For those unfamiliar with the way a lot of Connecticut laws get implemented, October 1st could seem like just another day.  (Though for my kids, they would be impressed that it was a different October 1st in 1982 that EPCOT opened at Disney World.)

But a lot of bills that are passed by the Connecticut General Assembly go into effect on October 1st each year. This year is no exception.

For employers, the biggest of these bills is the new law concerning “Pregnant Women in the Workplace”.  I’ve previously recapped the law for pregnant employees in a prior post way back in May, but because we’re getting close to implementation, it’s time for a little refresher.

Existing law makes it a discriminatory practice to:

  • To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy;
  • to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy;
  • to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer;
  • to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.

Those rules remain unchanged. But the new law revises some other provisions and adds more to the protections. Effective October 1st, it will now also be unlawful to:

  • Limit, segregate or classify the pregnant employee in a way that would deprive her of employment opportunities due to her pregnancy;
  • Discriminate against an employee or job applicant on the basis of her pregnancy in the terms or conditions of her employment;
  • Fail or refuse to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee or job applicant due to her pregnancy, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship;
  • Deny employment opportunities to an employee or job applicant if the denial is due to the request for a reasonable accommodation due to her pregnancy;
  • Force an employee or job applicant affected by pregnancy to accept a reasonable accommodation if she (i) does not have known limitation related to her pregnancy, or (ii) does not require a reasonable accommodation to perform the essential duties related to her employment;
  • Require an employee to take a leave of absence if a reasonable accommodation can be provided in lieu of the leave; and
  • Retaliate against an employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment based upon the employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation.

The changes don’t stop there. The new law also explains that the word “pregnancy” will also include “pregnancy, childbirth or a related condition, including but not limited to, lactation”.  It also expands the definition of “reasonable accommodation ” and “undue hardship”.

  • “Reasonable Accommodation” means, but is not limited to, being permitted to sit while working, more frequent or longer breaks, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring, light duty assignment, modified work schedules, temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work, time off to recover from childbirth or break time and appropriate facilities for expressing breast milk; and
  • “Undue Hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as (A) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (B) the overall financial resources of the employer; (C) the overall size of the business of the employer with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities; and (D) the effect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of the accommodation upon the operation of the employer.

Continue Reading Two Weeks Until New Protections for Pregnant Employees Become Effective

Labor Day has come and gone. Summer is over.  Can we all stop listening to Despacito now. (Please?)

But it’s time to look at a decision that came out during the dog days of summer that might have been overlooked.  A recent federal district court case (Noffsinger v. SSN Niantic Operating Co. LLC, download here) has answered the question of whether Connecticut’s medical marijuana laws were preempted by federal law.

The decision held that Connecticut employees who have received approval from the state agency to use medical marijuana outside of work cannot be fired just because they test positive for marijuana during a drug screening.  In doing so, the court held that employees and job applicants can sue based on a termination or a rescinded job offer.

As my colleague wrote for my firm’s alert:

Unlike the laws of other states permitting residents to be prescribed medical marijuana, Connecticut’s statute expressly makes it unlawful to refuse to hire or to discharge an employee solely because of the individual’s status as a qualifying patient, or for testing positive in a drug screening as a result of using medical marijuana within the protections of the statute. However, Connecticut does not protect such individuals if they are found to be using or are under the influence of medical marijuana during working hours.

The court analyzed federal drug laws and determined that they do not address the issue of employment and do not make it unlawful to employ a medical marijuana user. As a result, even though federal law prohibits possession or use of marijuana, those restrictions do not apply to someone properly using medical marijuana under state law.

The decision follows one from Massachusetts that we previously recapped here.

In prior posts, I’ve talked about the difficulties for employers trying to navigate this still-developing area of law.  Employers should proceed carefully under such circumstances and ensure compliance with the state’s medical marijuana laws that prohibits firing employees solely because of the individual’s status as a qualifying medical marijuana patient.

If an employee is under the influence of marijuana during working hours, that may afford employers the opportunity to take decisive employment action but other circumstances may not be so clear.

Consulting with your legal counsel on this changing area of law is advisable for the foreseeable future while more court decisions define the parameters of acceptable action.

The Connecticut Appellate Court today released an important disability discrimination decision that gives employers some support for employees who struggle with employees who ask for “accommodations” for an indefinite leave for a medical condition.

The case ostensibly addresses the request for “indefinite leave” which I’ve previously talked about it in prior posts.

But the case boils down to a familiar set of facts for employers. An employee who one day says, “I need to take 30 days off for a medical condition” and leaves the employer to twist without further response. As explained by the court:

The plaintiff informed the defendant that she would be taking a leave of absence, did not provide the defendant with any time frame for her return, and did not respond to the defendant’s subsequent attempts to contact her regarding her request for leave. The plaintiff effectively asked the defendant ‘‘to hold [her] position open indefinitely while [she] attempt[ed] to recover. . . .’’

Under these circumstances, the court said that the Plaintiff cannot establish even a prima facie case of discrimination because she cannot show that she “requested a reasonable accommodation that enabled her to perform the essential functions of the job”.

In doing so, the state court reviewed federal law and noted that “[R]easonable accommodation does not require [an employer] to wait indefinitely
for [the employee’s] medical conditions to be corrected . . . .’’

In this particular case, the court said, the plaintiff, prior to her departure, informed her supervisor that she would be taking leave for ‘‘over thirty days depending on my lung condition . . . .’’  At a subsequent deposition, the court went on to say, the plaintiff was asked, with respect to her request for leave, that ‘‘you didn’t know how long you were going to be out, correct?’’ The plaintiff responded, ‘‘[c]orrect.’’

The forms submitted by the employee at the time were confusing and the Plaintiff did not respond after requests by certified and regular mail by the employer for more information.  When the employee was told to submit information by a date certain and did not do so, the employer just went ahead and fired her. The court upheld that termination.

For employers, the case offers some helpful reminders:

  • Reasonable accommodation is an interactive process. So long as the employer holds up its end, courts will be more inclined to support the employer in the end.
  • Seeking medical documentation from employees regarding their requested leaves is both necessary and essential to defending a claim where the documentation is vague.  Don’t hesitate to followup and set firm deadlines to the employee to provide the information.
  • As always, seek legal counsel to help navigate through this and work through any issues regarding termination.

Employers may feel like anti-discrimination laws are rigid, but there is built-in flexibility for employers if they know where to look.

The case, Thomson v. Department of Social Services, can be downloaded here. 

While the relaunch of the blog has been delayed a bit more (I swear it’s coming soon), it’s time to have another post in the interim. My colleague Gary Starr is back with an interesting decision from the state next door — Massachusetts. As some Connecticut employers cross state lines (and marijuana cases continue to arise), the case is a reminder that the law continues to evolve in unexpected ways.

Many states have approved the use of medical marijuana, despite the fact that the federal government continues to classify marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.  As a result there is a tension between state rights to use medical marijuana and federal law prohibiting its possession.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to determine how to balance the rights of an employee who had been prescribed and was taking medical marijuana for Crohn’s Disease versus the employer’s interest in complying with federal law and maintaining a drug free work place.  The Court found that the employee had sufficiently alleged that she was a qualified individual with a disability who was entitled to a reasonable accommodation related to use of medical marijuana.

As a result, her firing after testing positive could be challenged and she could pursue a disability discrimination claim under state law.

As part of the hiring process, a new employee was required to take a drug test.  She immediately explained to her supervisor that she suffered from Crohn’s disease and she had been prescribed and was using medical marijuana which was improving her appetite and allowing her to stabilize her weight.  She said that she did not take it before work or during working hours, but that if tested, she would test positive.  After being tested and getting a positive result, the human resource administrator called and fired her.  When the employee tried to explain the she had a prescription, the administrator told her that the company follows federal law, not state law.

The employee ultimately sued in state court claiming that she was being discriminated against because of her disability and that the company had failed to accommodate her disability.

The lower court had dismissed the case, but the highest Massachusetts court concluded that the employee had sufficiently alleged that she had a disability, that she was qualified for the position, and that she was entitled to a reasonable accommodation.  As a result, the case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.

The high court, however, also made clear that the employer could still win, but the employer must show that the accommodation was not reasonable and/or caused an undue burden.  The court noted that the employee could not come to work intoxicated, nor could the employee engage in tasks that could pose a risk to the public.

It also noted that if the employer was subject to federal laws related to a drug free work place or similar obligations, then the accommodation could be found unreasonable.

In Massachusetts, employers must not simply apply a drug free work environment policy, but must look at each situation to determine whether the employee is entitled to a reasonable accommodation.  In states that have adopted medical marijuana statutes — like Connecticut — employers must decide whether the employee has a disability, how to handle a request for an accommodation, and whether there is a compelling reason to deny the accommodation based on undue hardship.

It is also critically important to meet with and discuss the situation with the employee to determine whether there is an alternative to the use of medical marijuana and to review how the job is structured to see if the employee can do the essential functions without violating company policies or impairing the company’s business operation.  It is also important to determine the scope of the medical marijuana statute to determine whether employees have additional employment rights under state statutes.

In states where an employee has been prescribed medical marijuana, employers may not be able to fire an employee who has simply failed a drug test.  More questions must be asked before firing someone who tests positive for marijuana.

Many states have approved the use of medical marijuana, despite the fact that the federal government continues to classify marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.  As a result there is a tension between state rights to use medical marijuana and federal law prohibiting its possession.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to determine how to balance the rights of an employee who had been prescribed and was taking medical marijuana for Crohn’s Disease versus the employer’s interest in complying with federal law and maintaining a drug free work place.  The Court found that the employee had sufficiently alleged that she was a qualified individual with a disability who was entitled to a reasonable accommodation related to use of medical marijuana.  As a result, her firing after testing positive could be challenged and she could pursue a disability discrimination claim under state law.

As part of the hiring process, a new employee was required to take a drug test.  She immediately explained to her supervisor that she suffered from Crohn’s disease and she had been prescribed and was using medical marijuana which was improving her appetite and allowing her to stabilize her weight.  She said that she did not take it before work or during working hours, but that if tested, she would test positive.  After being tested and getting a positive result, the human resource administrator called and fired her.  When the employee tried to explain the she had a prescription, the administrator told her that the company follows federal law, not state law.

The employee ultimately sued in state court claiming that she was being discriminated against because of her disability and that the company had failed to accommodate her disability. Continue Reading Employer’s Defense Goes Up In Smoke

starrMy colleague Gary Starr sits next to my office and sometimes we bounce ideas off each other. One of the things we were talking about recently was a new case that discussed an employer’s obligations to enter into the interactive process.  

This often comes up in ADA cases where the employee may need a reasonable accommodation.  As we discuss in this joint post below, there are no magic words needed — and sometimes no words needed at all.  

Both federal law (ADA) and state law (CFEPA) require employees and management to meet and discuss what might be a reasonable accommodation when an employee with a disability seeks an accommodation.

This interactive process was envisioned as a way to work collaboratively to find a reasonable accommodation.  Certainly when an employee asks for an accommodation, an employer must engage in the process.

But here are a few questions to ponder:

  • What should happen when the employee does not quite use the right words to start the process?
  • Can the employer be liable for failing to engage in the interactive process after terminating an employee who has not been accommodated?
  • While there are no magic words that must be uttered to start the interactive process,  what will trigger the obligation?

A recent federal appeals court case (Kowitz v. Trinity Health) discussed this situation, where the employer apparently ignored the signs requiring it to explore possible accommodations.  As a result, the employee will get her day in court.

The basic facts:

  • A respiratory therapist was diagnosed with a degenerative disease.
  • She requested and was granted time off for surgery under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  After she exhausted her FMLA leave, she returned to work with restrictions.
  • During her leave, management reminded the department’s employees that they needed to submit proof of their certification in CPR, an essential job function.  Employees who needed to get recertified were required to say when they were going to take the course and the written and physical tests.
  • Having discussed the matter with her doctor, the therapist left a voice mail message for her supervisor that she would take the course and the written exam, but needed to complete 4 more months of physical therapy before she could do the physical portion of the test.
  • The next day, the respiratory therapist was terminated because  she was unable to perform CPR.

She sued, claiming that her employer did not engage in the interactive process.  The court found that while the therapist did not expressly ask for an accommodation, she provided sufficient information to start discussions.

The court pointed out that the employer was aware of the disability.  It approved the FMLA leave.  It received the Return to Work form from her doctor with work restrictions.  And there was evidence that the employee had told her supervisor about her problems completing the CPR certification and she told her supervisor about her doctor appointments and her continuing pain.

What’s the Takeaway?

This decision warns employers that if you know about an employee’s medical limitations, that knowledge may be sufficient to trigger the informal interactive process.

While it is not clear whether other courts will adopt this liberal approach, which is better in the long run: Sitting down with the employee or litigating?

It is important to remember that not all requests for an accommodation are reasonable.  The expense of a requested accommodation may not be reasonable; what the employer offers may be reasonable, even if rejected by the employee; and there may not be a solution to the situation.

But engaging in the process makes much more sense than trying to convince a judge or jury that you were too busy to meet for an hour or so and were unwilling to listen to possible ways to have the employee be productive and contribute to the company.

While a recent Second Circuit case received lots of headlines regarding its discussion of individual liability under FMLA, the case has some other nuggets for employers to understand, as my colleague Gary Starr explains in today’s post.  Buried in Graziadio v. Culinary Institute of America case is a reference to the fact that the federal appeals court had not “yet had occasion to consider what standard should govern such rarely litigated claims of ‘associational discrimination.'”

That is, until now. Thanks to Gary for highlighting this notable aspect of the case.

starrYou should all know by now (and call us if you don’t) that when an employee asks for a reduced schedule to address his/her own disability, the ADA and Connecticut law may apply. Indeed, under the ADA and state law, you should engage in an interactive process to work out a way for both parties to benefit.

But what happens when it is not the employee who has the disability, but rather a family member and the employee seeks an accommodation?

While we know that employers must address the situation involving a qualified individual with a known disability, the situation is different when the employee has a relationship with someone known to have a disability.

Discrimination is prohibited based on that relationship or association, but importantly, the scope of the employee’s rights is not the same.

The Second Circuit recently explained that there are three situations that can lead to a claim of associational discrimination:

  1. Where the employee suffers an adverse action as a result of the employer’s concern over the “expense” that may cause increases in insurance due to the employee’s association with a disabled individual covered by the employer’s insurance;
  2. Where the employee suffers an adverse action as a result on the employer’s fear that the employee may contract or is genetically predisposed to develop the disability of the person with whom he/she is associated; or
  3. Where the employee suffers an adverse action due to the employer’s fear that the employee will be inattentive at work due to the disability of the disabled person.

If any of these 3 situations is the basis for the adverse action, then the recent case suggests that the employer will have to prove that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action.

In the case before the court, there was no claim involving concerns about insurance or about the possibility that the employee might develop a disabling condition.  Instead the employee alleged that the employer feared the employee would be inattentive at work because her son developed diabetes and he was learning how to monitor his blood sugar.

While that was the allegation, the employee could not and did not show that she was fired because the employer believed she would be “distracted” by her son’s condition.  Rather, the evidence showed that she was fired because her employer’s concern was that she would not be at work at all.

The employee failed to prove she was discriminated against under the ADA as an accommodation was not available under these circumstances.

However, often these cases have an aspect under another federal law.  Here, the Family Medical Leave Act could provide her with the opportunity for intermittent leave, if necessary, and this became the basis for her lawsuit.

What cases like this demonstrate is that under the patchwork of state and federal laws, it is important to analyze a situation under differing statutes.  In this case, the employee had no recourse under the ADA, but did under the FMLA.  It is important to take the time and be sure that the requests made by an employee for an accommodation are fully reviewed.  The consequences can be protracted litigation and a large back pay judgment.

 

aslWhat does it really mean to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee who has a disability?

That’s a question I talk about a bunch with clients.  The employee may request one thing but the employer may think that another accommodation can accomplish close to the same thing, perhaps at a lower cost.  Who wins?

It’s not a new question; I’ve talked about it before here on the blog too.

But a recent case by the Second Circuit adds some layering to that discussion.  The case, Noll v. IBM, isn’t one that you’ll see on the front page of The New York Times.  I found out about it from the always reliable (and underrated) Wait a Second Blog.

That blog’s recap is appropriate here:

Noll worked in Poughkeepsie, N.Y., but IBM is a huge corporation for which internal communication were broadcast over a company-wide intranet. Noll asked for captioning of certain intranet videos or transcripts of audio files. Instead, as noted above, IBM gave him transcripts and access to ASL interpreters. Noll said these alternatives were not good enough it was “confusing and tiring” to look back and forth between the video and the ASL interpreter. Also, it sometimes took five days or longer for transcripts to be made available to Noll, and links to the transcripts were sometimes broken.

The IBM Media Library stores over 46,000 video files (!), only 100 of which were captioned.  As for live meetings, IBM provided him with ASL interpreters and Noll found those to be “effective.”  But he didn’t like the interpreters for the videos because he found it “confusing and tiring.”

The Second Circuit noted that determinations of the reasonableness of accommodations are typically fact-specific, but summary judgment can be granted to an employer if the accommodations are “plainly reasonable.”  (Pro tip: If the court is setting forth this standard, you can figure out where it is headed.)

This is an important point to emphasize and the court seems to be setting forth a standard that hasn’t been utilized much before in discussions. “In other words, the plain reasonableness of the existing accommodation ends the analysis. There is no need to engage in further burden‐shifting to consider whether the employee’s requested accommodation would have been reasonable.”

Reasonable accommodation can take many forms, but must be “effective”, the court said.  And, at the same time, employers are not required to provide the “perfect” accommodation or even the “very accommodation most strongly preferred” by the employee.  “All that is required is effectiveness.” 

Here, the court found that the accommodations from IBM were indeed “effective”.  While Noll said the interpreters were not as effective as captioning and that it was “tiring” to watch it, that objection is not enough to get him to a jury trial, let alone victory.

This disadvantage does not render interpretive services ineffective. A person who is deaf necessarily receives auditory information from other senses (principally sight); so it can be expected that many accommodations of deafness — ASL interpretive services as well as captioning — will tax visual attention to some degree. An accommodation for deafness therefore cannot be rendered ineffective by the need to divide visual attention, without more.

For employers, this is an important case to consider. IBM here had access to many more resources than most employers. And even with all the services it provided, it was sued for still not doing enough. The Second Circuit put an end to that — no doubt after IBM spent significant sums to defend itself.  Smaller employers may not be so fortunate.

Still, for employers, showing that you have entered into the interactive process with employees and provided what it believes to be an “effective” reasonable accommodation can still provide a path to success if sued.

UPSairBack in September 2013, I reported on a seemingly never-ending case of Tomick v. UPS and mentioned that it was headed to its second appeal at the Connecticut Appellate Court. (I talked about the history of the case and the first appeal back in 2012 too.  Amazingly, it dates to a termination decision way back in 2004!)

Well, it’s back. Today, the Appellate Court officially released its newest decision looking at a particular issue: Namely, is an employee required to show that he was qualified to perform the essential duties of his position at the time of an adverse employment decision?

To establish the basic elements (or a “prima facie case”) of a disability discrimination, an individual must typically show that he was “qualified for the position”.  UPS argued on appeal that it “is fundamental, under both state and federal law, that a plaintiff bringing a claim of disability [discrimination] must be capable of performing his/her essential job functions as of the date of the adverse employment action being challenged”.

The Appellate Court disagreed.  In doing so, it indicated that the requirement of “qualification” is necessary only when it is “germane” to the issues involved.  It cited Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. where the “plaintiff’s qualifications were essential in determining whether the employer could in fact employ the plaintiff with or without a reasonable accommodation.”

But the court went on. If the “question of qualification is not relevant to the main question of whether there was discrimination, our Supreme Court holds that no such showing is necessary….”.

In this case, because the plaintiff was already an employee of the defendant and his qualifications for the position held were not being challenged, the court said that the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of his position at the time of termination was not relevant.

Interestingly, the court did suggest a different result in a different case.  If the defendant, for example, asserted that it could no longer continue to employ the plaintiff, with or without reasonable accommodations, on the basis of his unsatisfactory performance or lack of qualifications as a result of his disability, then the qualification element might come back into play.

For employers, the case is a notable play on legal theories.  But from a practical perspective, it’s hard to see how this will change the advice typically given to employers.

The Appellate Court went on to address another interesting aspect: Punitive damages. I’ll tackle that in an upcoming post.

My colleague, Jarad Lucan, returns today with a post discussing a new Connecticut Supreme Court case that has expanded the state’s anti-discrimination laws when it comes to disability claims. 

When Congress enacted the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), it recognized that fears, misperceptions, and stereotypes about disabled individuals are so pervasive that employment discrimination reaches beyond those who are burdened by the requisite substantially limiting impairments.

As a result, the definition of a disability under the ADA expressly includes being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one of more major life activity.

In other words, the ADA clearly prohibits disability discrimination based on an employer’s mistaken belief.

Unlike the ADA, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) does not expressly protect an employee whose employer mistakenly regards him or her as being physically disabled (the CFEPA does expressly make it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employer regards the employee as being mentally disabled).

In fact, under the CFEPA, physically disabled is defined to include only any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment.

Nevertheless, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined last week that the CFEPA does protect individuals from being discriminated against because of an employer’s mistaken belief about his or her physical disability.

In Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized that the language of the CFEPA is plain and unambiguous (which normally ends a court’s inquiry into the meaning of a statute) in that nowhere does it establish protection for an individual who is regarded as having a physical disability.

However, the Supreme Court determined that applying the CFEPA in such a manner would bring about bizarre results.

“Namely, under the plain language of [the CFEPA], if an employee has a chronic disease, the employer may not discharge the employee on that basis. If, however, the employer is undergoing testing that leads his employer to believe that he has a chronic disease, the literal terms of the [the CFEPA] do not protect the employee from discharge on that basis, despite the fact that the employer’s actions, in both cases, were premised on the same discriminatory purpose.”

In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court relied, in large part, on the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities’ long standing interpretation of the CFEPA to include protection for employees who are regarded as having a physical disability.

In addition, the Supreme Court looked to the legislative history of the CFEPA, which made clear that the definition of physically disabled was to “cover as many people as possible under the definition and leave it open and broad.”

In the Court’s opinion, it would be inconsistent with the legislative efforts to protect as many individuals as possible and “thwart” the purpose of the CFEPA to exclude protection for employees who are merely regarded as being physically disabled.

Not surprisingly, Justice Zarella issued a forceful dissent saying that the interpretation would not lead to a “bizarre” result:

Although the majority’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language may be the better public policy, and although the legislature might adopt that policy if the matter is brought to its attention, that is not sufficient reason for abandoning the plain and unambiguous directive in the statute itself. The fact that a better public policy exists does not mean that the expressed public policy ‘‘yields absurd or unworkable results . . . .’’

Nevertheless, the outcome is probably not terribly surprising. The Supreme Court has long looked to federal antidiscrimination laws, including the ADA, when interpreting the CFEPA and taken a fairly expansive view.

Way back in 2008, for example, the Supreme Court determined in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. that the CFEPA requires an employer to engage in the interactive process with employees and provide reasonable accommodations if necessary even though no such requirements are expressly included in the CFEPA.

For employers in Connecticut, the case shouldn’t result in dramatic changes to policy because most employers simply follow the ADA procedure — whether or not it applies to them. After this decision, it’s pretty clear that those procedures will apply in a similar fashion under state law tool.

(Disclosure: Dan Schwartz represented an individual defendant in this matter at the lower courts and will refrain from direct comment on this matter.