A few months ago, I wrote about how artificial intelligence was being introduced in the workplace.
At the ABA Annual Labor & Employment Conference last week, a whole panel discussion was devoted to the legal ramifications of using artificial intelligence — particularly in hiring decisions.
The speakers talked about the EEOC guidance that I
So if last Tuesday’s post about the latest Connecticut Supreme Court decision on travel time was for employers, this post is for the ones who love the nuances of the law.
Dan Klau on his Appealingly Brief blog did a deep dive into the decision. And it wasn’t pretty.
The issue Dan highlights is this: The Connecticut Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) interpretation of its own regulation on travel time was first rejected because that interpretation had not been time-tested and was not the product of formal rule-making procedures.
But it was also rejected because the Court said the agency’s interpretation was also not reasonable. Dan questions this:
The DOL based its interpretation of its regulation on a 1995 opinion letter of the United States Department of Labor concerning travel time under the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. The DOL expressly referenced that letter in a written guide it published, “A Guide to Wage and Workplace Standards.” (The link is to the 2014 revision, which appears to contain the same relevant text (see p. 38) at issue in Sarrazin.) The Court noted that Congress had rejected that position (on policy grounds) in 1996, “yet the department’s handbook inexplicably fails to acknowledge the questionable history of the 1995 opinion letter. . . .” This, according to the Court, is what made the DOL’s interpretation of its own regulation unreasonable.
I fail to see why the DOL’s statement that it interpreted its own regulation in accord with the 1995 opinion letter means that its interpretation is “unreasonable.” It seems to me that the question of reasonableness turns on the “fit” between the 1995 opinion letter and the text of the regulation, not on whether Congress, as a policy matter, disagreed with the 1995 opinion letter. Congress’s intentions are certainly relevant to federal law, but not to the reasonableness of the DOL’s interpretation of its own regulation. Employment lawyers, what say you?
There’s more, of course, to this story. It actually starts with a 1994 US Department of Labor Opinion letter which ruled that the time spent by an employee traveling from home to the first work assignment, or returning home from the last assignment, in an employer provided vehicle was similar to that of traveling between jobs during the day and therefore represented a principal activity, which must be compensated. No compensation would be required in cases where employees used their own personal vehicles.Continue Reading CTDOL’s Interpretation of Travel Time Not “Reasonable”; What Happens Next?
In a decision officially released today, the Connecticut Supreme Court (Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc.) has concluded that a plumbing foreman who carried his tools to and from work was not entitled to be compensated for his commuting time.
That’s about the only simple thing about the decision for employers.
The case addresses complicated and
This week, the U.S. Department of Labor updated their website and provid
ed some new online tools to help employers figure out which recordkeeping, reporting and notice requirements apply to them.
The new FirstStep Recordkeeping, Reporting and Notices elaws Advisor has been integrated into a FirstStep suite of advisors that also