Last week I talked about the new state law regarding pregnancy discrimination that is going into effect on October 1, 2017.  In that post, I mentioned a new notice that was required to comply with the law.

Although there is no set form that is required to be used, the Connecticut Department of Labor has created one that is available for employers to use that will comply with the state law.  It is free to download here.  

Because the content is useful, I’m using it down below so that employers can cut and paste it into a handbook or into a notice to be given to employee upon starting work too.  One can quibble with some of the word phrasings that are used, but overall — and stating the obvious — if you use this, you’ll be in compliance according to the state.

Covered Employers

Each employer with more than 3 employees must comply with these anti-discrimination and reasonable accommodation laws related to an employee or job applicant’s pregnancy, childbirth or related conditions, including lactation.

Prohibition of Discrimination

No employer may discriminate against an employee or job applicant because of her pregnancy, childbirth or other related conditions (e.g., breastfeeding or expressing milk at work).

Prohibited discriminatory conduct includes:

  • Terminating employment because of pregnancy, childbirth or related condition
  • Denying reasonable leave of absence for disability due to pregnancy (e.g., doctor prescribed bed rest during 6-8 week recovery period after birth)*
  • Denying disability or leave benefits accrued under plans maintained by the employer
  • Failing to reinstate employee to original job or equivalent position after leave
  • Limiting, segregating or classifying the employee in a way that would deprive her of employment opportunities
  • Discriminating against her in the terms or conditions of employment

    *Note: There is no requirement that the employee be employed for a certain length of time prior to being granted job protected leave of absence under this law.

Reasonable Accommodation

An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to an Employee or job applicant due to her pregnancy, childbirth or needing to breastfeed or express milk at work.

Reasonable accommodations include, but are not limited to:

  • Being permitted to sit while working
  • More frequent or longer breaks
  • Periodic rest
  • Assistance with manual labor
  • Job restructuring
  • Light duty assignments
  • Modified work schedules
  • Temporary transfers to less strenuous or less hazardous work
  • Time off to recover from childbirth (prescribed by a Doctor, typically 6-8 weeks)
  • Break time and appropriate facilities (not a bathroom) for expressing milk

Denial of Reasonable Accommodation

No employer may discriminate against employee or job applicant by denying a reasonable accommodation due to pregnancy.

Prohibited discriminatory conduct includes:

  • Failing to make reasonable accommodation (and is not an undue hardship)**
  • Denying job opportunities to employee or job applicant because of request for reasonable accommodation
  • Forcing employee or job applicant to accept a reasonable accommodation when she has no known limitation related to pregnancy or the accommodation is not required to perform the essential duties of job
  • Requiring employee to take a leave of absence where a reasonable accommodation could have been made instead
    ** Note: To demonstrate an undue hardship, the employer must show that the accommodation would require a significant difficulty or expense in light of its circumstances.

Prohibition of Retaliation

Employers are prohibited from retaliating against an employee because of a request for reasonable accommodation.

Notice Requirements

Employers must post and provide this notice to all existing employees by January 28,2018; to an existing employee within 10 days after she notifies the employer of her pregnancy or related conditions; and to new employees upon commencing employment.

Complaint Process

CHRO:

Any employee aggrieved by a violation of these statutes may file a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). Complainants have 180 days from the date of the alleged act of discrimination, or from the time that you reasonably became aware of the discrimination, in which to file a complaint. It is illegal for anyone to retaliate against you for filing a complaint. CHRO main number: 860-541-3400 CHRO website: www.ct.gov/chro/site/default.asp CHRO link “How to File a Discrimination Complaint”: http://www.ct.gov/chro/taxonomy/v4_taxonomy.asp? DLN=45570&chroNav=|45570|

DOL:

Additionally, women who are denied the right to breastfeed or express milk at work, or are discriminated or retaliated against for doing so, may also file a complaint with the Connecticut Department of Labor (DOL). DOL phone number: 860-263-6791 DOL complaint form: For English: http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/wgwkstnd/forms/DOL-80%20fillable.doc For Spanish: http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/wgwkstnd/forms/DOL-80S%20fillable-Spa.doc

For those unfamiliar with the way a lot of Connecticut laws get implemented, October 1st could seem like just another day.  (Though for my kids, they would be impressed that it was a different October 1st in 1982 that EPCOT opened at Disney World.)

But a lot of bills that are passed by the Connecticut General Assembly go into effect on October 1st each year. This year is no exception.

For employers, the biggest of these bills is the new law concerning “Pregnant Women in the Workplace”.  I’ve previously recapped the law for pregnant employees in a prior post way back in May, but because we’re getting close to implementation, it’s time for a little refresher.

Existing law makes it a discriminatory practice to:

  • To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy;
  • to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy;
  • to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer;
  • to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.

Those rules remain unchanged. But the new law revises some other provisions and adds more to the protections. Effective October 1st, it will now also be unlawful to:

  • Limit, segregate or classify the pregnant employee in a way that would deprive her of employment opportunities due to her pregnancy;
  • Discriminate against an employee or job applicant on the basis of her pregnancy in the terms or conditions of her employment;
  • Fail or refuse to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee or job applicant due to her pregnancy, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship;
  • Deny employment opportunities to an employee or job applicant if the denial is due to the request for a reasonable accommodation due to her pregnancy;
  • Force an employee or job applicant affected by pregnancy to accept a reasonable accommodation if she (i) does not have known limitation related to her pregnancy, or (ii) does not require a reasonable accommodation to perform the essential duties related to her employment;
  • Require an employee to take a leave of absence if a reasonable accommodation can be provided in lieu of the leave; and
  • Retaliate against an employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment based upon the employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation.

The changes don’t stop there. The new law also explains that the word “pregnancy” will also include “pregnancy, childbirth or a related condition, including but not limited to, lactation”.  It also expands the definition of “reasonable accommodation ” and “undue hardship”.

  • “Reasonable Accommodation” means, but is not limited to, being permitted to sit while working, more frequent or longer breaks, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring, light duty assignment, modified work schedules, temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work, time off to recover from childbirth or break time and appropriate facilities for expressing breast milk; and
  • “Undue Hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as (A) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (B) the overall financial resources of the employer; (C) the overall size of the business of the employer with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities; and (D) the effect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of the accommodation upon the operation of the employer.

Continue Reading Two Weeks Until New Protections for Pregnant Employees Become Effective

capitoldas2Well, the Connecticut General Assembly ended earlier this week and, as predicted, it ended with a whimper and not a bang.  Many employment law proposals failed to receive votes, including those on minimum wage and Paid FMLA, leaving many employers (and the CBIA) breathing a bit of a sigh of relief.

I’ve previously recapped most of the bills here and here, so I’m only going to recap the session here in the interests of time.

  • The Governor is expected to sign a bill expanding the requirements for employers to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant employees. Again, I’ve recapped the measure here but this is probably the most significant bill to come out of the session regarding employers.
  • There will be no minimum wage hike and the introduction of Paid FMLA failed to get enough votes this term.  There is little doubt that the split in the Senate along party lines slowed momentum down for what was going to be the Democrat party’s signature achievement this session.
  • Also not getting votes this session was a bill that would have prohibited many employers from running credit checks on prospective employees and a bill that would required employers to give advance notice to employees about their work shifts.
  • Another bill that would change whistleblower protections in Connecticut also failed to clear the House.

Some of the other technical changes, to workers compensation or unemployment compensation, offer up a mixed bag. I’ve covered them in a prior post.

A special session is still on the way and it’s possible that some measures will get plopped into an “implementer” bill for the budget like it did a few years ago.  But my gut tells me that the budget is unlike to be used this way given the significant financial issues in play.  Nonetheless, employers should continue to watch for any developments in this area until the special session is closed.

GA2Today is the last day of the Connecticut General Assembly regular session.  So it’s a good time to take a look at some of the bills pending or passed.  Strangely, things seem pretty quiet on the employment law front.  But after the dust settles, I’ll have another update. Here is where we stand as of early this morning (Wednesday).

  • Last night, the Senate approved of the measure (House Bill 6668) expanding protections in the workplace for workers who are pregnant.  It was previously passed by the House.   I’ve covered the bill in depth before but it now goes on to the Governor for his signature.  The bill, if signed, would become effective October 1, 2017.
  • The House also passed a measure last night (H.B. 6907) that exempts certain professional drivers from coverage under the state’s unemployment law.. The exemption applies to drivers under a contract with another party if the driver meets certain conditions. The measure moves to the Senate but given the backlog of bills today, final passage is definitely unclear.
  • The Senate last night passed a measure (H.B. 7132) that streamlines procedures for filing workers compensation claims.  Currently, the law generally requires private-sector employees seeking workers’ compensation benefits to submit a written notice of claim for compensation to either a workers’ compensation commissioner or their employer’s last known residence or place of business. This bill requires private-sector employees who mail the notice to their employer to do so by certified mail. It also allows employers, except the state and municipalities, to post a copy of where employees must send the notice (presumably a specific address). The posting must be in a workplace location where other labor law posters required by the labor department are prominently displayed.  Under the bill, employers who opt to post such an address must also forward it to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, which must post the address on its website. Employers are responsible for verifying that the information posted at the workplace location is consistent with the information posted on the commission’s website.By law, within 28 days after receiving an employee’s written notice of claim, an employer must either (1) file a notice contesting liability with the compensation commissioner or (2) begin paying workers’ compensation benefits to the injured employee (and retain the ability to contest the claim for up to a year). Employers who do neither of these within 28 days of receiving the notice are conclusively presumed to have accepted the claim’s compensability. Under the bill, if an employer posts an address where employees must send a notice of claim, the countdown to the 28-day deadline begins on the date that the employer receives the notice at the posted address.The bill now moves to the Governor for his review and approval.
  • The General Assembly is also continuing to review a possible Paid Family and Medical Leave insurance scheme.  This bill (S.B. 1) is definitely one to watch over the next day and over any special session as well.
  • Senate Bill 929 would expand whistleblower protections under 31-51m. It has passed the Senate and is awaiting a vote in the House.  Existing law prohibits employers from discharging, disciplining, or otherwise penalizing an employee for certain whistleblowing activities, including reporting suspected illegal conduct to a public body.  This bill additionally prohibits employers from taking such actions against an employee for objecting or refusing to participate in an activity that the employee reasonably believes is illegal. Specifically, it applies to such beliefs about violations or suspected violations of state or federal laws or regulations, municipal ordinances or regulations, or court orders. The bill also (1) extends the time an employee has to file such a lawsuit and (2) adds to the possible remedies available to employees, including punitive damages in certain circumstances.

That seems to be it so far. A lot can change though today and employers should continue to be mindful of the shifting landscape. Even bills that appear “mostly dead” sometimes come back to life at the end — and particularly in special session as well. So stay tuned.

pregnancy1On Tuesday, May 23rd, the Connecticut House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a measure that would greatly expand the already broad anti-discrimination provision that exist under Connecticut law.  The bill, House Bill 6668, would make several substantive changes to the protections including defining what is a “reasonable accommodation” instead of leaving that determination open.

I’ve previously written extensively about the state laws covering pregnant employees before (here and here for example) so I encourage you to familiarize yourself with the current law so you can fully understand the contemplated change. But I’ll try to break it down here.

Existing law makes it a discriminatory practice to:

  • To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy;
  • to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy;
  • to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer;
  • to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.

Those provisions would remain unchanged under the bill.

Existing law also makes it a discriminatory practice to:

  • fail or refuse to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the position held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus;
  • fail or refuse to inform the pregnant employee that a transfer pursuant to subparagraph (E) of this subdivision may be appealed under the provisions of this chapter; or
  • fail or refuse to inform employees of the employer, by any reasonable means, that they must give written notice of their pregnancy in order to be eligible for transfer to a temporary position; 

The bill would delete those three rules and instead expand existing law to make it a discriminatory practice to:

  • limit, segregate or classify the employee in a way that would deprive her of employment opportunities due to her pregnancy;
  • discriminate against an employee or person seeking employment on the basis of her pregnancy in the terms or conditions of her employment;
  • fail or refuse to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee or person seeking employment due to her pregnancy, unless the employer can demonstrate that such accommodation would impose an undue hardship on such employer;
  • deny employment opportunities to an employee or person seeking employment if such denial is due to the employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation due to her pregnancy;
  • force an employee or person seeking employment affected by pregnancy to accept a reasonable accommodation if such employee or person seeking employment (i) does not have a known limitation related to her pregnancy, or (ii) does not require a reasonable accommodation to perform the essential duties related to her employment;
  • require an employee to take a leave of absence if a reasonable accommodation can be provided in lieu of such leave; and
  • retaliate against an employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment based upon such employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation.

The changes don’t end there.  The bill creates definitions now for “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”.

  • Under the bill, “Reasonable accommodation” means, “but shall not be limited to, being permitted to sit while working, more frequent or longer breaks, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring, light duty assignments, modified work schedules, temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work, time off to recover from childbirth or break time and appropriate facilities for expressing breast milk.”
  • And under the bill, “Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as (A) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (B) the overall financial resources of the employer; (C) the overall size of the business of the employer with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities; and (D) the effect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the employer.

Contrast that with the ADA’s definition of those terms. If passed, the confusion for employers in interpreting these phrases are going to be plentiful.  The ADA, for example, does not define it so precisely in the law and leaves it to regulations to provide further guidance.  The undue hardship definition tracks closer but still differs:

The term “reasonable accommodation” may include (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-­time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

A) In general. – The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).

(B) Factors to be considered. – In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include – (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity

You will now have the same words mean different things.

Two other notes: First, the bill creates a broad definition of “pregnancy” by not just including the pregnancy and childbirth but also any “related condition, including, but not limited to, lactation”.   Contrast this with the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act which defines pregnancy to just related medical conditions.

And second, the bill would create a new poster regarding pregnancy discrimination that employers would need to add to their facilities.

The CBIA initially expressed concern about this bill increasing the number of lawsuits and suggesting that “we should consider whether adequate enforcement of existing law is better than making businesses risk endlessly litigating what ‘could have been provided’ to employees in the past.”

For employers, this is a bill that warrants close attention; these have the potential to bring the most significant changes to this area of law in well over a decade.

U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court decided one of the most anticipated cases in the court’s docket this year — at least for employment lawyers — in Young v. UPS.  There’s been lots of bytes uploaded talking about the case from a federal level.  Much of it is straightforward — in the sense that everyone is trying to figure out how the court’s decision will work in practice.

The crux of the Court’s decision is that pregnancy discrimination cases will now be analyzed using a familiar three-part test that the court uses in other discrimination cases. (It’s called the McDonnell-Douglas test and I’ve talked about it on the blog before.)  From an employer perspective, that’s kind of boring.

As Walter Olsen commented at Cato:

Few non-lawyers are likely to stick around for its dry details, in which Justice Stephen Breyer laid out a balancing test mushy enough in its liberalism to win over Chief Justice Roberts and even Justice Alito. (Readers interested in such matters as McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting and the selection of similarly situated co-worker “comparators” should follow up at the specialty employment-law blogs.) The practical impact of the case is also somewhat limited by Congress’s having further liberalized pregnancy accommodation law in plaintiffs’ favor after the events being sued over.

In coming to its conclusion, the majority in Young rejected each of the arguments raised by the employee, the employer and the EEOC.  You don’t see that happen all that much in discrimination cases.

And as Jeff Nowak pointed out on the FMLA Insights blog, all the court really did was create the “potential for pregnant employees to secure workplace accommodations by endorsing a balancing test to determine under what circumstances a pregnant employee can prevail on a failure to provide workplace accommodations.”

What’s the problem with this approach? Jon Hyman at Ohio Employer’s Law Blog says Justice Scalia pinpoints it. “By permitting a pregnant worker to establish pretext by demonstrating a disadvantage presented by the application of a facially neutral work rule, the majority’s opinion allows one to establish intentional disparate treatment by demonstrating a disparate impact.”

Of course, most employers will probably never get there because employers will end up accommodating pregnant employees in many instances.

What does this mean for Connecticut employers? Well, as I’ve talked about earlier this month, Connecticut employers have to worry first about the state anti-discrimination laws which are broader than the federal ones.

Connecticut law for example may require an employer to transfer a pregnant employee to a temporary position if she reasonably believes her current position may cause harm to her or her fetus.

So, for employers, the notion that you may have to provide some type of accommodation to your pregnant employees should not be a new concept. What exactly that accommodation may (or may not) be will depend on several factors including how you treat other employees.  Consistency in your approach remains key.  Being considerate and mindful of your obligations will go a long way to reducing your legal risks.

 

Ms. Lora Wagner -- see below
Ms. Lora Wagner — see below

So, in yesterday’s post, I alerted you to a portion of the state’s pregnancy discrimination law that you may not have been aware of, namely Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(a)(7)(E).  If you haven’t read it yet, I’d suggest you do so for background for today’s post.

But after yesterday’s post, you may be wondering, is this a theoretical issue? In other words, have their been any lawsuits that employers should perk up their ears to?

As it turns out, yes.

One such case (Fenn Mfg. v. CHRO) began in 1983, when an pregnant employee complained to the CHRO that her employer, Fenn Manufacturing, had violated her rights under Section 46a-60(a)(7)(E) by refusing to permit her to work outside her normal work area whenever a co-worker at a nearby work station spray painted aircraft housings with an aerosolized paint primer containing aromatic hydrocarbons. Claiming that she had suffered ill effects when the primer was first used in her area, and that her doctor had later instructed her to avoid all exposure to aerosols and hydrocarbons during pregnancy, the pregnant employee insisted that she had come “reasonably[to] believe[ ] that continued employment in [her current]position m[ight] cause injury to [herself] or [her] fetus.‘

On that basis she contended that upon informing Fenn in writing of her belief and of the basis therefor, she became entitled under Section 46a-60(a)(7)(E) to have Fenn ‘make areasonable effort to transfer [her] to any suitable temporary position which may [then have] be [en] available‘ for her.

Claiming that at least one such ‘suitable temporary position‘was indeed ‘available‘ for her — that being a modified version of her existing position in which, during the first part of her pregnancy, Fenn had admittedly allowed her to work outside her normal work area during spray painting — the employee argued that Fenn had violated Section 46a-60(a)(7)(E) by refusing to allow her to work in that or some other suitable temporary position until the birth of her baby. As a result of Fenn’s refusal to make this accommodation, she argued, it should be required to compensate her for the wages she lost and the emotional distress she suffered when, as a result of that refusal, she was forced to leave her job to protect the health of her unborn child.

The CHRO sided with the pregnant employee and Fenn appealed. The case went all the way to the Connecticut Supreme Court on the issue of emotional distress damages, but as to the underlying discrimination claim, it was upheld without comment.  Indeed, it’s the lower court’s decision that is instructive.

The court addressed what “reasonable belief” in injury means.

The text of Section 46a-60(a)(7)(E) gives much useful guidance as to what the legislature intended when it conditioned the availability of the statute’s transfer remedy on a pregnant employee’s “reasonabl[e] belie[f]” that continued employment in her current position may cause injury to herself or her fetus. Of special note in this regard are three distinct features of the statute’s triggering mechanism.

The first of these is the use of the term “belief” to describe the measure of conviction which the employee must have as to the existence of a workplace danger before she can invoke the statute’s protections. A “belief” that one faces a particular danger is clearly different from “knowledge” that such a danger exists. Whereas “knowledge,” in common parlance, is a subjective state of certitude as to a fact that is demonstrably true, “belief” is but a firm commitment to or acceptance of the truth of a given proposition, with or without the corresponding ability to prove by any standard that it is true. Though a person cannot “know” what he doubts or cannot prove, he can readily “believe” it, notwithstanding his uncertainties. Therefore, by expressly providing that an employer’s obligation to accommodate an employee under this statute is triggered by the employee’s reasonable “belief” that continued employment in her current position may cause injury to herself or her fetus, the legislature must be found to have intended that pregnant employees should be entitled the statute’s protections even when they cannot prove, by objective, scientific evidence or otherwise, that the dangers they seek to avoid are real and substantial.

In other words, this is a much lower standard for a pregnant employee to meet.

Continue Reading Connecticut Law May Force Employer to Transfer Pregnant Employee

pregnancy1With all the talk about the Supreme Court deciding a pregnancy discrimination case this term and what it means for federal law, there is a separate Connecticut law on the subject — a portion of which you are probably unfamiliar with.

Yes, you probably know that if you’re an employer with three or more employees, you can’t fire an employee because of her pregnancy or even refuse to grant that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy.

You may even know that you have to reinstate an employee to her original job or an equivalent position unless the circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.

But buried deep in a paragraph of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(a)(7) are these clauses which makes it illegal to:

  • (E) to fail or refuse to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the position held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus;
  • (F) to fail or refuse to inform the pregnant employee that a transfer pursuant to subparagraph (E) of this subdivision may be appealed under the provisions of this chapter; or
  • (G) to fail or refuse to inform employees of the employer, by any reasonable means, that they must give written notice of their pregnancy in order to be eligible for transfer to a temporary position.

The last two of these provisions are fairly straightforward and requires the employer to provide notice in some instances.

But it’s the (E) provision that is the trickiest.  It requires an employer to make a “reasonable” effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any “suitable” temporary position which “may” be available where the employee gives written notice and either her employer or she “reasonably believes” that the current position “may” cause injury to the employee or fetus.

If you haven’t noticed, that’s a lot of “may”s and “reasonably”s.  And it creates a great deal of uncertainty.

Suppose a pregnant employee works at an amusement park and the park just had an limited outbreak of measles.  She works as a cashier with lots of interaction with the public.  The employee asks to be transferred to a “back office” position on a temporary basis because she believes that — even though she has the vaccine — working as a cashier may expose her and her fetus to contact with measles. And besides, no vaccine is fool proof.  She even has her doctor write up that the employee should avoid extensive contact with members of the public while pregnant due to the measles outbreak.

What’s the employer to do?

So, looking at the statute, note that it is the employee’s “reasonable belief” of possibly injury to her or her fetus that dictates what needs to occur.  How is that determination made? What standards should apply”? Is the CDC’s website on the subject enough?

And does an employer have to create a temporary position? What is “suitable” in these circumstances.

Lest you think this is a mere hypothetical, a significant case arose under this statute over 20 years ago — Fenn Mfg. v. CHRO. And earlier this year, a federal court looked at this same statute.  We’ll talk about that in a followup post.

 

Reading the Tea Leaves

Every year, I break out a crystal ball, or a magic 8-ball, or some tea leaves, and make some pronouncement about what will happen in the upcoming year.

It’s sort of a no-lose proposition. If I’m right, well, then I pat myself on the back. If I’m wrong, well, it’s just an educated guess.

So, continuing my series of outlook posts, here are three bold predictions on what we could see in the area of employment law on a national basis. In a post next week, I’ll look at Connecticut and make three more “bold” predictions.

1. A Battle Royale Over the NLRB: A new Republican-controlled Congress + a reinvigorated NLRB spells trouble.  We’ve already seen in the closing weeks of 2014 a renewed sense of vigor at the NLRB. It has taken aggressive stances in several cases and has now finalized “quickie” election rules that will disrupt the settled way that such elections have been held for years.  The Republicans who now control Congress will no doubt attempt to push back at such actions, but with President Obama wielding a veto pen, we’re unlikely to see such actions. Instead, look for lawsuits to be the continued mechanism by business interests to try to halt what they see as NLRB overreach.

2. The Supreme Court’s Makes No One Happy: The highest court has taken some interesting employment law cases over the years.  In Young v. UPS, I predict the court will punt on the issue of the extent of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, deferring to the United States’ brief recommending the same thing.  In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, my sense is that the Court will find that actual knowledge of an employee’s religion is needed in order to find discrimination. (Argument set for February 25, 2015.) In Mach Mining v. EEOC, the Court will agree with the lower courts that have looked at the issue and find that the EEOC’s duty to conciliate before filing a charge cannot be the subject of an affirmative defense.  (That case is set for oral argument on January 13, 2015.)

3. Lots of New Regulations: There are a number of items that the EEOC and Department of Labor have on their regulatory agenda. Among the new regulations that are likely to come down the pike in 2015 are revisions to the “white collar” exemption for overtime purposes and guidance on “wellness plans”.

Bonus prediction: If I’m going to make one crazy prediction, here it is: Perhaps we will see consideration of the Employment Nondiscrimination Act as a way for Republicans to show that they can govern with their majorities in Congress.  Yes, I recognize this is a stretch but with both President Obama and Republican leaders talking about taking bold steps over Obama’s last two years, could we see a breakthrough on a compromise for this bill? Stranger things have happened.

Will these come true? Stay tuned.

Last week, my colleagues Peter Murphy and Harrison Smith, offered to write about the latest developments in the law regarding pregnancy.  The post was scheduled to come out today, when, much to our surprise, the EEOC yesterday afternoon released long-awaited guidance on the subject.

So much for that post!

After a quick rewrite last night, here’s the very latest that includes both my comments and additional sourcing from Peter & Harrison….

Just a few short weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that next term it will once again tackle an issue that raises strong feelings in many women (and men)–how pregnant women are treated in the workplace in comparison to non-pregnant employees. 

As anyone interested in employment law knows, both Congress and the EEOC have focused extensively in recent years on getting employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees.  Although what constitutes a reasonable accommodation remains a difficult determination in certain circumstances, the need to engage in an interactive dialogue with disabled employees over accommodations now is well established. 

What to do with pregnant employees under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, however, has been less clear.  The EEOC yesterday chimed in with new guidance on the subject.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. First, the background.

The Federal Courts of Appeals are split on whether, and in what situations, an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant, disabled employees with work limitations must also provide work accommodations to  pregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work” as the non-pregnant employees.  

In the case coming to the Supreme Court, Young v. United Parcel Service, the trial court and the Fourth Circuit held that the PDA does not require employers to provide accommodations to pregnant employees.  

The Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits agree with the Fourth Circuit, while other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, hold otherwise.

Since 2012, the EEOC has been kicking around the subject of revising its guidelines on the subject.  By a 3-2 vote, the EEOC decided that it could not wait until the Supreme Court gave birth to a clarifying decision, and so yesterday the EEOC issued its final pregnancy discrimination guidelines. Continue Reading EEOC Declines a “Pregnant” Pause; New Guidance Awaits Supreme Court Decision