Connecticut Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Daniel Schwartz : Stamford, Hartford New Haven, CT

Last month, I addressed the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, which expanded state disability laws to match (or in some cases, exceed) the scope of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The employer has moved, on limited grounds, to have the court reconsider its decision.  You can download a copy of the motion here.  

One of the grounds raised by the employer is something that I touched on before  -- namely that the court is expanding the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to former employees who request reinstatement and an accommodation. 

The employer has also requested reconsideration on the grounds that the court's ruling could also be interpreted to require an employer to convert a temporary light duty position into a permanent one, contrary to the general rule cited by the court. Because the case's procedural status was that of a summary judgment, the employer also expressed its concern that the court's rulings could be seen as determinations of fact in case that still has issues of disputed facts.

The brief's relevant portion is as follows:

In this case this court has ruled, for the first time, that the disability provisions of General Statutes § 45a-60(a)(1) require an employer to make the same kind of reasonable accommodation required under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  However, in the course of applying this principle to the facts of this case, this court addressed issues other than the application of the reasonable accommodation requirement itself. In this regard, the opinion identifies two actions that “satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of initiating the interactive process.” 286 Conn. at 417.

The first is the plaintiff’s “affirmative request to continue working the warehouse night shift in March, 2001.” Id. The second is plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of April 19, 2001 requesting that the defendant “(1) reconsider its decision; (2) provide a cost-benefit analysis supporting its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and (3) continue to grant the plaintiff the accommodation of having another worker assist him when it became necessary to retrieve boxes that weighed more than the plaintiff’s lifting restrictions.” Id. 

However, as the opinion notes, the defendant did not contest the claim that the statute required it, prior to the defendant’s termination, to make some accommodation and to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine if a reasonable accommodation existed. Rather, the focus of the parties below was on the adequacy of the employer’s efforts at reasonable accommodation, not on whether the two actions cited by the court constituted new requests for accommodation requiring a new interactive process.  There are, at the very least, serious questions whether either of the actions cited by the court is sufficient to trigger this obligation.

It's too easy for some to state that all employers are the "evil empire" and that all arguments that they raise are frivolous.

But as I've noted before, the grounds the employer raises here are sensible ones.   The Court went beyond what it needed to to make its decision and, in doing so, created some rules that could have significant implications in all disability cases in Connecticut.

Here's hoping that the Connecticut Supreme Court takes the time to review  them; otherwise, there may be a lot of busy employment law lawyers later this year.

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A few weeks ago, I pondered the impact that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman would have on cases involving learning and mental disabilities. Turns out, I didn't need to wait long at all. A CHRO Hearing Officer has already used that decision to chime in and indicate that  must be accommodated.  (Big H/T: Overlawyered). 

In CHRO ex. rel. Lenotti v. City of Stamford, (download here) a firefighter claimed that the City's refusal to give him additional time on a promotional exam violated the state's disability discrimination laws.  The firefighter, who had Attention Deficit Order, claimed that state law required the the City' to provide him with a reasonable accommodation.  A CHRO Hearing Officer agreed.

The city argued that a fire captain, the position Lenotti sought, must be able to read and process information quickly at a fire scene. But the CHRO Hearing Office concluded that the city never supported its position and never showed that it would be a "direct threat" to public safety if he were promoted under such conditions.

The case is a long read but there are a few quick bullet points of note:

• Because Connecticut's definition of a mental disorder is anything listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, there was not a real dispute that the firefighter's ADD qualified as a "mental disorder".  Although some employers view such claims with proper skepticism, this decision demonstrates that broad application of state law to these types of claims.
  
• The Hearing Officer seemed troubled that although the City claimed it was "implicit" that a fire captain must be able to read quickly, that requirement was not in the written job description. Thus, a takeaway from the case is that employers should be sure their written job descriptions contain sufficient details and match what the requirements of the position really are.
  
• Lastly, the case reinforces what I said earlier: After the Curry case, we may start to see more and more disability discrimination cases being brought under state law. With the state laws being interpreted in a broad manner, like they are here, employers in the state ought to start paying attention.

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I've returned from vacation today with hundreds of e-mails to dig through and about 3000 posts in various RSS feeds.

But one e-mail I received relating to the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision earlier this month in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, bears some immediate discussion. The comments are from Attorney Richard Hayber, the attorney representing the employee in that matter.  He has authorized me to re-publish his comments in part here, which I'm pleased to do so and I thank Richard for taking the time to comment. 

[Y]our coverage of this case has failed to point out the most disturbing fact of the case. The employer had a policy of only permitting injured workers to return to work if they had been cleared to "full duty." When asked at a deposition how the company applied this policy, it stated that it would not return an employee to work even if the only restriction he had was to take a 60 second break during the day to stretch his back!!! The Supreme Court held this policy, which foreclosed an individualized analysis of each disabled worker's request for accommodation, to be illegal.

I greatly appreciate Richard's comments and as I've suggested before, readers should read the lengthy decision to get a full appreciation for the contested facts.  Because the case is at the summary judgment stage, however, many of the facts remain disputed.

In my defense, reading the decision again, I do not see the deposition referenced, nor do I believe that the Court placed a particular emphasis on the "full duty" clearance requirement.  In fairness to Richard, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in footnote 23, did say that the Court's newly imposed "interactive process" requirement  creates a parallel requirement that assessments of a disability be done on an individualized basis. 

A policy—whether express or by application—that eliminates the individualized assessment of each disabled employee for purposes of reasonable accommodations is for all the reasons articulated in this opinion necessarily illegal. ... Whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail after an individualized assessment will depend on the interactive reasonable accommodation process.

Ultimately, I agree with Richard that with the Connecticut Supreme Court's imposition of an interactive process for small employers will require those employers to conduct an individualized assessment of an employee's capabilities and abilities.  Because each case is unique and may also have some relationship to workers compensation injuries, employers may want to seek legal assistance in these types of determinations, at least until Connecticut law becomes more settled.

Richard also notes that "most superior court judges had already interpreted our Fair Employment Practices Act to require reasonable accommodations. Employers reading your Blog should not
be as alarmed as you would have them be."  A fair enough point, though there were hardly a significant number of cases in this area to begin with and I don't believe the law was as settled as Richard suggests.  In any event, I think the Curry decision's broad application to employment law warrants the concern that I have sounded.

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Reading the Connecticut Supreme Court case of Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. decided last week,  I'm struck by how many questions the decision seems to raise -- and how many are left unanswered. I've discussed the case and some questions it raises before, most recently here. 

The case appears to stand for the proposition that an employer must engage in an interactive process with a disabled employee who requests some type of reasonable accommodation.  But another question that arises is: What types of "disabilities" are within the scope of this reasonable accommodation duty under state law? 

The Americans with Disabilities Act has a plain definition of "disability" that reviews the person's condition in relation to a major life activity.  Connecticut's anti-discrimination scheme, however, is different.

In many ways, Connecticut's anti-discrimination provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(a)(1) is broader in scope because it includes "present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness." Broadening the scope even further are the definitions of these categories in Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-51.

So what answer does the Supreme Court say about what types of "disabilities" are covered? It appears to say: All of the above (with emphasis noted below):

Because the text and legislative history illustrate that the intent of the legislature is to stamp out discrimination on the basis of physical disability and a wide range of other disabilities (mental disability, learning disability, and mental retardation), we must not interpret the statute in a way that would thwart this purpose. ....

Accordingly, we adopt the commission’s time-tested interpretation construing § 46a-60 (a) (1) to require employers to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s
disability.

This leads to more issues.  For example, the definition of a "mental disability" in Connecticut is essentially anything that is defined as a disorder within the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual IV, which includes diagnoses such as "Pathological Gambling" and "Exhibitionism". 

Some strange questions then arise.  Do employers now need to accommodate "Pathological Gambling" because it falls within the definition of a "mental disability" and perhaps provide an employee with a "break" to play online poker or take a visit to Foxwoods?   Or even more bizarre, does an employer need to provide a "reasonable accommodation" to someone who suffers from Exhibitionism and what would that entail?

As for providing reasonable accommodations to people with "learning disabilities", suppose an employee suffers from dyslexia.  Suppose that this employee is computer programmer, but can't read all the instruction manuals. Must the employer provide an audio version of the same manuals as a "reasonable accommodation" or how about a person who must be available to read those manuals to them? How must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation for others who suffer from similar types of learning disabilities?

While the analysis of the Curry case thus far has noted that it now applies the reasonable accommodation provisions normally found in the ADA to small employers (who were not covered by the ADA),  there is a flip side too: Employers who were covered by the ADA, might need to contemplate reasonable accommodations to disabilities that are much broader than covered by the ADA. 

Is this settled? No.  And it may be that Superior Courts reviewing this case will take a narrow approach to the decision.

But after reading the Curry case over several times, I'm convinced that the importance of this case and its potential scope cannot be understated.   Absent some legislative intervention and oversight, this case has the potential to create lots of work for employment law attorneys in the years to come.

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The blog and press coverage of the Connecticut Supreme Court's case of Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. continues this week with two additional shout-outs to this blog.  In addition, another resource cited to the decision that is worth mentioning.

First up, the well-run and informative Point of Law blog, edited by Walter Olsen, discusses the case today with a references to this blog.  There are lots of other employment law issues discussed at the site so I would recommend it for a different perspective on the legal system.    

In addition, the Connecticut Law Tribune (subscription required) has a detailed article in this morning's paper on the Curry decision.  The reporter contacted me last week and I provided him with some additional insights in the case. The reporter was also kind enough to quote this blog as well.

"This is a very significant decision," said Daniel A. Schwartz, an employment lawyer at the Hartford office of Pullman & Comley, who writes ctemploymentlawblog.com. He is not personally involved in this case, but said the ruling is "mandatory reading" for all employment law practitioners.

"There have been attempts in recent years to create this reasonable accommodation language with legislative changes, but those bills did not pass," Schwartz said.

The decision — officially released April 15 — puts employers on notice to be responsive to needs of disabled employees and to actively engage in communication once a problem is identified. "They can't just take a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil, speak-no-evil attitude," Schwartz said in an interview.

Lastly, as part of the press coverage, I also stumbled on to a very good site today that I'm sure others have known about for years: the Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries Newslog.  The site keeps readers updated on  "Connecticut legislative developments, new court decisions, online legal research tools, new law library resources, and other topics of interest to the Connecticut legal community."  I would definitely check the site out.

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Like the television show, Lost, reading the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. will leave readers with more questions than answers at the end of the day.  (For more background on the case, see this prior post.)

Those unanswered and indeed, troubling questions arise from the suggestion by the Connecticut Supreme Court that an employer's duty to accommodate an employee (and engage in the interactive process) may arise even after the employer has already terminated the employee. 

For example, if the employee makes a request for reasonable accommodation after the employee has already been terminated, does the employer have to listen to this request? And more importantly, does the employer then have to reinstate the employee with the new accommodations in place?  And what if the request for accommodation comes a month after the employee has already been terminated, must the employer still consider the request? The decision appears to say "yes" to these questions.

In order to understand this, some background facts on the case are needed as described by the Court:

The plaintiff  began working as a driver for the defendant, a distributor of wines and liquors, in September, 1986. In that position, the plaintiff had to lift cases of liquor  weighing between forty and seventy pounds on and off his truck. On or about August 26, 1998, the plaintiff  injured his back during work when lifting a case of liquor. ... [He] returned to work in September, 2000, but was restricted by his physician, Charles B. Kime, to working four hours a day, lifting a maximum of fifteen pounds at a time, and avoiding prolonged periods (more than thirty minutes) of sitting or standing. ...

When the plaintiff returned to work, the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff’s union and placed him in a night shift position, working the ‘‘split line’’ in the  warehouse. Although employees normally bid on these positions every six months on the basis of their seniority, because he was injured, the plaintiff temporarily was given the split line warehouse job pursuant to the agreement between the plaintiff’s union and the defendant. ..
When the defendant first placed the plaintiff on the split line, he was required to do only light duty tasks and was not required to replace empty cases with full cases [part of the job of a night-shift position]. ...

[By] March 7, 2001, however, [Plaintiff's physician] indicated that the plaintiff had not improved as expected and that his light duty restriction— ten hours a day with no repetitive bending or lifting of objects more than twenty-five pounds—likely would be ‘‘permanent.’’ ...

Subsequently, the plaintiff placed his name on the bid list for a night shift warehouse position. Although the plaintiff attests that he was high enough on the seniority list to qualify for this position, he did not receive the position. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment, informing him by letter dated April 17, 2001, that it had determined that there was no suitable position for him. Approximately two days later, the plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to one of the defendant’s managers, Richard Conroy, advising him of the defendant’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation under the law, asking to be provided with a cost-benefit analysis of the decision to terminate the plaintiff, and requesting that the defendant reconsider its termination decision. The record does not reveal that the defendant took further action or reconsidered its decision.

As the Supreme Court recognized, it is up to the employee to initiate the request for a reasonable accommodation, not the employer.  Here, the Court found that the employee's placing his name on a "bid list" for a warehouse position and the letter from the employee's attorney after the employee was terminated was sufficient to start the request for reasonable accommodation. 

In the present case, the plaintiff made an affirmative request to continue working the warehouse night shift in March, 2001. In addition, the plaintiff’s counsel, in his April 19, 2001 letter to the defendant, requested that the defendant: (1) reconsider its decision; (2) provide a cost-benefit analysis supporting its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and (3) continue to grant the plaintiff the accommodation of having another worker assist him when it became necessary to retrieve boxes that weighed more than the plaintiff’s lifting restrictions. These actions satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of initiating the interactive process.

The defendant’s response to this request was merely to reject it. Conroy, the defendant’s manager, stated during his deposition that, upon receiving the letter from the plaintiff’s counsel, he did not reconsider his decision, confer with anyone else, review any records, or conduct any investigation or cost-benefit analysis of the hardship that the proposed accommodation would cause the defendant. The record reflects no effort by Conroy or any other representative of the defendant to contact the plaintiff or his counsel to engage in any additional, meaningful discussion. We conclude that this response is clearly not the dialogue envisioned by the interactive reasonable accommodation process and the defendant’s duty of good faith compliance.

From an employer's perspective, this is a disturbing because it seems to suggest that an employer's obligations to provide a reasonable accommodation continues after an employee has already been terminated.  Moreover, it suggests that "demand letters" (in which an attorney demands that the employer take certain action, like paying severance or reinstating the employee) can also be a requests for reasonable accommodation.

In addition, this decision suggests that even though the employee may not make a reasonable accommodation while employed (and only applies to be considered for a position with the company without explanation), the employer must still consider any request by the employee made after the employee was terminated.

It is unclear whether the employer will be filing a motion for rehearing in the case to rule on this issue. But if left unchallenged, this part of the Court's decision could be the real legacy of the case and set the stage for lots of demand letters for disabled workers even after they've already been fired.

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Yesterday, I provided some highlights about the important case of Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. (can we all just agree to call it Curry v. Goodman?)   The case is the first appellate decision in Connecticut that applies the reasonable accommodation provisions found in federal law, to state law. The effect is that small employers in the state (3-14 employees) will now have an obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation to physically disabled employees.

So, how did the court get there? I'll explore in detail in today's post.  It's a little technical but for employment lawyers in Connecticut, the logic is key to understanding the result. 

Before I get there, though, I urge you to review the comments of yesterday's post in which Charles Krich, who submitted an amicus brief in the case, provided some further insights into the case. Very informative and I hope to address it further shortly.

First, the Supreme Court relied in an "agency deference" doctrine, similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's Chevron deference rulings. 

[T]he question has been addressed by the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), which, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-54 and 46a- 56, is charged with effectuating the provisions of the act. We traditionally have accorded deference to the time-tested interpretation of an agency charged with enforcing the provisions of a statute, provided that ‘‘the agency’s interpretation has been formally articulated and applied for an extended period of time, and that interpretation is reasonable.

The Court goes on to note that the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) has "consistently interpreted" Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60 to include a duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for 12 years.  The Court then notes that various Superior Court cases have also followed this rule.

However, the Court then adds that this does not end the inquiry. Rather, the Court must then determine if the CHRO's interpretation is "reasonable".  In doing so, the Court applied its rules of statutory construction.

Now, those who have been in Connecticut for a while, know that in 2003 the legislature passed Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-2z to make sure that the language of the statute is examined first. That statute states:

The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

But, even though the statute contains no duty to provide reasonable accommodation, the Court does not find that to be an impediment.

When . . . a statutory provision is silent with respect to [the issue at hand], our analysis is not limited by . . . § 1-2z, which provides that the meaning of statutes shall be ascertained from only their text and their relationship to other statutes if those sources reveal an unambiguous meaning that is not absurd or unworkable. ...  In addition to the words of the statute itself, ‘we look to . . . the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was  designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.

The Court also notes that federal anti-discrimination statute (and cases interpreting them) are also a proper resource for it. Although the statute "admits" that there is no reference to reasonable accommodation in the statute, the Court looks further to see if this would be an unworkable result.  The court first looks at language regarding a BFOQ.

[The statute] does include a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to discrimination—i.e., ‘‘except in the case of a [BFOQ] or need . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) (1)... We therefore first consider the meaning of a BFOQ, namely, whether such qualification may be interpreted as either coextensive, or inconsistent, with a reasonable accommodation requirement for individuals with physical disabilities. As the court previously has recognized, a BFOQ is an all or nothing proposition that legitimately links the qualifications of the job directly to a protected traitunder the statute, thereby categorically excluding individuals in the protected class. ...

We determine then that the BFOQ defense and the duty of reasonable accommodation for employers of individuals with disabilities are neither
coextensive nor inconsistent. The statutory text does not speak to a duty of reasonable accommodation or other similar requirement. Nothing in the previous discussion, however, demonstrates that, by including a BFOQ defense, the legislature disclaimed a duty of reasonable accommodation.

Given its discounting of the BFOQ defense, the court then notes that it should look to other sources to determine the "intent" of the legislature.  The court notes some discussion in 1973 that suggests that the statute was intended to be broad and protect disabled people who are otherwise qualified for a job.  And the Court looks to other statutes passed by the legislature over the years that show its strong concern for protecting those with disabilities. 

And last, the court notes -- perhaps in an effort to justify its broad reading of the statute -- that other states have also imposed a reasonable accommodation, including some by "judicial gloss".  The Court therefore finds that the CHRO's interpretation is a reasonable one.

In upcoming posts, I'll look at the facts of the case, and the effect of this case on other disabilities. An interesting unanswered question is whether this would also apply to those with learning disabilities (which is a protected class in Connecticut).  Stay tuned.

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In a case that automatically vaults to the top of important disability discrimination cases in Connecticut, the Connecticut Supreme Court today held, in an issue of first impression, that employers have a duty to provide a reasonable accommodation to disabled workers under state law, even though the law does not explicitly say so. 

While the Americans with Disabilities Act applied this rule to employers under federal law for employers of 15 or more employees, small employers have been exempt from it, leaving workers only with the protection of a vague state law (Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60(a)(1)) prohibiting "physical disability" discrimination. 

The case, Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., was released earlier today, although practitioners are cautioned that it is not "officially" released until April 15, 2008. 

Although the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities has applied this rule for years to their view of cases, the Connecticut Supreme Court had yet to decide the issue, leaving employers (to which the Americans with Disabilities Act did not apply) with the thorny question of whether or not they had an obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation.  Certainly, some did; but others may not. 

The court's rationale is fascinating and I'll explore it more in upcoming posts.  Although the Connecticut statute was put in place almost two decades, the court said it was appropriate to still look to federal law for guidance. Since the reasonable accommodation requirement appeared in federal law, it was appropriate -- in part -- to add it here. There's more to the decision, of course, and I'll recap more later.

While the decision itself should be one that employers can follow, what's fascinating is that the Court has ignored various bills that have been proposed over the years at the legislature to add reasonable accommodation language to the statute.  After all, if the legislature "thought" such a requirement was already there and that was its "intent", why are there bills proposing adding such language?

For example, a 2004 bill would have changed the definition of "physical disability" to mirror the language.  A 2002 Senate bill called "the Preservation of Disability Rights" would have introduced language of a "qualified individual with a disability" that would have required reasonable accommodation. 

I'm not suggesting that its bad policy to add this; that's up to the legislature and/or the courts. But it seems a stretch to add a "reasonable accommodation" requirement to state law, when legislature never thought it important enough to do so itself. 

The Court then applies federal reasonable accommodation provisions (such as the interactive process) to the case at hand.  It also addresses the issue regarding light duty accommodation and what an undue hardship is.  I'll explore these provisions in future posts as well.

Until then, the case should be required reading for small employers in the state and their attorneys. 

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Last month, I reported that the U.S. Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case of Huber v. Wal-Mart, to decide whether disabled employees must be reassigned to a vacant position for which they are qualified or merely be permitted to apply for such a position.

Yesterday, however, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to dismiss the matter because the parties had reached a settlement. 

Multiple blogs have commented on it including the Ohio Employer's Law Blog, and SCOTUS Blog.  A few news articles also have provided coverage, including this blurb from Bloomberg, which indicated that the case settled on Friday for undisclosed and confidential terms.   

It's unfortunate that we won't have any guidance from the Supreme Court on this subject but I would expect the Court to find a case with similar facts to take up in the upcoming months.  (I would also expect other attorneys with similar cases to file their petitions with the court shortly.)  In the meantime, employers will be left to struggle with the question and risk second-guessing before we receive further guidance from the court.

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The U.S. Supreme Court this afternoon granted certiorari to an important question under the Americans with Disabilities Act, namely whether disabled employees must be reassigned to a vacant position for which they are qualified or merely be permitted to apply for such a position.

In Huber v. Walmart, the Eighth Circuit held for the employer in concluding that:

the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a reassignment would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate. ... Thus, the ADA does not require Wal-Mart to turn away a superior applicant for the router position in order to give the position to Huber. To conclude otherwise is “affirmative action with a vengeance. That is giving a job to someone solely on the basis of his status as a member of a statutorily protected group.” [citation omitted]

Here, Wal-Mart did not violate its duty, under the ADA, to provide a reasonable accommodation to Huber. Wal-Mart reasonably accommodated Huber’s disability by placing Huber in a maintenance associate position. The maintenance position may not have been a perfect substitute job, or the employee’s most preferred alternative job, but an employer is not required to provide a disabled employee with an accommodation that is ideal from the employee’s perspective, only an accommodation that is reasonable.

The SCOTUSBlog, as usual, has the particulars including the opinion below, the petition for certiorari and the brief in opposition. Expect more analysis to come.

UPDATE: Oral argument is likely to be held in March 2007, with a decision by the end of the term in June 2007.

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