Connecticut Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Daniel Schwartz : Stamford, Hartford New Haven, CT

The Employee Benefits blog has a terrific post this week explaining the "Gross Misconduct" rule for COBRA Coverage.

For those unfamiliar with the lingo, The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) (among other aspects) describes rights that employees have to continue their health insurance after their employment as been terminated (and for some other reasons too).    But there is an exception: When the employee is terminated for "gross misconduct", the benefits cease.  What does that mean? Well, the Act doesn't define it.

But the Employee Benefit blog shares some insight from one case about what it means. 

Three things are very important about this decision.  First, the court did not find that any “criminal” conduct was required to meet the “gross misconduct” definition.  Gross misconduct can be an intentional, deliberate, extreme and outrageous that “shocks the conscience.”  It can be “reckless or in deliberate indifference to an employer’s interests.”  ...

Second, the employer has the burden of establishing the termination was for “gross misconduct.”  ... It must be the primary reason, not one of many.

Finally, the employee and potential COBRA beneficiaries have to be notified of the determination that COBRA is not being offered because of the termination for gross misconduct.  

So what's an employer to do? The blog suggests some thoughts, but I'll share some general observations as well.

1. Document, document, document.  If an employer is going to claim "gross misconduct", there ought to be ample documentation supporting the decision.

2. Make sure the termination documents reflect the actual reason and the reason amounts to "gross misconduct".  Meeting this standard is difficult and courts will understandably look to any reason to deny it. Having a letter of termination that merely states the employee was let go for "performance" reasons, isn't going to cut it. 

3. Follow policies and COBRA to the letter. The requirements, for example, about notification under COBRA are strict. Missing deadlines or not providing information may provide the escape hatch that might not be available otherwise.

And as always, seek some legal guidance on this. Denying COBRA nowadays is rare; if an employer does try to use that provision, it can be assured that a fight about coverage may not be too far behind.

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Last month, I addressed the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, which expanded state disability laws to match (or in some cases, exceed) the scope of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The employer has moved, on limited grounds, to have the court reconsider its decision.  You can download a copy of the motion here.  

One of the grounds raised by the employer is something that I touched on before  -- namely that the court is expanding the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to former employees who request reinstatement and an accommodation. 

The employer has also requested reconsideration on the grounds that the court's ruling could also be interpreted to require an employer to convert a temporary light duty position into a permanent one, contrary to the general rule cited by the court. Because the case's procedural status was that of a summary judgment, the employer also expressed its concern that the court's rulings could be seen as determinations of fact in case that still has issues of disputed facts.

The brief's relevant portion is as follows:

In this case this court has ruled, for the first time, that the disability provisions of General Statutes § 45a-60(a)(1) require an employer to make the same kind of reasonable accommodation required under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  However, in the course of applying this principle to the facts of this case, this court addressed issues other than the application of the reasonable accommodation requirement itself. In this regard, the opinion identifies two actions that “satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of initiating the interactive process.” 286 Conn. at 417.

The first is the plaintiff’s “affirmative request to continue working the warehouse night shift in March, 2001.” Id. The second is plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of April 19, 2001 requesting that the defendant “(1) reconsider its decision; (2) provide a cost-benefit analysis supporting its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and (3) continue to grant the plaintiff the accommodation of having another worker assist him when it became necessary to retrieve boxes that weighed more than the plaintiff’s lifting restrictions.” Id. 

However, as the opinion notes, the defendant did not contest the claim that the statute required it, prior to the defendant’s termination, to make some accommodation and to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine if a reasonable accommodation existed. Rather, the focus of the parties below was on the adequacy of the employer’s efforts at reasonable accommodation, not on whether the two actions cited by the court constituted new requests for accommodation requiring a new interactive process.  There are, at the very least, serious questions whether either of the actions cited by the court is sufficient to trigger this obligation.

It's too easy for some to state that all employers are the "evil empire" and that all arguments that they raise are frivolous.

But as I've noted before, the grounds the employer raises here are sensible ones.   The Court went beyond what it needed to to make its decision and, in doing so, created some rules that could have significant implications in all disability cases in Connecticut.

Here's hoping that the Connecticut Supreme Court takes the time to review  them; otherwise, there may be a lot of busy employment law lawyers later this year.

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I've returned from vacation today with hundreds of e-mails to dig through and about 3000 posts in various RSS feeds.

But one e-mail I received relating to the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision earlier this month in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, bears some immediate discussion. The comments are from Attorney Richard Hayber, the attorney representing the employee in that matter.  He has authorized me to re-publish his comments in part here, which I'm pleased to do so and I thank Richard for taking the time to comment. 

[Y]our coverage of this case has failed to point out the most disturbing fact of the case. The employer had a policy of only permitting injured workers to return to work if they had been cleared to "full duty." When asked at a deposition how the company applied this policy, it stated that it would not return an employee to work even if the only restriction he had was to take a 60 second break during the day to stretch his back!!! The Supreme Court held this policy, which foreclosed an individualized analysis of each disabled worker's request for accommodation, to be illegal.

I greatly appreciate Richard's comments and as I've suggested before, readers should read the lengthy decision to get a full appreciation for the contested facts.  Because the case is at the summary judgment stage, however, many of the facts remain disputed.

In my defense, reading the decision again, I do not see the deposition referenced, nor do I believe that the Court placed a particular emphasis on the "full duty" clearance requirement.  In fairness to Richard, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in footnote 23, did say that the Court's newly imposed "interactive process" requirement  creates a parallel requirement that assessments of a disability be done on an individualized basis. 

A policy—whether express or by application—that eliminates the individualized assessment of each disabled employee for purposes of reasonable accommodations is for all the reasons articulated in this opinion necessarily illegal. ... Whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail after an individualized assessment will depend on the interactive reasonable accommodation process.

Ultimately, I agree with Richard that with the Connecticut Supreme Court's imposition of an interactive process for small employers will require those employers to conduct an individualized assessment of an employee's capabilities and abilities.  Because each case is unique and may also have some relationship to workers compensation injuries, employers may want to seek legal assistance in these types of determinations, at least until Connecticut law becomes more settled.

Richard also notes that "most superior court judges had already interpreted our Fair Employment Practices Act to require reasonable accommodations. Employers reading your Blog should not
be as alarmed as you would have them be."  A fair enough point, though there were hardly a significant number of cases in this area to begin with and I don't believe the law was as settled as Richard suggests.  In any event, I think the Curry decision's broad application to employment law warrants the concern that I have sounded.

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Reading the Connecticut Supreme Court case of Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. decided last week,  I'm struck by how many questions the decision seems to raise -- and how many are left unanswered. I've discussed the case and some questions it raises before, most recently here. 

The case appears to stand for the proposition that an employer must engage in an interactive process with a disabled employee who requests some type of reasonable accommodation.  But another question that arises is: What types of "disabilities" are within the scope of this reasonable accommodation duty under state law? 

The Americans with Disabilities Act has a plain definition of "disability" that reviews the person's condition in relation to a major life activity.  Connecticut's anti-discrimination scheme, however, is different.

In many ways, Connecticut's anti-discrimination provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(a)(1) is broader in scope because it includes "present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness." Broadening the scope even further are the definitions of these categories in Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-51.

So what answer does the Supreme Court say about what types of "disabilities" are covered? It appears to say: All of the above (with emphasis noted below):

Because the text and legislative history illustrate that the intent of the legislature is to stamp out discrimination on the basis of physical disability and a wide range of other disabilities (mental disability, learning disability, and mental retardation), we must not interpret the statute in a way that would thwart this purpose. ....

Accordingly, we adopt the commission’s time-tested interpretation construing § 46a-60 (a) (1) to require employers to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s
disability.

This leads to more issues.  For example, the definition of a "mental disability" in Connecticut is essentially anything that is defined as a disorder within the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual IV, which includes diagnoses such as "Pathological Gambling" and "Exhibitionism". 

Some strange questions then arise.  Do employers now need to accommodate "Pathological Gambling" because it falls within the definition of a "mental disability" and perhaps provide an employee with a "break" to play online poker or take a visit to Foxwoods?   Or even more bizarre, does an employer need to provide a "reasonable accommodation" to someone who suffers from Exhibitionism and what would that entail?

As for providing reasonable accommodations to people with "learning disabilities", suppose an employee suffers from dyslexia.  Suppose that this employee is computer programmer, but can't read all the instruction manuals. Must the employer provide an audio version of the same manuals as a "reasonable accommodation" or how about a person who must be available to read those manuals to them? How must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation for others who suffer from similar types of learning disabilities?

While the analysis of the Curry case thus far has noted that it now applies the reasonable accommodation provisions normally found in the ADA to small employers (who were not covered by the ADA),  there is a flip side too: Employers who were covered by the ADA, might need to contemplate reasonable accommodations to disabilities that are much broader than covered by the ADA. 

Is this settled? No.  And it may be that Superior Courts reviewing this case will take a narrow approach to the decision.

But after reading the Curry case over several times, I'm convinced that the importance of this case and its potential scope cannot be understated.   Absent some legislative intervention and oversight, this case has the potential to create lots of work for employment law attorneys in the years to come.

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Like the television show, Lost, reading the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. will leave readers with more questions than answers at the end of the day.  (For more background on the case, see this prior post.)

Those unanswered and indeed, troubling questions arise from the suggestion by the Connecticut Supreme Court that an employer's duty to accommodate an employee (and engage in the interactive process) may arise even after the employer has already terminated the employee. 

For example, if the employee makes a request for reasonable accommodation after the employee has already been terminated, does the employer have to listen to this request? And more importantly, does the employer then have to reinstate the employee with the new accommodations in place?  And what if the request for accommodation comes a month after the employee has already been terminated, must the employer still consider the request? The decision appears to say "yes" to these questions.

In order to understand this, some background facts on the case are needed as described by the Court:

The plaintiff  began working as a driver for the defendant, a distributor of wines and liquors, in September, 1986. In that position, the plaintiff had to lift cases of liquor  weighing between forty and seventy pounds on and off his truck. On or about August 26, 1998, the plaintiff  injured his back during work when lifting a case of liquor. ... [He] returned to work in September, 2000, but was restricted by his physician, Charles B. Kime, to working four hours a day, lifting a maximum of fifteen pounds at a time, and avoiding prolonged periods (more than thirty minutes) of sitting or standing. ...

When the plaintiff returned to work, the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff’s union and placed him in a night shift position, working the ‘‘split line’’ in the  warehouse. Although employees normally bid on these positions every six months on the basis of their seniority, because he was injured, the plaintiff temporarily was given the split line warehouse job pursuant to the agreement between the plaintiff’s union and the defendant. ..
When the defendant first placed the plaintiff on the split line, he was required to do only light duty tasks and was not required to replace empty cases with full cases [part of the job of a night-shift position]. ...

[By] March 7, 2001, however, [Plaintiff's physician] indicated that the plaintiff had not improved as expected and that his light duty restriction— ten hours a day with no repetitive bending or lifting of objects more than twenty-five pounds—likely would be ‘‘permanent.’’ ...

Subsequently, the plaintiff placed his name on the bid list for a night shift warehouse position. Although the plaintiff attests that he was high enough on the seniority list to qualify for this position, he did not receive the position. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment, informing him by letter dated April 17, 2001, that it had determined that there was no suitable position for him. Approximately two days later, the plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to one of the defendant’s managers, Richard Conroy, advising him of the defendant’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation under the law, asking to be provided with a cost-benefit analysis of the decision to terminate the plaintiff, and requesting that the defendant reconsider its termination decision. The record does not reveal that the defendant took further action or reconsidered its decision.

As the Supreme Court recognized, it is up to the employee to initiate the request for a reasonable accommodation, not the employer.  Here, the Court found that the employee's placing his name on a "bid list" for a warehouse position and the letter from the employee's attorney after the employee was terminated was sufficient to start the request for reasonable accommodation. 

In the present case, the plaintiff made an affirmative request to continue working the warehouse night shift in March, 2001. In addition, the plaintiff’s counsel, in his April 19, 2001 letter to the defendant, requested that the defendant: (1) reconsider its decision; (2) provide a cost-benefit analysis supporting its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and (3) continue to grant the plaintiff the accommodation of having another worker assist him when it became necessary to retrieve boxes that weighed more than the plaintiff’s lifting restrictions. These actions satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of initiating the interactive process.

The defendant’s response to this request was merely to reject it. Conroy, the defendant’s manager, stated during his deposition that, upon receiving the letter from the plaintiff’s counsel, he did not reconsider his decision, confer with anyone else, review any records, or conduct any investigation or cost-benefit analysis of the hardship that the proposed accommodation would cause the defendant. The record reflects no effort by Conroy or any other representative of the defendant to contact the plaintiff or his counsel to engage in any additional, meaningful discussion. We conclude that this response is clearly not the dialogue envisioned by the interactive reasonable accommodation process and the defendant’s duty of good faith compliance.

From an employer's perspective, this is a disturbing because it seems to suggest that an employer's obligations to provide a reasonable accommodation continues after an employee has already been terminated.  Moreover, it suggests that "demand letters" (in which an attorney demands that the employer take certain action, like paying severance or reinstating the employee) can also be a requests for reasonable accommodation.

In addition, this decision suggests that even though the employee may not make a reasonable accommodation while employed (and only applies to be considered for a position with the company without explanation), the employer must still consider any request by the employee made after the employee was terminated.

It is unclear whether the employer will be filing a motion for rehearing in the case to rule on this issue. But if left unchallenged, this part of the Court's decision could be the real legacy of the case and set the stage for lots of demand letters for disabled workers even after they've already been fired.

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The sad reality is that, on rare occasion, some employees will revert back to their middle school days and behave like a couple of children. Some will even resort to physical fighting. In such a case, employers are faced with a difficult question -- can I punish one employee more than other if I think they "started" it?

The answer has not always been as clear as you'd like in Connecticut.  Indeed, earlier this month, I commented about a case where the employer punished both employees -- and was still subject to a discrimination claim.  But the Second Circuit provided some helpful guidance to employers and suggests that not all fights need to be treated the same. 

The Second Circuit yesterday released an interesting "summary order" (being it is not "binding precedent") that tackles the subject even further.  In Mincey v. University of Rochester (download here), the Court was faced with an age discrimination claim by a former employee who was terminated for her role in an altercation with a younger co-worker, who was not. 

The employer moved for summary judgment on the claim arguing that the termination, which resulted from determining that the Plaintiff was the instigator, in an altercation, did not give rise to an inference of age discrimination.  The lower court granted the employer's motion and the employee appealed.

At first, it appears that the court is going to overrule the District Court's decision. Indeed, it concludes that the district court erred in finding that the employee was not terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination:

Although it is true, from the record, that Mincey admitted to striking [her co-worker], the record also demonstrates that she consistently stated that she had struck [her co-worker] only after he had struck her with his index finger. Taking the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to Mincey, her contention that [her co-worker] hit her first is sufficient to demonstrate that her termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination.

But the court quickly shoots down the employee's claim that her evidence was sufficient to send the case to trial because it found that the employer's decision was not false or "pretextual".

[E]ven if the conclusion made by the Hospital after its investigation was incorrect-- even if [the co-worker] did actually strike Mincey first -- so long as  that conclusion was the “actual purpose” for her termination, Mincey’s age-discrimination claim fails. An incorrect conclusion, while unfortunate for Mincey, does not constitute age discrimination.

Notably, for employees and their counsel, the case does highlight two arguments that could have been made that might have helped the employee's cause -- but were not. 

For example, the court notes that "Mincey offered no evidence that the investigation was improperly conducted for the purpose of providing a pretextual explanation for an otherwise discriminatory termination." The court also notes that plaintiff did not offer evidence "to suggest that other employees who had struck their coworkers had not been terminated by the [employer], or to rebut the [employer's] evidence that it uniformly terminated employees for fighting. "

The case shows that for employers, a consistently applied disciplinary policy will assist the employer in defending against discrimination cases.  It also reinforces the notion that were an employer conducts an investigation before terminating employees, that investigation should be thorough enough to withstand some criticism.  The case highlights the fact that employers should not be afraid to treat employees in a fight differently, but should be prepared with a good reason for doing so.

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As cases go, Smith v. Connecticut (D. Conn., Jan. 9, 2008) (Bryant, J.) will not rank up there in the annals of legal history.  (Even the name of the case sounds generic.)  Moreover, when you read the facts, the case doesn't scream "precedent".  The Smith case, however, reinforces the notion that consistently applied disciplinary policies are typically key to avoiding discrimination cases, as I've stated previously. 

But the case also shows that there need not be a blind application of this rule to the specific case you may have at hand.  Each case may be different, whether based on the position that someone holds (supervisor/non-supervisor) or the severity of the incident alleged. 

According to the Court:

On November 20, 2004, Smith was acting as shift supervisor at the Hartford Correctional Center when another lieutenant, Rhonda Arnold, confronted him and initiated an argument. Arnold grabbed certain papers away from Smith,sat on them, and refused to return them. A third lieutenant, Kyle Godding, observed the incident and told Smith to leave the room so that Godding could try to retrieve the papers from Arnold. Smith did not leave, and Arnold then struck him with her hand. Smith and Arnold proceeded to engage in a physical altercation, and Smith ultimately pinned Arnold against a window, grasping her shoulder with one hand and her neck with the other hand. Godding pulled Smith away from Arnold and stepped between them, but Arnold then picked up several objects from a desk and hurled them at Smith. Finally, Smith left the room. The entire incident lasted approximately five minutes. Arnold experienced redness on and discomfort in her neck after the altercation.

Smith and Arnold were subsequently placed on administrative leave and then terminated. ... Smith then filed this action, claiming that the department terminated him because of his race. In Smith’s view, he received a harsher form of discipline for his role in the altercation because of his race. Smith and Arnold are both African-American.

Now, looking at the case, and the fact that both of the people engaged in the altercation were African-American (and both terminated), the initial instinct might be to simply argue that there is no disparate treatment here because both employees were fired.  But the employer here argued in the summary judgment papers, something further; that it had terminated white employees for the same or similar conduct.  (The employee's brief in opposition can be downloaded here.)  It was an argument that ultimately the court said was unnecessary because none of the comparisons mattered.

All told, the evidence submitted by the parties indicated that 3 white employees were terminated for physical altercations, 5 white employees were not terminated for physical altercations, and 2 African-American employees were not terminated for physical altercations.  

The court, however, rejected comparison to all of them because there were not "similarly situated" to the Plaintiff. What does that mean? Most were not supervisors like Smith was; the Court found that it would only compare Smith to those who held the same rank or higher than he did.  And the incidents of physical conduct varied in scope from what was alleged here.

Therefore, the Court granted the Department of Corrections summary judgment noting, "it appears that the department has not terminated some African-American employees who were involved in violent workplace incidents, while the department has terminated some white employees who were involved in violent workplace incidents."   The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the employee's race was a factor in his termination.

The case highlights the need for consistency because any variation will be heavily scrutinized. But it also demonstrates that blind adherence to past cases need not be rigid. Courts will allow employers to view each case on its own if it is not similar to past incidents.  Suppose that an employee had been previously warned about their misconduct, while another employee had not. The Court would likely view those people as not "similarly situated" for purposes of a comparison should they later engage in misconduct.

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Earlier this week, I had the privilege of judging various middle school mock trials that the Connecticut Consortium for Law and Citizenship Education sponsors. Students "try" a case with lots of items you'd see in a regular trial -- opening statements, direct and cross examination of witnesses and closing arguments.  I've done this for almost a decade now and have always enjoyed seeing the energy (and nerves) that these students bring.

One important aspect that they bring to the case is simplicity.  Sure, not every issue is thought out, but the students (mostly) were able to focus on a few items that they thought would make a difference in the case. 

In the mock trial case, a student was accused of vandalizing a cemetary.  Although there were lots of extraneous issues (did the cemetary have posted hours, etc.), the students focused on something simple: Where was the student at the time of the incident? Once they were able to focus on the alibi, deciding the case became much easier.

The mock trials reinforced an observation I've had over the years: adults tend to make issues more complicated than they need to be.  We tend to analyze and overanalyze the issues, looking at the pros and cons of everything. Cost/benefit analysis are performed and ultimately, decisions are second-guessed and micromanaged.

This is particularly true in human resources.  Sure, there is an alphabet soup of employment laws to worry about, which I'm not minimizing, but not every decision implicates an all-hands-on-deck approach either. 

How can a human resources representative avoid this pitfall? By keeping things simple, just like students do in middle school. Break an issue down to easiest components and, if necessary, ask a few basic questions.

If you're considering a firing, for example, are there contract issues at stake? Is the person in a protected class? Is the decision well-documented? Will the decision seem "fair" to an outsider?Asking these basic questions may not solve all the issues related to the employment decision, but it may answer most of them. 

For a memo regarding an employee's performance, again, keep things simple.  Point out how the employee's performance is not up to par and what the employee needs to do to improve. Then suggest steps to get there.  Consider using bullet points to get the major issues across.

I won't belittle this issue by suggesting that you learned all you need to know to make these decisions in kindergarten, but by the same token, not every HR issue needs to be turned into a full-blown legal crisis either.  Keep it simple, be straightforward in your approach, and most of the time, you'll be on the right track.

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A few posts this week caught my eye:

• First, the HR Carnival has a great post this week about various HR issues, including how to train managers better.  And, best yet, you'll find a link back to this blog.  Thanks to the writers of the Carnival for the reference.
  
• Kris Dunn, over at HR Captialist,  has an interesting post about how HR professionals can help their companies keep benefit costs down. As Kris says, "If You Don't Have a Meaningful Answer to this Question From Your CEO, Update Your Resume..."
  
• Evil HR Lady, has an informative post as to how employers can prepare for terminations and how to educate managers about the right ways to do so.
  
• Workplace Horizons has been right on top of the Congress' consideration of ENDA, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.  Near daily updates about the rumors of various amendments have been going up and its a useful site to keep track of certain pieces of legislation. 
  
• And finally, The Employment Blawg has been posting a series of hypotheticals on different workplace situations including violence, workplace and overtime.  As stated on the blog "Read Trucks and Guns: An Employment Law Fable, Part I (Overtime for Truck Drivers) for the whole story. . . . It ends with an HR manager getting shot by the driver (just hypothetically)."

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