Everyone knows that taxes are inevitable.  Except perhaps one employee who won his Title VII case but complained that the employer shouldn’t have made withholdings for taxes when it paid out the judgment.  The Second Circuit, in a decision released right before the Labor Day weekend, said the employer did the right thing.

You can

Over the years, I’ve openly questioned whether the CHRO has been improperly awarding emotional distress damages and attorneys fees in employment discrimination claims.  

Indeed, back in February 2009, I noted “Nearly 15 years ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court came out with a pair of decisions that seemed to put to rest the question of

The Office of Legislative Research, whom I’ve praised in several posts before (here and here), recently issued a report on the consequences of a felony conviction on employment. 

Overall, it does a good job summarizing the issues when it comes to state employment.

But later on in the publication it states the following

The EEOC yesterday released important new guidance for employers on the use of arrest and conviction records by employers under Title VII.  You can read the guidance here as well as a short question-and-answer document too. 

For employers in Connecticut, this new guidance only adds to the state-specific rules we have here in state and

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court today gave some teeth to the “ministerial exception” that, in essence, precludes some employees of religious institutions from suing them under federal discrimination laws.

I’ve discussed the exception in various posts over the years here and here.  Its been supported in the Second Circuit and by the Connecticut Supreme Court, but until now, the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken directly on the issue.  The SCOTUS blog has already posted its recap of the entire case here.

SCOTUS: Broad ministerial exception applies

My quick reaction to the decision in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC (download here), is that the notion of a “ministerial exception” being recognized by the Supreme Court isn’t that much of a surprise.  To find otherwise, as the Court stated in its opinion, would be untenable and go against all of the Courts of Appeals.  “We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”

Indeed, the court concludes:

We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.

What is more notable is that there appears to be a broad definition of who is a “minister”.   (And, to state the obvious, rabbis and the like are obviously included). The court took pains to point out that it hasn’t adopted “a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”  But it concluded that “given all the circumstances of her employment”, it applies here.


Continue Reading BREAKING: U.S. Supreme Court Supports Fairly Broad “Ministerial Exception” to Anti-Discrimination Laws

Last week, a federal district court in Connecticut held that the Department of Corrections violated federal law in instituting a discriminatory physical fitness test that created a disparate impact on women.  It also found that the test was not job-related or necessary.  

In doing so, the court granted summary judgment to the employee