Connecticut Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Daniel Schwartz : Stamford, Hartford New Haven, CT

A few weeks ago, I pondered the impact that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman would have on cases involving learning and mental disabilities. Turns out, I didn't need to wait long at all. A CHRO Hearing Officer has already used that decision to chime in and indicate that  must be accommodated.  (Big H/T: Overlawyered). 

In CHRO ex. rel. Lenotti v. City of Stamford, (download here) a firefighter claimed that the City's refusal to give him additional time on a promotional exam violated the state's disability discrimination laws.  The firefighter, who had Attention Deficit Order, claimed that state law required the the City' to provide him with a reasonable accommodation.  A CHRO Hearing Officer agreed.

The city argued that a fire captain, the position Lenotti sought, must be able to read and process information quickly at a fire scene. But the CHRO Hearing Office concluded that the city never supported its position and never showed that it would be a "direct threat" to public safety if he were promoted under such conditions.

The case is a long read but there are a few quick bullet points of note:

• Because Connecticut's definition of a mental disorder is anything listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, there was not a real dispute that the firefighter's ADD qualified as a "mental disorder".  Although some employers view such claims with proper skepticism, this decision demonstrates that broad application of state law to these types of claims.
  
• The Hearing Officer seemed troubled that although the City claimed it was "implicit" that a fire captain must be able to read quickly, that requirement was not in the written job description. Thus, a takeaway from the case is that employers should be sure their written job descriptions contain sufficient details and match what the requirements of the position really are.
  
• Lastly, the case reinforces what I said earlier: After the Curry case, we may start to see more and more disability discrimination cases being brought under state law. With the state laws being interpreted in a broad manner, like they are here, employers in the state ought to start paying attention.

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Reading the Connecticut Supreme Court case of Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. decided last week,  I'm struck by how many questions the decision seems to raise -- and how many are left unanswered. I've discussed the case and some questions it raises before, most recently here. 

The case appears to stand for the proposition that an employer must engage in an interactive process with a disabled employee who requests some type of reasonable accommodation.  But another question that arises is: What types of "disabilities" are within the scope of this reasonable accommodation duty under state law? 

The Americans with Disabilities Act has a plain definition of "disability" that reviews the person's condition in relation to a major life activity.  Connecticut's anti-discrimination scheme, however, is different.

In many ways, Connecticut's anti-discrimination provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(a)(1) is broader in scope because it includes "present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness." Broadening the scope even further are the definitions of these categories in Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-51.

So what answer does the Supreme Court say about what types of "disabilities" are covered? It appears to say: All of the above (with emphasis noted below):

Because the text and legislative history illustrate that the intent of the legislature is to stamp out discrimination on the basis of physical disability and a wide range of other disabilities (mental disability, learning disability, and mental retardation), we must not interpret the statute in a way that would thwart this purpose. ....

Accordingly, we adopt the commission’s time-tested interpretation construing § 46a-60 (a) (1) to require employers to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s
disability.

This leads to more issues.  For example, the definition of a "mental disability" in Connecticut is essentially anything that is defined as a disorder within the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual IV, which includes diagnoses such as "Pathological Gambling" and "Exhibitionism". 

Some strange questions then arise.  Do employers now need to accommodate "Pathological Gambling" because it falls within the definition of a "mental disability" and perhaps provide an employee with a "break" to play online poker or take a visit to Foxwoods?   Or even more bizarre, does an employer need to provide a "reasonable accommodation" to someone who suffers from Exhibitionism and what would that entail?

As for providing reasonable accommodations to people with "learning disabilities", suppose an employee suffers from dyslexia.  Suppose that this employee is computer programmer, but can't read all the instruction manuals. Must the employer provide an audio version of the same manuals as a "reasonable accommodation" or how about a person who must be available to read those manuals to them? How must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation for others who suffer from similar types of learning disabilities?

While the analysis of the Curry case thus far has noted that it now applies the reasonable accommodation provisions normally found in the ADA to small employers (who were not covered by the ADA),  there is a flip side too: Employers who were covered by the ADA, might need to contemplate reasonable accommodations to disabilities that are much broader than covered by the ADA. 

Is this settled? No.  And it may be that Superior Courts reviewing this case will take a narrow approach to the decision.

But after reading the Curry case over several times, I'm convinced that the importance of this case and its potential scope cannot be understated.   Absent some legislative intervention and oversight, this case has the potential to create lots of work for employment law attorneys in the years to come.

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