a select group of blogs that set the online standard for a given industry.” Amazingly, the Connecticut Employment Law Blog is a nominated candidates for the LexisNexis Top 25 Business Law Blogs of 2010.

The list is impressive.  I'm particularly fond of Doug Cornelius' Compliance Building blog.  But in contests such as this, there is no room for compromise.  I need to enlist your help.

You see, apparently LexisNexis wants readers to voice their support of their favorite blogs.  Since Doug has already sent out a call to his readers to support his blog; I know readers of this blog can do better.

While Doug is willing to "sit back and take the consolation prize: the honor of being nominated", I think we have a shot to take this. Sure, we're up against the WALL STREET JOURNAL, and HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, but...

Ok, I know we're not fooling anyone, but if you'd like to say a good word about the blog, I'd be grateful.  Lexis Nexis invites you to comment on the announcement post at either of the following links:

To comment, you have to register. Registration is free and supposedly does not result in sales contacts (though I'd use one of your backup e-mail addresses just in case). The comment period for nominations ends on October 8, 2010. They don’t say how they will end up selecting the top 25 out of the nominees other based on their review and your comments.

CHRO Human Rights Referee Dismisses Case for Failing to Attend Hearing Pretrial Conference

Every once in a while there comes a decision that can shake up your expectations.  

Courtesy morguefile.com "beach"The case of CHRO ex. rel Nemeth v. Westport Big & Tall, Inc. is one of them.  In it, the presiding human rights referee dismissed a CHRO complaint because the employee's (and his attorney) failed to attend a hearing conference -- essentially a meeting were upcoming schedules are discussed. 

What's surprising about the decision is that the employee's attorney had notified the referee that she would be in Florida on the date in advance and said she could participate over the telephone.

In the referee's opinion that wasn't good enough because the request by the attorney didn't satisfy other procedural requirementst, including proposing alternative dates and copying the CHRO's counsel on the requests. 

Now, you might think that perhaps this was because the conference was scheduled well in advance and the request for a delay came about at the last minute. But that's not the case here either.  In fact, notice for the July 23, 2010 hearing conference was only sent out the prior week, on July 14, 2010.  To the human rights referee, this too provided no excuse for failing to follow other regulations:

Notwithstanding the policy in favor of having cases heard on their merits, parties and their attorneys do not, without consequences, decide for themselves if they will attend hearings, what hearings they will attend, what procedures they will follow and what procedures are too inconvenient for them to attempt compliance. 

What's the takeaway for employers (and even employees) from this case?  If you have a matter in which reasonable cause has been found and you're proceeding with a hearing at the CHRO, strict compliance with the procedural requirements is the path being advanced by the CHRO now. Even vacation schedules are no match, unless other attempts are made to comply with the rules. 

The Risks of Using Social Media Sites for Hiring

The rise in social media sites has provided employers with the opportunity to learn more about the candidates that they are considering hiring than every before.

But the problem is that some of the information they may be learning is irrelevant to the job qualifications, or worse, may be improper for the employer to use.

Sharlyn Lauby published an article on the American Express Open Business Form last night that goes into these issues in-depth from a human resources perspective.  While I am quoted in the piece, I highly recommend it for a different reason: It doesn't try to sugarcoat the issue.

On the one hand, I think we have to recognize that it is unrealistic to expect that employers will simply ignore these social media sites; after all, who hasn't Googled their name (or their friends) to see what is out there.

But the amount of data now available can also be overwhelming and without filters or controls, it's tough trying to place such information into a proper perspective. 

I suggest in the article asking yourself a few questions to decide if using social media in the recruiting process makes sense for your organization.

  • Why do you want to use social media?
  • What information are you hoping to find?
  • Is the fact that an employee uses social media a bonus or a demerit?

As I then note in the article, "I think too many employers think that adding social media to the hiring process will make their decision-making easier, but because of the volume and types of information available, it may only make it more complicated."

There's good input from other human resources professional about how they balance the need to know with other legal and practical concerns.  If you're considering using social media sites in your hiring process, it's an article worth reading. 

Employment Discrimination Complaints at CHRO Up Slightly in 2009-2010

The conventional wisdom in a down economy is that employment discrimination claims will skyrocket. While there have been some indications of that at a national level, the numbers in Connecticut tell a very different story.

The state agency in Connecticut responsible for investigating discrimination complaints recently released its annual report (download here) for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010. 

It shows that 1740 employment discrimination complaints were filed in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, up slightly from 1716 complaints the year before (a little over 1 percent). However, these numbers are still well below the 1814 complaints filed in FY2008, and the over 2000 complaints in FY 2001. 

(I've previously looked at the annual report numbers in posts here, here and here.) 

Notably, the numbers of "reasonable cause" findings are down 15 percent from the year prior -- to just 75 instances during the whole year (down from 91 in FY2009). It is the first time in 4 years, that the numbers of reasonable cause findings were this low. 

In upcoming posts I'll delve into the numbers a bit further including increasing numbers of retaliation complaints being filed.

The numbers confirm what I had suspected last year -- a discrimination complaint is not a foregone conclusion from a layoff, at least not in Connecticut.

Photo credit: Grafixar from morguefile.com

Second Circuit: Repeated Use of "Bitch" May Be Enough to Create Hostile Work Environment

If you're an employer with an appeal to the Second Circuit, having the EEOC write a brief on behalf of the Plaintiff-employee is not one of those things that portends well for the case.

So, when the Second Circuit issued its decision in Pucino v. Verizon Communications (download here), perhaps the writing was already on the wall when the EEOC filed an amicus brief months earlier.

What attracted the EEOC to the matter? Perhaps it was the way the facts were presented.  In the Pucino matter, it may have been the district court's dismissal of the employee's claim, where the court said that repeated use of the word "bitch" was not enough to get a claim of a hostile work environment to a jury.

The Second Circuit vacated the lower court's decision saying that under the circumstances of this case, the repeated use of that term was enough. But notably, the court didn't say that it would always be enough.  Rather, it said that the context was critical:

...Pucino and the EEOC suggest that the word "bitch" is such an intensely degrading sexual epithet that its use implies as a matter of law hostility toward women. It surely is the case that use of that word in many contexts reflects such hostility. However, we cannot say that use of the word "bitch" always and in every context has that meaning or that its usage need not be viewed in context.  We also see no need to worry that a trier of fact cannot make the appropriate judgment about the word's use. We therefore reject a rule that would automatically command an inference of gender-based hostility to be drawn from its use.

Having said that, we also have no doubt that such a trier could find that [the foreman's] "constant" use of the word over several years in the context of the present record was sex-based and reflected hostility to women.

The case goes on to discuss theories of "objective" versus "subjective" beliefs of harassment and is one of the few published Second Circuit decisions recently in this area. As a result, employers and their attorneys may want to take a look at the case because it is likely to be cited in similar matters.

Others have written about the case as well, including the Work Matters blog and Wait a Second! (the latter of which represented the employee). 

As an aside, the court's decision isn't as radical as it might appear to be at first. If the court adopted a rule that the use of the word "bitch" automatically created a hostile work environment, what would that mean for the iconic 1997 Meredith Brooks' song "Bitch". (One could only guess on the number of lawsuits that would have arisen from the playing of that song -- see below). 

On the other hand, if the court had found that the word "bitch" could never really amount to a hostile work environment, that would represent a shift from the court's prior holdings that words and context matter. Thus, the court's adoption of a "context" rule represents a continuation of prior precedent.

 

Musings from the Second Circuit

Today, I had the opportunity to argue in front of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in downtown Manhattan. (Hence the reason for the sparseness of posts lately).  

Although I have been there before, it continues to rank among the most professionally rewarding experiences in my career. Every attorney who dreams of an oral argument in law school should have such an opportunity.  Most of us will never get to the U.S. Supreme Court but if going to the Second Circuit is the "silver medal", I'll take it.

As is consistent with my practice on this blog, I'm not going to talk about the merits of the case I argued (you'll have to read about it from others), but because of uniqueness of appeals, I thought I would share some random observations about the proceedings.

  • First off, the court remains "old-school" in its approach to technology: Check it at the door. No Blackberrys, iPhones, iPods, iPads. You name it.   While this removes the temptation of a digital distraction, it still seems somewhat overkill in today's legal environment.  You go into your legal battle with only what you can carry.  Here's a tip though: If you rely on your cell phone to tell time, bring your watch.  Otherwise, you may end up feeling a bit lost in time.  
  • Hopefully, if you ever have argument (either as an attorney or client), you'll be in the main ceremonial courtroom on the 9th floor. While the building is fairly new, the courtroom has a wonderfully majestic feel to it.  Wide expansive windows line the room (with a view of Manhattan bridge) and lots of wood paneling. Comfortable leather seats adorn the front.  It can seat dozens of people and has modern updates that make it a court that you can feel comfortable in.
  • But it is the front of the room that defines it and gives it its aura. Several long wooden judges' benches go basically the width of the room and rise up in front of you. You cannot help but appreciate the magnitude of the event as the benches rise up and up.
  • If that's not enough, there's also bits of history dotted around the room. I liked the bust of Judge Learned Hand as you enter the room on the left-hand side -- one of those judges who made an impact on society without ever rising to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
  • Ever think time moves too slow? Try your hand at oral argument, where ten minutes has never been quicker.  A timer may track your progress in front but its no use fighting it, the time allotted will never be enough.
  • The Second Circuit is one of the last remaining courts where nearly every party is allowed oral argument in their appeal (many other Courts of Appeal have abandoned that practice). Every time I go, I find a newfound appreciation to that practice and I'm warmed by the concept that everyone is still entitled to their say, no matter how weak their arguments may truly be.  Yes, it is expensive, but there's still something about our system of justice that cries out for such a practice. (To read a spirited defense of such a practice, see this article.) 
  • And don't show up late -- the court is as on-time as the famed European trains.  A change of pace from some state courts where an argument in the morning can sometimes turns into one in the afternoon.

For employers and businesses that are involved in litigation, going to the Second Circuit is a stark reminder about how all the facts in your years-long case can get whittled down to just a few items in an appeal.  There's rarely time to mention it all and it really should be the last place you want to be if you're in litigation.  You just never know what the court will do.   It may be an uplifting experience for oral argument, but the time and expense necessary to file the appeal and prepare are not insignificant.  

Perhaps its best to remember this at the beginning of a case when there may be a decision to settle early or fight.  Sometimes you have to fight. But sometimes the long road not taken -- no matter how scenic or majestic the path may be -- is the better choice.  

Breaking: Connecticut Supreme Court Finds A Bonus Can Constitute "Wages", in the Right Case

Back in June, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its decision in Ziotas v. The Reardon Law Firm -- a significant ruling because it found that where a bonus is discretionary and is not ascertainable by applying a formula, it did not constitute "wages". 

I talked about the case in a lengthy post and noted that the court left open the possibility of finding that a bonus can constitute "wages" in some cases:

The case is also significant because it resolves the issue of whether a contractually-based bonus constitutes "wages" in all circumstances. The court left the door open the possibility under the right set of circumstances, but rejected the argument here, based mainly on the fact that the amount of the bonus was indefinite.

For employers, this finding is particularly significant because some higher-level employees have contracts in which the bonus is discussed -- albeit in discretionary terms. ...

But the court also made it clear that there are a set of circumstances in which a bonus might be deemed to be wages. If a bonus was ascertainable by a "set formula", then the bonus might be deemed to be "wages". For example, suppose a contract states that an employee is produce 2000 widgets over a year and if that goal is met, the employee is entitled to $1000. In that case, it seems to remove any discretionary on behalf of the employer as the amount or whether a bonus should be paid.

In case that will be officially released next week, the Court found exactly such a case in Association Resources, Inc. v. Wall (download here). 

The Court concluded that  the trial court properly determined that the bonuses in the present case were "wages as defined by § 31-71e (3) because, under the employment agreement, they were entirely nondiscretionary, both as to whether they would be awarded, and the amount thereof."

The Court examined the employment agreement, and found that the employer"

was contractually bound to pay the bonus to the plaintiff. Additionally, the amount of the bonus, which derived from the net profitability of the [Plaintiff's group] after expenses, was nondiscretionary because it was subject to calculation by applying a contractually mandated, precise formula set forth in § 2.2 (b) of the employment agreement. That formula was based on the budgets of the Digital Group, one of which, for fiscal year 2003–2004, was attached to the employment agreement as a schedule, and the other, for fiscal year 2004–2005, that was plainly crossreferenced therein.

The court also distinguished this case from another case, Weems v. Citigroup, were it had held a bonus based on "subjective" factors, such as the profitability of a particular branch was also not a wage because the employee was not directly responsible for how the branch performed.  Here, the court said that even though the profitability of the area was a factor in the bonus, that did not disqualify the bonus as "wages" because the employee at issue was the executive in charge of the area. 

As the court said:

Put differently, to conclude that the bonus is not a wage because not every dollar earned by the [particular division or group] was directly attributable to the plaintiff’s labors would be to ignore the realities of his executive-level managerial position, which was to be directly and solely responsible for the profitability of that division.  

In a footnote, the Court said that to read the statute any other way would be to exclude management-level employees from bringing any claim for unpaid bonuses under the state's wage laws. 

If we were to agree with the defendant’s reading of Weems v. Citigroup, Inc.,... then no management level employee overseeing the work of other employees would ever be entitled to prevail under the wage statutes when bringing a claim to recover an unpaid bonus. There is no indication in the language of the wage statutes or their legislative history that the legislature intended to exclude all management level employees.

There's more to this opinion and in the upcoming days after digesting its implications, I'll add some additional analysis and guidance. In the meantime, employers who have bonus agreements with their executive-level employees should dig into this case and others to figure out their exposure if such bonuses are not paid out.  But more importantly, I stand by what I said back in June:

As a result, employers that want to keep some flexibility with their bonus systems may want to set up their bonus systems to merely discuss factors that will be considered in setting a bonus and also make it clear that the amount of such a bonus is discretionary and subject to change. It will make it more difficult (but not impossible) to argue that the employee had a reasonable expectation of a bonus payment under those circumstances.

The Basics: Drug Testing Laws in Connecticut for Applicants

Continuing our weekly summer series on the basics of various employment laws, we'll turn this week to the state's drug testing laws (which can be found starting at Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51t)

I've discussed some of the quirks in this statute in a prior post, including the fact that the testing rules for applicants differ from employees, but that an "employee" may also include a former employee too. 

But what are the rules that employers must follow for job applicants?

For job applicants (the statute uses "prospective employee"), an employer cannot require a urinalysis drug test as part of the application process unless three items are met:

  1. the applicant "is informed in writing at the time of application of the employer's intent to conduct such a drug test"
  2. the test is in accordance with procedures set up in the statute (basically a two-step test); and
  3. the applicant is "given a copy of any positive urinalysis drug test result."

The results of that test must be kept confidential and only shared with an employee "to whom such disclosure is necessary." (Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51v)

While many employers in Connecticut have the discretion as to whether or not to implement drug testing, those employers who are subject to the Drug Free Workplace Act (mainly those federal contractors or grantees) may have additional requirements to follow. 

As always, this area is filled with traps for the unwary so if you're thinking about implementing such a program be sure to consult with an attorney or a company that specializes in this area. 

 

Quick Hits: Trade Secrets Protection Program, Baldness & GINA, ADAAA Update, Blackberry & Overtime, In-House Counsel Registration, Telecommuting

The dog days of summer are clearly upon us. So, it seems the right time for another installment of the occasional feature, Quick Hits, featuring a few posts or tidbits you might have missed recently.