The laws regarding the protections owed to pregnant employees got far broader a few years back. In fact, the statutory provision prohibiting discrimination against pregnant employees has eleven key items. Rather than tackle them in separate posts, we’ll “super-size” this post to cover it all.

The main law is set forth at Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a-60(b)(7), though it is to be read in conjunction with the state’s broad anti-discrimination laws.

The key prohibitions state that it shall be a “discriminatory employment practice” for an employer (or the employer’s agent):

(A) To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy;

(B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy;

(C) to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer;

(D) to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so;

(E) to limit, segregate or classify the employee in a way that would deprive her of employment opportunities due to her pregnancy;

(F) to discriminate against an employee or person seeking employment on the basis of her pregnancy in the terms or conditions of her employment;

(G) to fail or refuse to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee or person seeking employment due to her pregnancy, unless the employer can demonstrate that such accommodation would impose an undue hardship on such employer;
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chro99Last week, the Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee released a 129-page report on the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, with a focus on Discrimination Complaint Processing.  You can download it here.

The report is worth a deep dive at another time, and a final report from the Committee is due in January 2017.

Collins, left, addresses CBA; Shipman & Goodwin Partner Gabe Jiran, right, moderates.

At Monday’s Connecticut Legal Conference, CHRO Chair Gary Collins spoke for a bit about the developments at the oft-maligned agency since he’s come on board.  (You can follow all the tweets from the conference on Twitter using #ctlegalconf as

Next week, one of my colleagues, Peter Murphy will be at the Connecticut Bar Association to present a program entitled “CHRO 101 – From Complaint to Public Hearing”.   Full details are available at the CBA website.

The program includes a discussion of

  • The Complaint Process, MAR (Merit Assessment Review), and Mandatory Mediation,
  • Responding to the

Earlier this week, I wrote about the perception among some that the CHRO has been retaining more cases for investigation by letting more cases through the Merit Assessment Review.  These cases that used to be dismissed — mainly “frivolous” ones as  I’ve collectively termed them — mean more headaches for employers who have to spend time and money defending against them.

(To simplify the blog post for readers, I labelled all these cases that had been dismissed at MAR together as “frivolous” even though there are technically different reasons why the CHRO may dismiss a case on Merit Assessment Review, including that there is “no reasonable possibility” that an investigation will lead to a reasonable cause finding of discrimination. )

In response to my blog post, CHRO Principal Attorney Charles Krich crafted a reply. While it is attached to the original blog post, I thought it notable enough that it warranted its own blog post.   While he indicated that there were no statistics yet available, he “would not be surprised if fewer cases are being dismissed for no reasonable possibility” under the Merit Assessment Review.

Here’s his reply in full (my further comments are below):
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I’m looking forward to a bunch of speaking opportunities over the next few months or so. Here are a few:

Back in February 2009, I talked at length about whether compensatory damages (for things such as emotional distress) was properly awarded in employment discrimination claims that proceeded to a hearing at the CHRO.  I went on to say back then that I believed the agency and the human rights referees at the agency had been