"Me Too" Evidence - A Thorough Review of the Supreme Court's Decision in Sprint/United v. Mendelsohn

Paul Secunda over at the Workplace Prof blog has alerted me to a great discussion that is ongoing on various blogs and law reviews about the Supreme Court's decision in Sprint/United v. Mendelsohn.  (My earlier coverage of the case from February 2008 can be found here.) 

In particular, you can read Paul's review of whether the Supreme Court's decision was the "right" one and its impact on other discrimination cases. For a starting point, check out this post at the Adjunct Prof blog here. As that blog notes: "Scholars and attorneys interested in employment discrimination may find our Colloquy important to review."

I agree.

Mandatory Retirement Policies at Law Firms - The Trend in Connecticut

In representing clients, I have, on occasion, had a client make a honest inquiry about the federal laws regarding age discrimination. Their question is something along the lines of: If discriminating against age is against the law, why can law firms insist on mandatory retirement policies?

The simple response is that partners at law firms have, historically, been viewed as owners/employers, rather than employees. But that view has been challenged in recent years by the EEOC's lawsuit against Sidley Austin LLP -- a case that settled in October 2007 for $27.5 million.  But it's always struck me how this rule is perceived as creating two different sets of rules -- one for lawyers and one for everyone else.

Business New Haven, a niche business publication in Connecticut (which is republished on Conntact.com), has an article in this week's issue about this very topic and how law firms in Connecticut are addressing this situation:

Connecticut law firms are practicing what the American Bar Association (ABA) has been preaching since last summer about retirement rules for partners.

And many have been doing it far longer than that, according to area attorneys.

In August 2007, the ABA's House of Delegates, its policy-making body, approved a resolution encouraging law firms to jettison mandatory age-based retirement policies for partners and "instead evaluate senior partners individually in accordance with their attributes and interests and the firm's generally accepted performance criteria."

The resolution deemed mandatory retirement policies "inconsistent with accepted employment practices, against public policy and not in the best interest of either law firms or their clients.

I spoke to the reporter in the case as part of her research into the subject a few weeks ago.  In the article, I discuss the effect that the ABA policy will have on mandatory retirement practices in general.

As I said there, I don't expect the ABA resolution to have any dramatic impact on law firms immediately. But the trend over the years has been to discourage such policies and focus instead on performance.  As society's concept of what is "old" continues to change, so too do law firm's concepts of what they need to do for succession planning and overall performance. 

Supreme Court Decides Age Discrimination Case Defining What is a "Charge"! (Yawn.)

Attorneys can go months -- if not years -- without Supreme Court guidance on employment law issues. But today, the Supreme Court issued its second employment-law related decision in as many days.

However, for the second day in a row, the Supreme Court issued a decision that, at the end of the day, isn't really about employment law at all, but something else. In today's opinion, the Supreme Court really examined what type of deference  should be afforded to the EEOC in construing the federal statutes about what is a "charge" of discrimination under ADEA (the federal age discrimination statute).

In Federal Express v. Holwecki, the Supreme Court -- by a 7-2 margin -- decided the issue is what constitutes a "charge" of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act before plaintiff can institute a private lawsuit. Here, the Court found that the EEOC had some regulations and internal directives on the subject and is therefore entitled to some "measure of respect" as to what constitutes a charge.  It also provided that the EEOC acted reasonably in interpreting an intake questionnaire as a "charge".  

Workplace Prof has his early thoughts too and a general discussion of the case.

The case's outcome is good on two levels for employment discrimination plaintiffs. First, it allows these Fed Ex plaintiffs to get to the substance of their complaint and second, it will force the EEOC to come out with clear regulations on what counts as a "charge" in the future so the parties are able to structure their future conduct accordingly and not be prejudiced by a shifting rules.

And finally, I have to say that this well-reasoned majority opinion restores my faith somewhat that this court is not completely in the bag for employer interests. Not completely.

A few months ago, in a post entitled "'Supreme Court to Decide Age Discrimination!'" Is This Important To Employers in Connecticut",  I indicated that for employers in Connecticut, this case would not amount to much.  And since its not often an attorney gets to say, "I told you so", I'll just let my prior post speak for itself.

[For] employers and HR professionals, there is a remaining question that has not yet been answered so far: "Should we worry about this employment law case?" The answer is: Not that much.

For Title VII and ADA cases, this case will have no real impact. In those types of cases, an employee who wants to sue in federal court must first get a right to sue letter from the EEOC. For those cases, an employee's charge must be processed in a meaningful fashion.

ADEA (age discrimination) plaintiffs do not face a similar hurdle; rather the charge must simply be filed and the employee must simply wait 60 days before filing a federal claim; no right to sue letter is needed. Thus, the concern expressed by FedEx and by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in their amicus brief, that employers may not receive the same type notice of ADEA claims, is certainly possible. In Holowecki, FedEx's problems were compounded by the EEOC's admitted failure to follow statutorily mandated procedures to notify the the employer of the complaint.

As a practical matter, nearly all of the ADEA claims filed, particularly in Connecticut, are handled in the normal course of business -- that is, that the employee files a discrimination charge, and the employer is notified of that charge. Even if the EEOC only fills out an intake questionnaire, the EEOC is mandated to followup on it typically.

Connecticut, which has a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC to process EEOC charges that are cross-filed in the state, goes one step further. The CHRO will send out notices to employers upon receipt and initial processing of an age discrimination suit. Thus, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that an employer in Connecticut will not get notice of the charge. Because virtually all discrimination charges are filed in the normal course of business, the situation that arises in Holowecki is simply not likely to repeat itself with any frequency, particularly within Connecticut.

For that reason, a Supreme Court's decision in Holowecki -- while perhaps interesting in a "technical" way -- is not likely to have any significant impact for employers in Connecticut. Unless the Supreme Court deviates from its typical path and sets forth new criteria for handling such claims, the case ultimately may be newsworthy only to employment law bloggers such as myself.

And in fact, the Supreme Court did not deviate from its expected path.  The court found that although the employer had good reason to complain about the way the EEOC treated the matter, it was not entitled to a decision in its favor. Ultimately, the Supreme Court warned, the EEOC and other agencies are responsible for cleaning up their regulations and practices:

Here, because the agency failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process.

The employer’s interests, in particular, were given short shrift, for it was not notified of respondent’s complaint until she filed suit. The court that hears the merits of this litigation can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. True, that remedy would be imperfect.  Once the adversary process has begun a dispute may be in a more rigid cast than if conciliation had been attempted at the outset.

This result is unfortunate, but, at least in this case, unavoidable. While courts will use their powers to fashion the best relief possible in situations like this one, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the agency.

Justice Thomas - fresh off of being in the majority in yesterday's decision -- writes a dissent that basically mocks the majority for its failure to outline any real standards in the case:

Today’s decision does nothing— absolutely nothing—to solve the problem that under the EEOC’s current processes no one can tell, ex ante, whether a particular filing is or is not a charge. Given the Court’s utterly vague criteria, whatever the agency later decides to regard as a charge is a charge—and the statutorily required notice to the employer and conciliation process will be evaded in the future as it has been in this case. The Court’s failure to apply a clear and sensible rule renders its decision of little use in future cases to complainants, employers, or the agency.

"Me, too!" U.S. Supreme Court Punts on Evidence of "Other" Discrimination

After a long day of taking depositions on Tuesday, there's nothing like coming back to my computer with dozens of e-mail messages and hundreds of posts to read on the RSS feeds.  And, when I saw that the U.S. Supreme Court decided an employment law case, my brain got excited for a brief moment (and frustrated that I spent a day sitting in a conference room).

After all, when "The Nine" (good book by the way) speak, SURELY they must have something important to say. 

But alas, the decision issued on Tuesday by the Court is a let down. Don't get me wrong, I expected the results (though did not go into length about it as the Workplace Prof did), but I was hoping for something more dramatic than the nine-page, unanimous, color-by-numbers and connect-the-dots decision by Justice Thomas.

The SCOTUS Blog has, as usual, the most concise summary about the case, Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn.

[The Supreme Court] overturned a federal appeals court ruling on how courts are to treat ”me too” evidence — workplace discrimination testimony by workers other than the one raising a job bias claim.  In a unanimous decision, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court found the Tenth Circuit Court in error in deciding on its own, without remanding to a trial judge, that such evidence is admissible.

Federal rules, the Court said, “do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se inadmissible.” It is up to District Courts, in trying job bias cases (here, an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case), to sort out the fact-intensive nature of such evidence. “Whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case,” the opinion said.

Since other employment law bloggers have already dissected what's left of the decision, perhaps its best to let them start to summarize the case.  Here's the rundown:

  • Michael Fox at Jottings by an Employer's Lawyer calls it "[T]he equivalent to a judicial mulligan"
  • Law Memo says the case "was not so much an employment law case as it was an evidence case. It turned on the proper role of the trial courts versus the appellate courts in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence."
  • Michael Moore, at the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog indicates that the true issue that will be at the forefront of the practice is whether employees are "similarly situated" to the employee who has brought the suit.
  • Workplace Prof indicates that there is "dicta" language (which for non-lawyers out there means "non-binding") in the opinion that should be watched and calls the decision "a moral victory for ADEA plaintiffs."
  • Jon Hyman, at Ohio Employer's Law Blog, has another good analysis in which he states, "This decision makes a lot of sense. It skirts the ultimate issue of whether "me, too" evidence is admissible or inadmissible because that decision should be fought in the trial court, which is in the best position to examine the evidence and weigh its relevance and admissibility." 
  • The Laconic Law Blog also finds the Court's decision unsatisfying and says the "opinion leaves many questions about the admissibility of so-called “me-too” evidence unanswered."
  • Not to be outdone, John Phillips at The Word on Employment Law, stated that the case the Court "decided today was hyped, but the Court’s decision didn’t deliver on the hype. Of course, the Court wasn’t hyping it." John closes by hoping that "Maybe the next decision will bring more excitement with it."
  • Perhaps Will Schendel, of Alaska Employment Law Blog had it right when he didn't even waste time analyzing the case and said the equivalent of "ditto" to the analysis of the Workplace Prof. 
As you can see, lots of people posted on the case on Tuesday.

For employers, though, the question remains -- what's the practical takeaway from this decision?

In my view, nothing. The Supreme Court's decision, in essence, is just telling lower courts that sometimes evidence of discrimination of other employees is admissible. And sometimes it isn't.  For employers making employment law decisions, this case will have no effect on how it will treat its employees.  After all, employers don't go into a day thinking -- "hey, I'll treat Bob nice because if I don't, then Jim is going to use how I treated Bob as evidence in his own discrimination case".

The words of wisdom spouted by others remain true today: Treat employees fairly and it will nearly always reduce the risk of lawsuits and liability. 

What I'm Reading This Week -- "So Much to Say" About Employment Law and HR Developments

With iPods becoming ubiquitous, I'm sure I'm not the only one who feels like they are listening to more music in general.  A favorite song of mine is "So Much to Say" by the Dave Matthews Band song.  (Don't try reading too much into the lyricsPublic Domain -- there isn't much there.)  But this week, "So Much to Say" seems an appropriate label for all the great articles relating to labor & employment law.  There's "Too Much" to write about individually, but here are a few of the posts that warrant a mention for one reason or another.  

  • Kris Dunn, over at HR Capitalist, has a thought provoking post this morning about whether the paying of staff by Jay Leno is a good or bad thing for the union in the writers strike. The comments, including by yours truly, show that this is no ordinary strike. 
  • George Lenard, over at George's Employment Blawg, has a great post today about asking whether today's job applicants are dumber.  He reports that "A recent press release from Wonderlic, Inc., reporting on a new study of company data, says applicants today aren’t as smart (lower cognitive ability) as similarly-educated applicants of yesteryear."
  • Paul Secunda, at the Workplace Prof blog posted a thorough analysis of the transcript of the oral argument in the Supreme Court case yesterday (you can find the transcript here). In that ADEA case, one of the issues presented is whether a plaintiff-employee can present evidence of other employees who also claim that they were discriminated against.  It remains to be seen where this case will come out.

    Ultimately, Paul concludes:

I see this case coming out 5-4 in favor of Sprint. A majority opinion by Justice Scalia (joined by Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, and Roberts) saying that the district court should be deferred to in admitting evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Look for the court to also point out that allowing this evidence in would lead to mini-trials on other supervisor statements and so in most cases, this evidence is appropriately excludable under Rule 403. Justice Scalia may also try to get in that he thinks this case rises and falls on Rule 401, but I don't think he has a majority on that point.

"Supreme Court To Decide Age Discrimination Case!" - Is This Important to Employers in Connecticut?

Last week, lots of virtual ink was spilled on the U.S. Supreme Court's arguments in Federal Express v. Holowecki which has been labeled as a noteworthy age discrimination claim, following in the shoes of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ledbetter in the spring.  Several blogs have good summaries of what happened, including: LawMemo, Ohio Employer's Law Blog, and the New Jersey Employment Law Blog. 

What's the issue before the Supreme Court? The issue is what constitutes a "charge" of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act before plaintiff can institute a private lawsuit.   From the oral argument and the reports on the case, it appears likely that the court will find that the EEO's use of an intake questionnaire may be a "charge". 

All very well and good, but for employers and HR professionals, there is a remaining question that has not yet been answered so far: "Should we worry about this employment law case?" The answer is: Not that much.

For Title VII and ADA cases, this case will have no real impact. In those types of cases, an employee who wants to sue in federal court must first get a right to sue letter from the EEOC. For those cases, an employee's charge must be processed in a meaningful fashion.

ADEA (age discrimination) plaintiffs do not face a similar hurdle; rather the charge must simply be filed and the employee must simply wait 60 days before filing a federal claim; no right to sue letter is needed. Thus, the concern expressed by FedEx and by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in their amicus brief,  that employers may not receive the same type notice of ADEA claims, is certainly possible. In Holowecki, FedEx's problems were compounded by the EEOC's admitted failure to follow statutorily mandated procedures to notify the the employer of the complaint.  

As a practical matter, nearly all of the ADEA claims filed, particularly in Connecticut, are handled in the normal course of business -- that is, that the employee files a discrimination charge, and the employer is notified of that charge.  Even if the EEOC only fills out an intake questionnaire, the EEOC is mandated to followup on it typically. 

Connecticut, which has a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC to process EEOC charges that are cross-filed in the state, goes one step further. The CHRO will send out notices to employers upon receipt and initial processing of an age discrimination suit.  Thus, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that an employer in Connecticut will not get notice of the charge.  Because virtually all discrimination charges are filed in the normal course of business, the situation that arises in Holowecki is simply not likely to repeat itself with any frequency, particularly within Connecticut. 

For that reason, a Supreme Court's decision in Holowecki -- while perhaps interesting in a "technical" way -- is not likely to have any significant impact for employers in Connecticut.  Unless the Supreme Court deviates from its typical path and sets forth new criteria for handling such claims, the case ultimately may be newsworthy only to employment law bloggers such as myself.

CHRO Awards Police Officer over $100k in Age Discrimination Case; Follows "Cat's Paw" Theory

Only a handful of CHRO Human Rights Referee Decisions are issued each year -- a number that has seemed to slow to a trickle recently.   But this month, the CHRO issued a lengthy decision in an age discrimination case.  In that case, CHRO Referee concluded that the Town of Bloomfield, Connecticut discriminated against a police officer because of his age when it terminated him.   (The officer was later reinstated as a result of an arbitration so his damages have been limited.)

In CHRO ex. rel. Donald Rajtar v. Town of Bloomfield, the Town was ordered to pay over $100,000 in backpay, lost benefits and interest.  The facts of the case are detailed and too lengthy to summarize, but suffice to say that the police officer relied heavily on alleged ageist comments made by co-workers and non-decisionmakers and on the theory that the investigation and decision into whether his employment should be determinated was deficient. 

The Town had contended that it terminated the Complainant because of the way he conducted a criminal investigation.  The Town further argued that the Complainant was dishonest in his work product; the CHRO Referee discounted that saying that "The charge that the complainant had lied was never pursued with sufficient objectivity so as to allow it to be fairly established." 

Notably, the CHRO Referee doesn't dismiss the town's defense entirely but simply found that the town's explanation was far from bullet-proof (couldn't avoid the pun here).  

A review of [the] detailed written explanation of why [the decision-maker] ultimately concluded the complainant had lied reveals a “house of cards”, which could easily (although admittedly not with certainty) have been toppled if the complainant had been extended the degree of animus free evenhandedness the law requires.

It is easy to question now whether the Town's investigation into the Complainant before it terminated his employment was thorough. Certainly, in reading the opinion, it is clear that the town did more than a minimal investigation into such facts and from an outsider's perspective, you have to applaud an employer that takes steps to support their employment decision beforehand. 

However, the case reinforces the notion that in order for an employment decision to hold up -- you must be able to answer one question clearly: Was the employee treated fairly? The CHRO Referee here found "The complainant was entitled to more than a career ending 'surmise'"; it is not a stretch to say that he did not believe the decision was "fair" since there is nothing in the law that requires that something "more".  This may not necessarily be "right" (and it's probably not enough to appeal on) but appealling to a factfinder's sense of fairness, is always critical to litigation success. 

One other noteworthy aspect of the case is the CHRO Referee's decision to follow the "cat's paw" theory of discrimination.  What is this theory? In essence, a court will find an employer liable based on a subordinate’s discriminatory animus, even where the person who actually made the adverse employment decision admittedly harbored no discriminatory motive toward the impacted employee.  Here, the CHRO found that allegedly ageist comments and actions made by lower-level supervisors and co-workers "influenced" the actual decision-makers here.

The issue of the "cat's paw" theory's application was up for review by the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this year, but the case settled before the issue was ruled upon by the court.  Nevertheless, the theory has been previously supported by the Connecticut Appellate court five years ago in United Technologies v. CHRO (a case that has some parallels to this case).  Until the appellate courts see fit to revisit the issue, it is likely to remain the dominant theory in Connecticut state courts and at the CHRO. 

Court: "Stray" Remarks Do Not Exist in ADEA Cases, only "Probative" Remarks

Courtesy of Morgue File -  Public Domain"You can't teach a old dog new tricks."

In discrimination cases, analysis of whether a remark like this is probative has typically moved into whether the comment was a "stray" remark.  Indeed, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins case in 1989, in fact, talked about whether "stray remarks" could satisfy a plaintiff's burden to prove discrimination. 

A new District Court of Connecticut decision released this week -- taking the lead of some comments by the 2nd Circuit -- has now refused to categorize certain comments as "stray" or not .  Instead, the court has applied a four factor test from a Southern District of New York case that could set the tone for other District Court cases in Connecticut. 

In Koestner v. Derby Cellular Products,3:06-cv-00188 (VLB), the Plaintiff argued that his employment had been terminated because of his age.  Judge Vanessa Bryant, a relatively new appointee to the federal bench, held that the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to defeat the company's motion for summary judgment.
 
Key Facts: 

  • The Plaintiff alleged that the Company President stated during a managers’ meeting that the company was “getting killed on insurance premiums due to the average age of the company’s employees” and that the company “had to get younger.”
  • He also alleged that the company's CEO told him that the company “had to do something about” a 60-year-old employee in poor health. That employee and the Plaintiff were later terminated on the same date. 
  • Lastly, he alleged that when his supervisor terminated his employment, he told the Plaintiff that “someone more energetic” would be better suited for the job.
Court's Analysis Denying Summary Judgment:

The Court, in determining whether the Plaintiff was terminated because of his age, held that it "does not need to determine whether the remarks by [the executives] are 'stray.'" Instead, the Court said it would decide "whether the remarks are sufficiently probative of age discrimination such that the jury could reasonably find that the Plaintiff was terminated because of his age." 

The Court then went on to apply four factors to determine the probative nature of the comments:

  1. who made the remark, i.e., a decisionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker;
  2. when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue;
  3. the content of the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and
  4. the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decisionmaking process.
Ultimately, the court applied the four factors and found that the first two comments could be probative of age discrimination but that the "energetic" comment was not.  (Obviously, the court was not ruling on the underlying merits of the claim, only whether the case should proceed to trial.)

For employment lawyers in Connecticut, this decision provides a workable framework for analyzing such comments.  It is admittedly much easier to apply four factors than to determine, in the abstract, whether such comments are probative or not.  But whether this test will ultimately hold up on appeal remains unanswered for now.

At the same time, this decision further emphasizes the importance that alleged discriminatory remarks can have on a case. Here, the Plaintiff's evidence to defeat summary judgment on the ADEA claim rested solely on the alleged comments.  For employers, The case demonstrates that  what they say can have tremendous implications down the road, even where the comments may be otherwise innocuous.