Connecticut Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Daniel Schwartz : Stamford, Hartford New Haven, CT

With the legislative session coming to a close next week, developments are heating up at a fast and furious pace.  I'll do some quick updating and then provide a more through review when time permits.

First, the State Senate debated the Paid Sick Leave bill (S.B. 217) yesterday for about an hour, when the debate apparently raised questions on its impact on collective bargaining agreements.  The Senate has been working off of some amendments as well, which can be located here.

The Hartford Courant has coverage here.   The CT News Junkie blog has a report earlier this week about it as well.

Second, the State Senate also passed amendments to the state's whistleblower law.  You can find my previous coverage here and you can view the Courant's coverage today of it here.

The bill, which is now listed at S.B. 335, is similar to a prior version proposed back in February and allows the Attorney General to intervene in some whistleblower cases.  The bill now moves on to the House for a vote. 

As I noted before, while the goals of the bill are laudable, the path that it takes to get there is troubling.  The bill creates a rebuttable presumption that an change in employment status (a transfer, for example) within three years of a person's complaint, is retaliatory. That creates a huge shield for employees and encourages them to file complaints -- even those that may not be warranted.

This proposal ignores what courts have been concluding over the years: that it is highly unlikely that an employer would wait a year -- much less three years -- to "retaliate" against such a complaint.  As the U.S. Supreme Court said a few years ago in Clark County Schools v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) in a unanimous, unsigned opinion:

The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be "very close."... Action taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.

Given the highest court's reasoned conclusion that a transfer or firing taken 20 months after a person's complaint does not suggest a connection between the two, what is the rationale behind the proposed legislation that assumes such a connection up to 36 months later?

Unfortunately, the rationale is not likely to be explained or even debated as the bill moves forward.  Legislators will try to show that they are "protecting" whistleblowers, but in doing so, they are likely to create a mess that the courts will be left to clean up.

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As with other U.S. Supreme Court cases this term, there's been more virtual ink spilled this week over two oral arguments scheduled for the U.S. Supreme Court this week that will examine some of the parameters of  when it is illegal for an employer to retaliate against an employee for complaining about discrimination.  For most employers, however, these cases may not have nearly the practical impact that some commentators seem to suggest.

I'll leave it to others, such as Ross's Employment Law Blog to explain the cases. 

• In Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, to be argued today, the question for the court is whether for federal employees, the ADEA prohibits retaliation for filing an EEO complaint.  ADEA already prohibits retaliation by private employers.  Even if the U.S. Supreme Court decides that the statute does not explicitly cover retaliation claims by federal employees, it is hard to imagine that Congress would not take up this issue immediately with bi-partisan support.
• In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries , to be argued tomorrow, February 20th, the question for the court is whether 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 (which prohibits race discrimination in the "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts...") provides a cause of action for retaliation as well.   However, as readers are no doubt aware, Title VII already prohibits retaliation on the basis of race, so there is and has always been some overlap between the two claims. 

Emily Bazelon, over at Slate, suggests that this is a "Big Discrimination Case."  Unless the decision's rationale is broad, that seems to be an overstatement at this point.  Most discrimination and retaliation claims, as a practical matter, are brought under Title VII, not Section 1981.  Indeed, the only reason the Humphries case is not a Title VII claim is that the Plaintiff missed the statute of limitations.  Section 1981 mostly gets used when an employee bringing a retaliation or discrimination claim misses that deadline.  Thus, even if the court were to rule against the employee in this case, it will have no impact on the vast majority of race retaliation cases out there that are being filed under Title VII.

Jon Hyman, at Ohio Employer's Law Blog, has some additional thoughts on the Humphries case as does Workplace Prof.  A decision on these cases is expected by June 2008.

For employers in Connecticut, I would ignore the hype about these cases.  Retaliation against employees for filing race and age discrimination claims would still violate state law, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60(a)(4).  Regardless of how the Supreme Court decides, state law will continue to apply.  If and when an employee claims discrimination at the workplace, take steps to avoid a retaliation lawsuit, and don't worry about whether federal or state law will ultimately apply. 

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Yesterday, I summarized a proposal by Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal to revise the state's whistleblowing laws. The Hartford Courant reported on Wednesday that Blumenthal testified before members of the General Assembly's black and Latino caucus on that issue.  Today, I'll take a look at it in more detail.

As I indicated yesterday, the Hartford Courant and others reporting on the case used the term "strengthen" to describe the changes to the laws. Although I'm not one for word-smithing articles, that term strikes me as a bit loaded for a few reasons.

First, it suggests that the state's whistleblower protection laws are "weak" -- which I'm not sure is the case. Second, it begs the question: how would it "strengthen" the laws and from what perspective? Third, what does it even mean to "strengthen" a law? And fourth, would this "strengthen" or affect existing constitutional retaliation claims that already exist to protect employees who report matters of public concern? The Courant's article, unfortunately, does not address these issues.

One issue that ought to be looked at, for example, is the proposal is to create a rebuttable presumption that an change in employment status (a transfer, for example) within three years of a person's complaint, is retaliatory. That creates a huge shield for employees and encourages them to file complaints -- even those that may not be warranted.

Moreover, such a proposal ignores what courts have been concluding over the years (see cases here and here for two recent examples): it is highly unlikely that an employer would wait a year -- much less three years -- to "retaliate" against such a complaint.

The U.S. Supreme Court said a few years ago in Clark County Schools v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) in a unanimous, unsigned opinion:

The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be "very close."... Action taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.

Given the highest court's reasoned conclusion that a transfer or firing taken 20 months after a person's complaint does not suggest a connection between the two (and even highlighting cases that say 3 months is too long), what is the rationale behind the proposed legislation assuming such a connection up to 36 months later?

Another question that should be examined is whether the proper role of the AG's office is preserved.  For example, on the AG's website, the AG's Department of Employment Rights indicates that it is designed to defend "state agencies and state officials in employment related litigation and administrative complaints and provides legal advice and guidance to state agencies on employment issues."  Obviously, if the AG is interfering in whistleblowing cases, the AG's office cannot serve in a dual capacity -- representing the employees and the agency as well. How will such a determination be made if the AG's office is allowed to intervene as proposed?

Certainly a review of existing laws to update them and to ensure protection to whistleblowers is appropriate.  And none of the issues I raise above are unresolvable. But before the legislature takes action, it should vet the provisions thoroughly. What makes for good headlines may not make for good law.

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On Friday, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal proposed new legislation to change the state's whistleblower laws.  Video from the press conference is available on Senator Edith Prague's website. 

Before the changes are discussed, it is useful to understand the state already has an existing whistleblower statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 4-61dd and that enforcement of the statute falls within the purview of the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. The CHRO has a portion of their website devoted to this area.

So what are the proposed changes? The changes would include:

• Allowing the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of whistleblowers in an administrative hearing on retaliation;
  
• Extending the time period for the rebuttable presumption that adverse personnel action is retaliation to three years from the date the whistleblower filed a complaint pursuant to the whistleblower statute;
  
• Authorizing the hearing officer to grant temporary relief to rescind a retaliatory action during the pendency of the hearing and to grant motions to amend the complaint if additional incidents of retaliation occur during the hearing.
  
• Requiring the hearing officer to send any finding of retaliation to the supervisor of the person found to have committed retaliation as well as the governor, head of the agency and the Commissioner of Administrative Services. Such individuals shall take appropriate personnel action.
  
• Requiring that the hearing officer's decision and any subsequent personnel action against the person who engaged in retaliation be a public record and shall be posted on the Department of Administrative Services' website

The Hartford Courant provides some additional background for the proposed changes as well including reference to an ongoing complaint against the Department of Corrections. 

Tomorrow, I will analyze the proposal and highlight some issues that the legislature ought to consider when it debates the bill.

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In 2003, a local Connecticut radio station, Hot 93.7 (WZMX) fired its prominent DJ - Wendell (JD) Houston.  Five years later, a federal court trial regarding Houston's claims that his termination was due to discrimination have just started.

As with all such matters, the allegations are complicated and contested. Thus, as always, a word of caution to the readers that allegations are not facts.   Both sides are presenting their case now and it will be that evidence that the jury will consider -- not what the parties tell the media.

The Associated Press takes a shot at trying to summarize a five-year old case into several paragraphs in this story, reprinted in the Hartford Courant today.

Ratings soared when WZMX-FM Hot 93.7 switched from "dancing oldies" to an edgier hip hop, but behind the on-air banter racial tensions were rising among the stars at the Farmington radio station.

Wendell "JD" Houston, the show's black host, says a figure depicting the lynching of a black man was left dangling from his microphone and racist posters were hung at the station. He says the station hired him in 2000 under pressure to diversify, but denied him promotional appearances and favored his white co-host when the pair clashed.

"The defendants wanted an Uncle Tom, a black person who would remain behind the radio microphone and be heard but not seen," Houston's attorneys wrote in a federal racial discrimination lawsuit that heads to trial Tuesday in Hartford.

CBS Radio, which owns the station, says Houston has no direct evidence of discrimination and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities dismissed a complaint he filed in 2002.

Houston was let go in 2003 after he was accused of cursing at his co-host, sexually harassing another colleague and constantly fighting with his supervisors and others at the station, the station says. They say he sent a note to the woman who accused him of sexual harassment titled "vengeance upon adversaries" that quoted the Bible.

Articles like this, although well meaning, do a disservice to the readers because they are unable to provide readers with the full context of the case.  Evidence that may never be presented to the jury is treated as "fact", which -- as highlighted above -- it is not. 

Thus, as a service and as background to the key points likely to be made by both sides in this trial, I'd suggest first reviewing the papers submitted to the court on a motion for summary judgment.  Infinity Radio's Motion for Summary Judgment is here, Houston's brief opposing it is here, and Infinity Radio's reply is here. Two years after the motion for summary judgment was filed in 2004, the Court denied the motion in a summary order here.  However, its fair to say that both sides will be relying on much of the same evidence at trial and letting a jury decide.

Where things get interesting is actually in the parties' joint trial memorandum filed in the fall of 2006.  Both sides have indicated that they may put on witnesses that are quite clearly in the public eye, including other radio personalities ("DJ Buck",  "Kid Fresh" and Jeanine Jersey, for example) and community leaders (like former Hartford School Board Chair, Rev. Wayne Carter).

The court records indicate that they were only able to get barely started yesterday on the trial so, according to the parties' own statements, this trial (presided by Judge Alvin Thompson) should last at least another week or two.  Houston is being represented by Frances Miniter and Infinity Radio has brought in Proskauer Rose out of their Boston office.

I won't pretend that I've listened to the station that much -- I'm a bit more attached to XM Radio these days -- but it is not often that radio and television stations make their own headlines.   "Stay tuned" for further developments.

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A U.S. District Court decision today by Judge Janet Arteron provides a bit of clarity on some first amendment retaliation issues that may be helpful to some employers. The case, Milardo v. City of Middletown (Dec. 20, 2007), is by no means groundbreaking; the facts of the case allow the court to sidestep some issues by simply finding a lack of evidence to support some of the claims.

Nevertheless, the case addresses, for example, the common argument of retaliation claims that mere temporal proximity should be sufficient to state a claim for retaliation.  (Click here for prior posts on the issue of temporal proximity for retaliation.)   The court here finds that the passage of nearly a year between an alleged complaint and the ultimate termination is insufficient to support a claim of retaliation.

One other interesting aspect is whether the filing of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request is sufficient to form the basis of a First Amendment claim.  The court says that the answer generally is no and that Plaintiff did not show that his case falls within the very narrow exception to that general rule. 

As a general matter, courts have held that there is no First Amendment right to access government information, even by way of the FOIA. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the First Amendment nor theFourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s control.”); id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government.”); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“As a general rule, citizens have no first amendment right of access to traditionally nonpublic government information. A litigant seeking release of government information under FOIA, therefore, relies upon a statutory entitlement — as narrowed by statutory exceptions — and not upon his constitutional right to free expression.”)

To the extent there is a limited constitutional right of access to some types of information held by the government, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(recognizing a First Amendment right to access certain aspects of criminal proceedings), Plaintiff has failed to show how what he requested through the FOIA falls within that exception. See Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934–36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (summarizing the limited ways in which the Constitution guarantees access to criminal trials).

Milardo argues in his brief only that, although “the mere filing of a FOIA request is not necessarily ipso facto the exercise of a protected First Amendment right, the nature of the request in this case does merit First Amendment protection.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) In his request, Plaintiff sought information which he believed would reveal evidence of improper conduct by city employees, but he has not shown how this is the type of exceptional request that merits constitutional protection.

Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that the city produced the documents he sought and that his request played no part in the city’s ultimate decision to terminate his employment ten months later. Thus, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment decision in retaliation for making any constitutionally-protected request.

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After an employee complains about discrimination, if an employer terminates the employee a year later, can that fact -- in and of itself -- be a sufficient grounds for a retaliation? A District Court decision released yesterday said no.

In Thornewell v. Domus Foundation, Inc.,U.S. District Court Judge Alvin Thompson dismissed outright a retaliation claim where the Plaintiff alleged only that his prior complaint was the basis for his termination a year later:

[The employee] only alleges that he “complained about the discriminatory treatment that he[experienced]” (Compl. at 7), and that he was later terminated. [The employee] alleges that the date of his last complaint was June 3, 2004 and that he was terminated as of May 1, 2005. Id. at 7, 9. Standing alone, these allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for retaliation because the alleged retaliation occurred nearly a year after the protected activity (i.e. the complaints). See Clark County School District v. Breedon, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (April 23, 2001) (per curiam), reh’g denied 533 U.S. 912 (June 11, 2001) (citations omitted) (noting that temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action must be “very close”).

The decision is another indication that courts are starting to look for more substance in retaliation claims other than just the filing of a complaint and a termination.  The Court went on to note in the case that although the Plaintiff did allege other facts in support of his retaliation claim, he did not note the dates of those; thus, the court did not view such allegations as relevant to the inquiry.

For employment practitioners and companies that appear before Judge Thompson, the decision is interesting because of the judge's own statements that he disfavors dismissing employment claims on the papers. His chamber practices statement indicates that he believes that:

dispositive motions are overused. In discrimination cases, he rarely grants motions for summary judgment that dispose of the entire case.

True to his word, he refused to dismiss an accompanying Title VII discrimination claim and a disability discrimination claim.

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Summary Orders (in other words, decisions with no precedential value) by the Second Circuit typically are not worth noting. However, a decision released today is telling for the court's view of race and gender discrimination cases and it can be cited by parties under certain limitations.

In Williams v. Consolidated Edison of New York, the court reversed a lower court's decision granting summary judgment to the employer on race and gender harassment grounds.  While the court may have been skeptical of the claims, it found that the amount of evidence presented by the Plaintiff -- if believed -- could support a claim of racial and gender harassment.

In approximately three years at the company: (1) one supervisor..., referred to Williams as a “black b****” on more than one occasion and ... another supervisor,
referred to her as a “b****”; (2) [one supervisor] directed gender-based verbal abuse at Williams...; (3) [one supervisor insinuated that Williams and [another employee] were having a sexual relationship; (4) several male co-workers repeatedly used offensive and derogatory terms for women, such as “b***” and “c***”; (5) women encountered pornographic materials in the workplace on at least several  occasions; (6) Williams and [another employee] experienced tampering and sabotage of their equipment; (7) male co-workers were unwelcoming to women and commented that they did not belong in the Brooklyn Flush unit; (8) male workers sought to avoid shifts with women and supervisors would honor their requests; (9) at least one employee made comments to the effect that supervisors should let the men know when women were menstruating; and (10) women were not provided with adequate locker room facilities for months, until October 2001, although the men were. In addition, one of Ms. Williams’s coworkers... states that she, too, was sexually harassed, including that she was called a “b**” and a “cunt” on a regular basis, that supervisors ignored her complaints about this verbal
abuse, and that one supervisor threatened to suspend her from her job if she continued to complain.

Obviously, as readers of this blog know, these allegations are merely that -- allegations.  But the language used here and the different types of harassment alleged, was obviously more than enough for the Second Circuit to reverse.

The Court also addressed the employer's response to co-worker harassment:

Whether Con Ed’s response to Williams’s complaints about a sexually and racially hostile work environment — and the information it obtained in the process of investigating her complaints — constituted “appropriate remedial action” is subject to reasonable dispute on the record before us. During the first human resources investigation into Williams’s complaints in 2002, several of Williams’s co-workers verified her allegations that men sought to avoid working with women and supervisors honored their requests and that African-American employees were sent more frequently to high-crime neighborhoods. Yet inexplicably, the report summarizing the investigation did not discuss these co-worker accounts in reaching its conclusion that there was no record of discriminatory work assignments. Given the information that Con Ed received during its investigation and the absence of anything in the record indicating whether Con Ed followed up on this information, a reasonable juror could find that Con Ed failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action in response to substantiated allegations of sexual and racial hostility in the workplace.

It's easy to look back on this case and point out that the employer should've done more.  And indeed, an investigation that may look thorough at the time, can appear to be incomplete given a the context later on.  However, the case is a further illustration about the importance of conducting a thorough investigation when complaints of harassment are made and detailing that investigation in a written report.  Whether that still would've been enough here is questionable but it might have helped. 

Moreover, when a second complaint was made by Williams and investigated until Williams said she was too "stressed" to continue, the court found that this second investigation was also subject to dispute and the employer may not have done enough.

When Williams complained a second time to human resources about being subject to a sexually hostile work environment, the human resources officer closed his investigation after speaking only to Williams’s supervisor. That action was based in part on Williams’s decision not to follow up with him because she was “too stressed.” A reasonable fact-finder could conclude this second investigation was a perfunctory and inappropriate response to Williams’s hostile work environment allegations, which Con Ed arguably should have investigated regardless of whether Williams had the time or the energy to pursue it further.

This illustrates the importance of continuing a sexual harassment investigation to its conclusion -- regardless of whether a complainant later refuses to cooperate or asks that the investigation be conducted in private. The court's decision suggests that employers have an independent and affirmative obligation to investigate claims of harassment, regardless of the complainant's wishes, once it is made aware of them

What is also notable about the case is that the court affirmed summary judgment to the employer on the retaliation claims finding them either time-barred or without merit.  In essence, the court found that the reasons given by the employer for the discipline of the employee were legitimate. 

Williams admitted that she made statements referring to the possibility of driving a truck into the trailers of the Brooklyn flush facility and to going “postal” at work — comments that invoke images of violence against her superiors and that could be understood as veiled threats. Furthermore, three coworkers reported that those comments were even more explicitly threatening than Williams admitted. Based on its zero tolerance policy of violence or threats of violence in the workplace, [the employer] took disciplinary action.

It's unfortunate that this case cannot be cited for precedent because it speaks to some issues that could use further clarification by the Second Circuit. But employers and in-house counsel can still take the lessons of the case to heart.

(H/T - Wait A Second!)

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A few days ago, I reported on the summary judgment decision of Tucker v. Journal Register East.  While the case is notable for its discussion of the whether an employee who expresses reluctance to testify has actually "participated" in a protected activity for Title VII purposes, the case also has a discussion of a claim arising from her First Amendment rights.

Now, your first question may be -- "I thought the First Amendment only applied to government employees.  Isn't she at a private employer?"  Well, in Connecticut, employees at private employer do have First Amendment rights; those rights happen to be dictated by a state statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 31-51q.  That statute states:

Any employer . . . who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution ..., provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages .....

There is, however, a limitation on the employee's rights.  Section 31-51q “applies only to expressions regarding public concerns that are motivated by an employee's desire to speak out as a citizen.”  Thus, if the employee is speaking on purely personal concerns, then the speech is not protected.

In the Tucker case, the court had to decide whether the employee, in relaying her reservations about testifying on the behalf of the company was speaking “as a citizen upon matters of public
concern” or “instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest.”

The court, in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment, held that the employee's speech may constitute a matter of public concern, and therefore she may be entitled to relief under C.G.S. 31-51q.

A jury could reasonably find that Tucker’s speech “was part of an overall effort . . . to correct allegedly unlawful practices or bring them to public attention.” Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tucker’s speech relating to her impending testimony did not concern the terms or conditions of her own employment, but rather the change in her views regarding the merits of [another employee's] sexual harassment complaint before the CHRO. She was not speaking strictly from her role as an employee; a jury could believe that she was speaking as witness who was concerned about her testimony at an upcoming proceeding. ...[A] jury could believe that Tucker was not furthering only her private interest, but instead the interest of a fellow co-worker, whose allegations Tucker felt were more trustworthy. Tucker’s speech was not in response to any personal aggrievement.

Whether the employee will prevail at trial is, as always, an open question. But for employers, this case is another indication of the difficulty that exists in getting summary judgment on employment claims. 

Also noteworthy here is the fact that the employee's reluctance to testify (if that is, in fact, what happened) formed the basis of not one, but two separate employment claims -- even though that employee was not the victim of sexual harassment herself.

For employers dealing with non-testifying co-workers, this case illustrates the perils of taking any action against them. Seeking legal advice when disciplining or discharging such an employee may avoid the potential pitfalls that may arise.

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For retaliation cases, an employee's active participation in another person's discrimination case has been viewed, in the past, as the threshold to be a "protected activity" under Title VII's retaliation clause.  That has been watered down in the Second Circuit in recent years.  A new District Court decision today has concluded that simply expressing a reluctance to testify in another employee's case, without actually testifying, could also be a protected activity.

In Tucker v. Journal Register East, (known more commonly as The New Haven Register), the Plaintiff -- a former employee, alleged that the Register terminated her employment because she was opposed to testifying as a favorable witness in the Register’s defense of another employee against whom a sexual harassment complaint had been filed.  The Employer filed for summary judgment claiming that the employee never opposed a discriminatory practice.

The Court rejected that argument finding that a different section of Title VII analysis -- the participation clause -- may apply.   Notably it follows the "it would leave the employee 'wholly unprotected' language used by the Second Circuit in recent years. 

The court believes that, in accordance with the principles set forth by the Supreme Court..., and by the Second Circuit..., [the employee]’s conduct is sufficient to qualify as a “protected activity” under Title VII. To hold otherwise would permit an employer involved in a Title VII proceeding to retaliate against an employee based upon that employee’s decision as to what her participation in the Title VII would be. Indeed, [the employee- would be “wholly unprotected” if the court were to find that the Register could terminate her because she had changed her mind about testifying on the Register’s behalf in the CHRO proceeding.

While the court's broad reading of Title VII is disputable, it appears the court was simply troubled by the timing of the employee's termination; it occurred two days after the employee allegedly expressed reluctance.  Moreover, the employer's reasons for terminating the employee (she allegedly accepted a collect call at work from a felon at a state correctional facility) seemed, to the court, excessively harsh.

Because this case involved a local newspaper, it'll be curious to see the media's reaction to this case. Obviously, this is only a denial of summary judgment; the employer may ultimately prevail at trial. But newspapers have a tendency to gloss over these facts in reporting about the case.

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Do you like tricks or treats? Depending on your perspective, you'll either find something to like or dislike about a decision just issued by the District Court of Connecticut. 

Judge Vanessa Bryant -- who has been busy issuing decisions and posting them online seemingly every few days -- granted a summary judgment motion by an employer, where the employee had claimed that she was retaliated against for filing a discrimination claim the prior year.  The court found no temporal link between the complaint and the "adverse employment action". 

In Anderson v. Department of Children & Families, State of Connecticut, (Civil Action No. 3:05-cv-00167) (October 30, 2007), the Plaintiff had previously filed discrimination claims in both federal court and the CHRO in 1996 and 1997 (Her prior discrimination claims were dismissed in 1999). 

According to the decision, in 2002, Elizabeth Anderson filed a new charge with the CHRO claiming race discrimination and retaliation. In late 2003, her employer, Department of Children & Families (DCF) placed her on administrative leave and investigated her for violating DCF policy. DCF ultimately reprimanded her and ordered her to return to work on March 12, 2004. She then filed suit in federal suit claiming claiming that DCF’s investigation and reprimand constitute retaliation. DCF countered that the investigation and reprimand were unrelated to Anderson’s CHRO complaints.

DCF ultimately moved for summary judgment submitting a memorandum of law and a statement of undisputed facts stating, among other claims, that the temporal proximity between the CHRO complaint in 2002 and the alleged retaliation in 2003 was insufficient to establish retaliation.  The Plaintiff submitted her opposition brief (and somehow also claimed summary judgment as well, though the court later dismissed that as "moot".) 

The court agreed with DCF:

As to the final requirement of a prima facie case, Anderson must show a causal connection between her protected activity—her 2002 CHRO complaint—and the adverse employment action—DCF’s investigation and reprimand in late 2003. Anderson relies on the concept of temporal proximity to establish the necessary causal connection. However, “[t]he cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close . . . .” Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (citing cases holding that three or four months between the protected activity and the adverse action is insufficient to establish causality in the absence of other evidence). In the present case, if DCF intended to investigate and reprimand Anderson in retaliation for her 2002 CHRO complaint, it could have done so much earlier than late 2003. Anderson has failed to satisfy the final requirement of a prima facie case.

The court's reasoning is an interesting use of logic and one that is used by employers in defending itself in other cases too. Employers often suggest: If I wanted to retaliate, why would I wait a year to do so? The court here, at least, found that logic convincing enough to throw out a retaliation claim.  That is even more important here because the plaintiff had previously filed discrimination claims as well. If there was a case where an employer could be assumed to be "angry" for all the claims filed by the Plaintiff, this would be one. But the court refused to bite.

For employers considering employment action against employees who file discrimination claims, the case provides some support for the proposition that it can still take such action after a sufficient amount of time has passed. How much time? Clearly here, 15 months was enough. Could it be shorter? Certainly and the court's reference to a Supreme Court case of 3-4 months suggests that.  

Avoiding retaliation claims should be a key concern for any employer who has had an employee file a discrimination clam. But the employer should not run scared out of each and every employment decision it needs to make. With a bit of a time buffer and more support for the decision, an employer can reduce the risk of liability on an inevitable retaliation claim. 

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It has been over a year since the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which held that where a public employee speaks as an employee and not a public citizen, such speech is not protected under the First Amendment. 

Courts applying the decision have tried to impart some parameters to the Court's decision such as whether an employee's job description is "controlling" as to what those job duties actually are.    (One issue not yet resolved-- and the subject of a future blog post -- is the question of whether Garcetti applies to employees at private companies.  A split in authority has been developing in the state courts on that issue, although the majority appears to answer that question "yes".) 

One interesting case came down from the U.S. District Court in Connecticut last month.  In O'Dea v. Shea, et al, the court granted a state agency's motion for summary judgment where the employee claimed that she was given a poor performance review in violation of her First Amendment rights.  

But the reasoning behind the decision shows that Connecticut courts have begun to apply the Supreme Court's ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos. The background of the case is straightforward:

• The Plaintiff became Director of Acute Nursing at Blue Hills Hospital in central Connecticut.
• In the spring of 2004, her supervisor purchased refurbished used furniture for the unit. 
• According to the plaintiff, she complained that bringing in used furniture into the facility would lead to more insect infestations. 
• In May 2004, the plaintiff received a "satisfactory" rating on her performance review and sued on that basis. 

Rather than address the issue of an adverse job action (which would seem to be the "easier" of the questions), the court ruled that Garcetti foreclosed her case.  "An Employee may still be performing his job when he speaks, even if that expression is not demanded of him."  The court emphasized, thus, that courts should not look at formal job descriptions but rather to the "practical" considerations of an employee's job.  Thus, the court -- in essence -- found that the job description was not dispositive of the issue.

Because the court concluded that the employee raised her concerns in her "professional capacity" as an employee, and not as a private citizen, her speech was not protected by the First Amendment.

The case reinforces the notion that First Amendment claims (including those brought under comparable state laws) by employees face an uphill battle.  For the time being, not even narrowly drafted job position descriptions appear to be able to defeat a defense that the employee's comments were in the course of his/her duties.

For employers that are considering revising an employee's job duties or position description, it makes sense to include a reference to reporting safety or other concerns (if that is a legitimate part of the job). Although the employer may believe that this is implicit in particular jobs, it is helpful to have this established at a neutral point in time in writing -- rather than as a company policy.

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A recent article by the Connecticut Law Tribune reported on the trial of two bar workers who claimed that they were terminated in retaliation for reporting a supervisor's alleged sexual harassment of a waitress.  According to court records In the trial of  Daniel Van Kruiningen and Kimberly Chatterton v. Plan B, LLC d/b/a Mohegan After Dark, which took place in federal court in May 2007 (the article fails to mention the date), the jury found for the employer on all counts, including a common law claim for wrongful discharge. 

The Tribune article sums up the salacious allegations found in the Complaint:

Mystic resident Daniel Van Kruiningen and Kimberly Chatterton of Norwich were assistant manager and club manager of Ultra 88, an upscale lounge at the Mohegan Sun casino on Dec. 7, 2003. After hours, Chatterton was checking on other bars owned by her employer... 

Afterwards, Van Kruiningen obtained copies of the video surveillance camera’s recordings at Lucky’s Lounge, which showed that a young waitress had returned to Lucky’s after Chatterton left. Indistinctly, the videos appeared to show that [the supervisor] had sex with her on or near the bar.

According to the Complaint in the matter, they alleged that the video showed the supervisor causing the waitress to become intoxicated through serving of alcohol. Chatterton and Van Kruiningen alleged that they complained about serving alcohol to this underage waitress and about the incident, and alleged that they were fired a month after this incident in retaliation. 

From an employment law perspective, the most interesting aspect of the case is the wrongful-discharge claim.  The real action on this count took place behind the scenes before the trial, however.  In ruling on a motion for judgment, the District Court rejected the employer's claim that reporting a supervisor's serving of alcohol to minors was not an "important public policy" giving rise to an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  The court found that a wrongful discharge claim could arise from a state statute that forbids the serving of alcohol to minors. 

Footnote 6 of the opinion contains an interesting observation by the court about whether its ruling  will open the floodgates in other matters.

Defendant maintains that “[u]nder plaintiffs’ theory, every employee who observes – but does not participate in – a supervisor’s single violation of an important public policy, and who reports such violation to her employer, is immune from termination on an at-will basis.” ...This is an overstatement because it overlooks the reality that such plaintiff must prove that he or she was terminated in retaliation for his or her reports of such  unlawful conduct; while the amount of allegedly unlawful conduct, and/or the number of times plaintiffs voiced complaints, may be relevant to the jury’s causation determination, these considerations do not render plaintiffs’ public policy claim as alleged legally insufficient.

What does this mean for employers in the state? It's another case that has, depending on your perspective, eroded the at-will employment doctrine in Connecticut further, or expanded wrongful discharge claims to protect employees who report violations of state law. Although the employer ultimately prevailed at trial, the cost of the litigation as well as the uncertainty regarding the outcome must have weighed on the employer.

For employers in the food-services industry, the decision takes on some added significance. Because complaints regarding other employee's violations of liquor laws could give rise to a wrongful discharge claim under this decision, employers should consider investigating such complaints and ensuring that its supervisors do not retaliate against employees who make such complaints. Advice of legal counsel to discuss the particular circumstances should also be considered.

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How do you avoid retaliation lawsuits? The true answer is by a bit by luck.  Despite all measures that some employers take, the inevitable fact is that some employees will file suit regardless. 

But all hope is not lost for employers.  There are steps that employers can take to reduce the likelihood of a suit.  Indeed, the single most important factor that an employer can apply is following the letter and spirit of the law.  The Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog recently posted a few of its tips that are worth considering.  Among them:

• Investigate even the Half Baked Complaints: Hindsight is 20/20 and its what employers are judged by in court. If an employee takes the time to complain about "illegal actions" then you take the time to make an investigation. First, ask the employee make a complete report of his suspicions. If the complaint involves you, let someone else do the investigation, please.

• Make a Written Finding: In the event of whistleblower type complaints, make a written finding that they were investigated and played no part in the termination decision and why.

• Manage the Appearance of Retaliation: Examine the timing of the whistleblower complaints and any discipline or termination decisions.

In Connecticut, there are specific laws that address whistleblowing and retaliation, including Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 31-51m.  As a result, employers who are aware of employees who have made complaints will need to be particularly cautious before making any employment related decisions that are unrelated to such complaints.

Two ideas for employers to consider in such event are:

• If action is necessary against the employee for reasons other than the protected activity, how has the employer treated similarly situated employees? Is the employer over-reacting here? Past precedent can be a good indication whether the decision is fair here.  Look to any internal policies that the employer may have to ensure that the policies are being applied in the same way.
  
• While the employee may have made complaints, such employees -- but not all -- are looking for an ear within the company.  If they feel that their concerns are being listened to, it may go a long way to resolving the issues that they may face in ways that are palatable to the company.  Maintain an open line of communication with the employee even when its difficult.  Treating that employee as a pariah will typically only make matters worse.

Of course, whistleblowing complaints in particular industries such as health care or product safety raise particular issues.  Before adverse action is taken against such employees, a thorough analysis of the risks involved (with human resources and an attorney reviewing the matter) will help ensure that the decision being made is done fairly and properly. 

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