Connecticut Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Daniel Schwartz : Stamford, Hartford New Haven, CT

Attorneys can go months -- if not years -- without Supreme Court guidance on employment law issues. But today, the Supreme Court issued its second employment-law related decision in as many days.

However, for the second day in a row, the Supreme Court issued a decision that, at the end of the day, isn't really about employment law at all, but something else. In today's opinion, the Supreme Court really examined what type of deference  should be afforded to the EEOC in construing the federal statutes about what is a "charge" of discrimination under ADEA (the federal age discrimination statute).

In Federal Express v. Holwecki, the Supreme Court -- by a 7-2 margin -- decided the issue is what constitutes a "charge" of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act before plaintiff can institute a private lawsuit. Here, the Court found that the EEOC had some regulations and internal directives on the subject and is therefore entitled to some "measure of respect" as to what constitutes a charge.  It also provided that the EEOC acted reasonably in interpreting an intake questionnaire as a "charge".  

Workplace Prof has his early thoughts too and a general discussion of the case.

The case's outcome is good on two levels for employment discrimination plaintiffs. First, it allows these Fed Ex plaintiffs to get to the substance of their complaint and second, it will force the EEOC to come out with clear regulations on what counts as a "charge" in the future so the parties are able to structure their future conduct accordingly and not be prejudiced by a shifting rules.

And finally, I have to say that this well-reasoned majority opinion restores my faith somewhat that this court is not completely in the bag for employer interests. Not completely.

A few months ago, in a post entitled "'Supreme Court to Decide Age Discrimination!'" Is This Important To Employers in Connecticut",  I indicated that for employers in Connecticut, this case would not amount to much.  And since its not often an attorney gets to say, "I told you so", I'll just let my prior post speak for itself.

[For] employers and HR professionals, there is a remaining question that has not yet been answered so far: "Should we worry about this employment law case?" The answer is: Not that much.

For Title VII and ADA cases, this case will have no real impact. In those types of cases, an employee who wants to sue in federal court must first get a right to sue letter from the EEOC. For those cases, an employee's charge must be processed in a meaningful fashion.

ADEA (age discrimination) plaintiffs do not face a similar hurdle; rather the charge must simply be filed and the employee must simply wait 60 days before filing a federal claim; no right to sue letter is needed. Thus, the concern expressed by FedEx and by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in their amicus brief, that employers may not receive the same type notice of ADEA claims, is certainly possible. In Holowecki, FedEx's problems were compounded by the EEOC's admitted failure to follow statutorily mandated procedures to notify the the employer of the complaint.

As a practical matter, nearly all of the ADEA claims filed, particularly in Connecticut, are handled in the normal course of business -- that is, that the employee files a discrimination charge, and the employer is notified of that charge. Even if the EEOC only fills out an intake questionnaire, the EEOC is mandated to followup on it typically.

Connecticut, which has a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC to process EEOC charges that are cross-filed in the state, goes one step further. The CHRO will send out notices to employers upon receipt and initial processing of an age discrimination suit. Thus, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that an employer in Connecticut will not get notice of the charge. Because virtually all discrimination charges are filed in the normal course of business, the situation that arises in Holowecki is simply not likely to repeat itself with any frequency, particularly within Connecticut.

For that reason, a Supreme Court's decision in Holowecki -- while perhaps interesting in a "technical" way -- is not likely to have any significant impact for employers in Connecticut. Unless the Supreme Court deviates from its typical path and sets forth new criteria for handling such claims, the case ultimately may be newsworthy only to employment law bloggers such as myself.

And in fact, the Supreme Court did not deviate from its expected path.  The court found that although the employer had good reason to complain about the way the EEOC treated the matter, it was not entitled to a decision in its favor. Ultimately, the Supreme Court warned, the EEOC and other agencies are responsible for cleaning up their regulations and practices:

Here, because the agency failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process.

The employer’s interests, in particular, were given short shrift, for it was not notified of respondent’s complaint until she filed suit. The court that hears the merits of this litigation can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. True, that remedy would be imperfect.  Once the adversary process has begun a dispute may be in a more rigid cast than if conciliation had been attempted at the outset.

This result is unfortunate, but, at least in this case, unavoidable. While courts will use their powers to fashion the best relief possible in situations like this one, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the agency.

Justice Thomas - fresh off of being in the majority in yesterday's decision -- writes a dissent that basically mocks the majority for its failure to outline any real standards in the case:

Today’s decision does nothing— absolutely nothing—to solve the problem that under the EEOC’s current processes no one can tell, ex ante, whether a particular filing is or is not a charge. Given the Court’s utterly vague criteria, whatever the agency later decides to regard as a charge is a charge—and the statutorily required notice to the employer and conciliation process will be evaded in the future as it has been in this case. The Court’s failure to apply a clear and sensible rule renders its decision of little use in future cases to complainants, employers, or the agency.

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New week; new job. 

But that hasn't stopped news from happening. So we'll be using this week to catch back up.

First up: The Department of Labor has published its proposed new regulations for military leave FMLA.  But these regulations (topping 500 pages) also contain updates to earlier discussed revisions to the FMLA as well.

The blogging community has been busy trying to sort and report on the release.  Here's the wrap-up as of early Monday morning. I may update this post later today as additional blogs post their summaries:

• Michael Fox, at Jottings, has the most detailed summary thus far of the major provisions here. According to Michael: "These proposed rules are not nearly as dramatic as the ones that were originally proposed to the white collar regulations which set off a legislative and political uproar. It will be interesting to see what happens to these. Although there will no doubt be comments from both sides, my initial thoughts are that if anyone should be howling for more, it should be employers."
• Workplace Prof links to the regulations and has provided ample coverage of the underlying statute before.
• Ross' Employment Law Blog hits the highlights as well and notes that "there are substantive changes dealing with the definition of "serious health condition," required notices, joint employers, light duty, overtime, bonuses, substituting paid leave for FMLA leave, voluntary settlement of claims, employer's failure to designate absences as being FMLA leave, and other matters."
• The Word reports that you have until April 11, 2008 to provide comments to the new proposed regulations.
• What's New reports what's new with the new regulations as well.

For employers in Connecticut, the challenge will remain trying to incorporate these national regulations into the state statute and deciphering when or if those provisions will even apply to Connecticut leave. Employers should continue to tread cautiously in FMLA issues until the dust settles from the new FMLA provisions and proposed regulations.

UPDATE: The always reliable Jon Hyman at Ohio Employer's Law Blog also has his first take on the regulations here. 

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The headlines of the week nationally have certainly surrounded sexual harassment allegations both old and new.  (Note: Due to my firm's involvement in one of those cases, I will not be blogging on it). 

But with the issue back in the forefront, I've been surprised lately in my discussions by how some small to mid-size employers are overlooking the basics in Connecticut.   Do they believe that such conduct just doesn't exist anymore or do they believe that their employees "know it all" about the subject? While claims of sex discrimination filed with the EEOC are down nearly 10 percentt from their peak in 2002, the numbers hardly show such a pronounced drop off that would indicate we've "solved' the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace.  Indeed over 20,000 complaints were still filed with the EEOC as of 2006.

What do I mean by the basics? In Connecticut, its training and posting.  These requirements are found in the administrative regulations , Conn. Regs 46a-54-200 et seq. set up by the CHRO regarding sexual harassment prevention. 

• For posting: All employers who have 3 or more employees must notices that say sexual harassment is illegal and address what the remedies are for such harassment.  The regulations all spell out in specifics that the notices must contain certain elements. Fortunately, the CHRO has also prepared a model poster that complies with the statute and is available for free download. 

Of course, there are other laws as well that require postings to be set up.  Rather than address each law separately, consider using a company that specializes in such posters, like G.Neil. 

• For training: The training requirements only apply to employers who have 50 or more employees and apply only to supervisory employees.  (This does not mean that employers who have less than 50 should NOT provide the training; instead, it means that they are not required to conduct such training.) 

Specifically, within 6 months of a new supervisor being hired or an employee being promoted to a supervisory position, the employee must receive at least two hours of training.  The format of the training is fairly rigid; according to the regulations:

Such training and education shall be conducted in a classroom-like setting, using clear and understandable language and in a format that allows participants to ask questions and receive answers.

Since that time, the CHRO has indicated, in an informal opinion, that some e-learning training may satisfy this requirement.  Regardless, the training must also include discussion of six discrete topics such as what the state and federal laws say, what types of conduct could be considered sexual harassment, and discussing strategies for preventing such harassment.

Here the kicker: The regulations suggest (but do not mandate) that such training be updated for ALL supervisory employees every three years.   What does this mean? It means that if an employer wants to project an image that it has a strong policy against sexual harassment, it should follow this advisory regulation to show that it is doing above and beyond what is required.

The regulations also suggest (but do not mandate) that records be kept of the training. Again, the regulations suggest a course of action that employers would be wise to follow.

Certainly, the workplace has changed in the 16 years since the issues surrounding Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Anita Hill became so widely publicized. But for employers in Connecticut, sustained vigilance is needed to make sure these changes and the progress that has been made, stick.

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Since the Ledbetter decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court last month, issues of the timeliness of employment discrimination claims have come to the forefront. An interesting decision by a CHRO Human Rights Referee recently suggests that complaints that do not specify the timeliness of certain claims may still survive a motion to dismiss. 

CHRO Human Rights Referee David S. Knishkowy late last month rejected an employer's motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds, even though the complaint did not contain sufficient details to determine whether the alleged discrimination practice occurred within the applicable time frame.

In Salvatore Feroleto v. State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Retardation, CHRO No. 0510140 (decided August 27, 2007), the employer, the Connecticut Department of Mental Retardation moved to dismiss a claim that had been certified to a public hearing on the grounds that most of the alleged acts occurred more than 180 days prior to filing of the complaint. 

Referee Knishkowy rejected that assertion, even though the complaint itself was vague as to whether certain acts fell within or outside the 180 day period.

In the present case, because of the exceedingly general nature of the allegations, I cannot ascertain when most of the discriminatory acts, discrete or otherwise, occurred. Denial of the motion to dismiss will afford the complainant an opportunity to present evidence, subject to the aforesaid rule, on each of his vaguely worded claims of unequal pay, denied promotions, denied accommodations (for his disability), lack of training and termination.

This decision raises a troubling prospect for employers.  According to the CHRO's own administrative regulations on complaints, Conn. Regs. 46a-54-35a, a Complaint -- when filed with the CHRO, "shall contain the following...(3) A plain and concise statement of the facts, including any pertinent dates, constituting the alleged discriminatory practices."  Thus, a complaint that does not have such dates, as appears to be the case here, appears to be violating the CHRO's implementing  regulations. Yet according to this decision, the employer is without recourse to move to dismiss the complaint because the Complaint should be allowed an "opportunity to present evidence". 

I should note that it is not clear whether the employer raised this particular argument or just challenged the timeliness of the complaint in general.  What this decision does make clear, however, is that employers will likely need to engage in discovery and motion practice at the CHRO hearing stage on timeliness grounds, because a motion to dismiss on such grounds is unlikely to succeed even against vague allegations.

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