lettersPicture this scenario:

You come into your office one morning to learn that an employee has filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that you failed to accommodate his disability reasonably and then terminated his employment because of his disability.

As if that isn’t challenging enough, many months afterwards, you receive a request from the EEOC to provide the names and contact information of his fellow employees who worked for you at the same time as the original complainant, as part of the EEOC’s investigation into the complaint.

This type of scenario isn’t uncommon; the state agency investigating discrimination complaints (CHRO) often requests information on co-workers as part of the investigation and sometimes requests that these co-workers be available for interview.

But here’s where the scenario gets interesting — and this story is based on a ruling on a motion to dismiss in federal court just this week in the EEOC v. Day & Zimmerman case.  The employer’s in-house counsel — seemingly with reference to outside counsel as well — decided to notify the co-workers of the request.

Indeed, the employer sent a letter to approximately 146 individuals, all of whom were members of same union as the Complainant and all of whom had worked, or continued to work, for the employer.  Whether you view the letter as an innocuous helpful note, or a nefarious threat will depend on your perspective.

In the letter (which you can download here at part of the employer’s filings — page 49), the employer identified the complainant by name, and indicated that he had filed a charge of discrimination on the basis of disability. The letter went on to identify the Complainant’s union local, the medical restrictions on his ability to work, and the accommodation he had requested. It further informed the recipients of their right to refuse to speak to EEOC investigator and offered them the option to have the employer’s counsel present if they chose to speak to EEOC.

Is there anything wrong with the letter?

According to the EEOC, yes (download here). The EEOC alleged that this letter constitutes retaliation against the original Complainant for opposing conduct made unlawful by the ADA. The EEOC further alleged that the letter interfered with the Complainant and the recipients of the letter in their the exercise or enjoyment of rights protected by the ADA, including the right to communicate with EEOC, the right to participate in an EEOC investigation, and the right to file a charge of discrimination with EEOC.

The employer, as you might imagine, vehemently disagreed and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (download here).  It argued that the lawsuit “exemplifies the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)’s enforcement position of ‘do as I say, not as I do.'”  It noted that the EEOC, through the lawsuit itself, publicized the same information it now criticizes the employer for doing, even though the employer was obligated — it argues — to do so by the Rules of Professional Conduct (simply, the ethical code for attorneys).

The employer also argued that the letter explicitly re-affirmed the employer’s policy against retaliation, its commitment to equal employment opportunity, and the “employer’s position that a decision to speak with the EEOC investigator ‘will not have an adverse impact on your current or future employment.'”

The federal court rejected the employer’s motion to dismiss (ruling available here for download); in doing so, it emphasized that under the standards governing review of such motions, it must construe the federal complaint in a light most favorable to the EEOC. After doing so, the court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to state a claim for ADA violations  even though the Complainant had already been terminated from employment at least 17 months prior to the letter being distributed.

As a starting point, the court noted that “Routinely, courts have held that, when an employer disseminates an employee’s administrative charge of discrimination to the employee’s colleagues, a reasonable factfinder could determine that such conduct constitutes an adverse employment action.”  And the court concluded that, again construing the facts most favorably to the EEOC, the letter was sent just three months after the employer learned that the EEOC intended to pursue the complaint seriously:

Here it is plausible that the first opportunity to retaliate against [the Complainant], whom they had already terminated, was when the EEOC provided a list of fellow union members to whom Defendant could disseminate the potentially damaging EEOC charge.

The court also addressed the seldom-litigated issue of an interference claim under the ADA. It noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has outlined a test for such a claim. (Though query whether the court overlooked the Second Circuit case of Gradziano — or at least had written its opinion before that one came out.)

Here, the court concluded that while there was no allegation of any direct evidence of the employer’s intent behind the letter, the issue of the employer’s intent “is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.”

Moreover, the fact that the employer disclosed “sensitive personal information” about the Complainant could dissuade the Complainant and the co-workers from communicating further with the EEOC.

Obviously, this lawsuit if far from over.  Both the EEOC and the employer have staked out positions that make a compromise seem unlikely.  And so the case will likely proceed to discovery and then another round of motion practice.

For the rest of us though, this case — and the issues it touches upon — is again worth following.

In the meantime, employers should be very wary of mass notifications of discrimination charges to co-workers (former or current) in response to an EEOC inquiry.   Left unclear from the decision is whether there are any circumstances in which the employer can notify co-workers of the inquiry and at what level of detail.  Would an e-mail indicating that the EEOC may be contacting them but without the details of the Complainant’s complaint pass muster?  How strongly should an employer emphasize its policies prohibiting retaliation?

Employers are going to want to tread very carefully for now and consult their counsel about any communications going out.

soccer1This morning came word that members of the U.S. National Women’s Soccer Team are filing a discrimination complaint against the U.S. Soccer Federation on the grounds that they are paid less than their male counterparts.

According to press reports, “the filing, citing figures from the USSF’s 2015 financial report, says that despite the women’s team generating nearly $20 million more revenue last year than the US men’s team, the women are paid almost four times less.”

U.S. Soccer issued its own release arguing: “While we have not seen this complaint and can’t comment on the specifics of it, we are disappointed about this action. We have been a world leader in women’s soccer and are proud of the commitment we have made to building the women’s game in the United States over the past 30 years.”

This is not the first time this argument has been raised. But it continues the forceful arguments of female athletes arguing that the pay disparity is at a minimum, unfair, or in other cases, illegal.

For example, Connecticut attorney Kelly Burns Gallagher has been talking about the disparities in the triathlon world for a while.  The 50 Women to Kona movement notes that “At the World Championships for the Ironman Triathlon in Kona, Hawaii, the professional men have 50 qualifying spots and the professional women have only 35.  We are asking you to help stop this unequal allocation by sending a message to the World Triathlon Corporation and its CEO, Andrew Messick.”

And recently in tennis, a tennis tournament directly resigned after suggesting that women tennis players owe their success to their male counterparts.

There is no doubt that the argument of equal pay for female athletes has strong appeal. I’ve watched the women’s World Cup, for example, with the same enthusiasm as I do the men’s World Cup (and written about my love of U.S. Soccer too).  Tennis has, for the most part, adopted the laudable position that tournament payouts should be the same for men and women.

But the lawyer in me recognizes that the legal issues aren’t neat and tidy. We’ve seen it come up in golf where LPGA golfer Stacy Lewis recently argued that LPGA players should be paid the same as their male counterparts on the PGA.

In that case, however, there are arguments that each tour has different endorsement deals, different sponsors and different viewer audiences.

The Equal Pay Act (which may or may not get the soccer players to victory, depending on the legal arguments raised) mandates that that men and women be given equal pay for equal work in the same establishment. The jobs need not be identical, but they must be substantially equal.  Title VII can also be raised; it does not require that the job of the person claiming discrimination be substantially equal to that of a higher paid person of the other sex, but unlike the EPA, Title VII requires proof of intent to discriminate on the basis of sex.

So how does one make a claim under the EPA? Simply stated, by showing that the jobs require substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility, and that are performed under similar working conditions within the same establishment defined as follows (and as noted by the Workplace Fairness site):

  • Skill: measured by factors such as the experience, ability, education, and training required to perform the job.
  • Effort: the amount of physical or mental exertion needed to perform the job.
  • Responsibility: the degree of accountability required in performing the job.
  • Working conditions: encompasses two factors: (1) physical surroundings like temperature, fumes, and ventilation, and (2) hazards.

It is this argument that the soccer players will likely try to advance. But as noted by The New York Times, there are likely to be several arguments that U.S. Soccer will respond with including that the law allows for different payments on factors other than gender:

U.S. Soccer could counter that the players’ pay is collectively bargained, and that the players agreed to all issues, including compensation and working conditions like whether the team must play on artificial turf on not. (The federation and the women’s players’ union are continuing discussions on compensation in a new collective bargaining agreement amid the current action.)

U.S. Soccer also receives substantially higher payouts from FIFA, world soccer’s governing body, for participation in the men’s World Cup. But the women’s complaint seems to take aim at a bigger share of domestic revenue, like sponsorships and television contracts.

Who will win? My guess is that we won’t know because ultimately U.S. Soccer and the soccer players will reach an agreement, perhaps as part of a new bargaining agreement.  But the arguments about pay disparity between male and female athletes and coaches will live on.

yankees3With Opening Day of baseball season nearly upon us, it’s time again to bring back a “Quick Hits” segment to recap a few noteworthy (but not completely post-worthy) employment law items you might have missed recently.

  • The U.S. Department of Labor released the final version of new “persuader” rules which will become effective April 25, 2016.  The new rules revise the “advice” exemption and will require a larger universe of consultants, lawfirms, and employers to report their labor relations advice and services.  You can find many recaps of the new rule (here and here, for example).  For Connecticut employers, if you haven’t had to worry about “persuader” reporting before (and don’t know what it is), it’s not likely to change things much, though for law firms and consultants, it may have a more significant impact.
  • Not every U.S. Supreme Court case is a big one.  The latest example of that is the Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo et al. case that was issued last week. In that case, the court ruled that employees could use representative evidence to establish liability and damages for class certification purposes in a donning and doffing case. As another blog post stated sufficiently, this decision allowed employees to rely on a “time study conducted on a sample of class members to calculate an average donning/doffing time, which is then extrapolated to each member of the class — even if the actual time spent on the activity in question varies dramatically among employees and even if some of the class members failed to prove damages at all based on that time study.”  For most employers, however, the decision will have limited utility. Donning and doffing cases are, for example, fairly rare.
  • An interesting case up for oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court today looks at the limited circumstances in which an employer can recover attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” in a Title VII suit.  The SCOTUSBlog has more on this case here.
  • Tax season has renewed fears regarding the privacy of W-2 forms.  A spear-phising e-mail scheme has been making the rounds of late, as this post reminds us.

 

One of the cases I’ve covered on this blog since the beginning, was a lawsuit challenging CIGNA’s change from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan.

In plain English, it was basically (and I’m oversimplifying) a conversion from a pension plan to a 401(k) plan.

That case has gone all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.

(And, in the interests of full disclosure, one of the named plaintiffs is a family friend who attended my wedding many years ago.)

Today comes word that the matter is reaching a conclusion, in a report by Mara Lee of The Hartford Courant.

Fifteen years after Cigna Corp. employees and former employees first sued over 1998 changes to the company pension plan, a federal court ordered the company in January to provide a list of all 27,000 people in the class-action lawsuit and how much each one is owed. There are 3,620 Connecticut residents in the lawsuit.

The conversion from a pension to a cash balance plan was legal, and did not discriminate against older workers, a U.S. District judge in New Haven found. But because the way the company described the changes was misleading, the court found Cigna liable for paying for what they are owed from the original pension, frozen at the end of 1997, plus additions to the lump sums the pensions were converted to.

Lawsuits like this one are rare. But after 15 years of pursuing the claims, the current and former employees look to finally get some closure on the matter later this year with payouts.  The exact amount is still to be determined but the company has reserved over $180M for the potential payouts.

robertsFirst things first. My favorite David Bowie song is “Heroes” (though I remember really being struck by its use in the 2001 movie, Moulin Rouge).

But the Bowie song that comes to mind today for various reasons is “Changes” and how it ties into another big story of the day — an oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case involving public employers.

At issue is whether public employees who do not want to be part of a union can still be required to pay an “agency fee”, which is typically the equivalent of the dues that union members pay as well.

The case is revisiting a 1977 case (the Abood case if you’re interested) which that requiring non-union members to pay fees for collective bargaining was constitutional.

The SCOTUSBlog sets up the argument on behalf of the non-union members like this:

Here is their logic: because unions cannot charge non-members for political activity and since non-members argue that everything a public-sector union does — even bargaining — is political in nature, it follows that any fees violate their First Amendment right not to pay for activity to which they object. Their target, in union parlance, is the “agency fee.”

The State of Connecticut has come out firmly on the side of upholding the current law.  In November 2015, it joined an amicus brief from New York urging the court to not change the current law and leave it to the state to determine the full scope.

It noted that 23 states permit these “agency fees” (also known as “fair share” fees) to “provide a mechanism for ensuring that represented employees contribute to  union costs germane to collective bargaining. The majority of these statutes make agency-fee requirements a permissible subject of bargaining and  authorize (but do not require) agency-fee provisions as part of public-sector collective-bargaining agreements.”
In the amicus brief, New York (and Connecticut) argue that the court should uphold the current scheme “recognizing that the government must have flexibility to manage its own internal operations, especially with respect to
matters affecting the delivery of government services.”

Why is this important, according to the states? A few things:

A lack of adequate funding can reduce a union’s ability to maintain the staff expertise necessary to perform collective-bargaining functions. Eliminating agency fees as a secure funding mechanism may require unions to focus disproportionate effort on recruiting members and collecting fees, thereby diverting attention from bargaining and contract-administration responsibilities. Moreover, the absence of secure funding may create skewed incentives for unions to make excessive bargaining demands or disparage management as antagonistic to labor, in order to encourage employees to give financial support.

Notably, a separate amicus brief filed by 18 other states argue the opposite.

It is time to abandon the meaningless distinction between collective bargaining and other political activity.  In the public sector, core collective bargaining topics such as wages, pensions, and benefits inherently implicate public policy, and in ways that matter.

Like lobbyists, public sector unions obtain binding agreements from the government that have enormous public impact — all without the natural counterweight of a financial market that exists in the private sector. In the public sector, it is taxpayers, not business owners and consumers, who foot the bill — and the bill is often steep.

Some pundits predict that the court will strike down agency fees.  Consistent with my post lack week, I won’t make any such predictions, but this case has significant implications obviously for public employers and it’ll be interesting to watch whether there will be any impact on private employers as well.

In any event, stay tuned and be sure to listen to some David Bowie in the meantime.

Governor Malloy with current CTDOL Commissioner Sharon Palmer

You’ve no doubt heard lots about how the U.S. Department of Labor is cracking down on independent contractors.  I’ve recapped it before and my former colleague, Jonathan Orleans, has a new post regarding Uber & electricians.

But in my view, there is a larger, more important battle now being fought in Connecticut and you may not be aware of it.  I touched on it briefly in a post in July but it’s worth digging a little deeper.  Disappointingly, I have not seen anything written about this in the press (legal or mainstream).

A case recently transferred to the Connecticut Supreme Court docket threatens to cause lots of havoc to company usage of independent contractors in Connecticut. The Connecticut Department of Labor has taken an aggressive stance in the case which is leading to this big battle.

The case is Standard Oil of Connecticut v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act and is awaiting oral argument.  You can download the state’s brief here and the employer’s brief here.  The employer’s reply brief is also here.

The employer (Standard Oil) argues in the case that it uses contractors (called “installers/technicians”) to install heating oil and alarm systems and repair and service heating systems at times of peak demand.  The state reclassified the installers/technicians as employees and assessed taxes and interest.  At issue is the application of the ABC Test which is used in Connecticut to determine if these people are employees or independent contractors.

As explained by the CTDOL:

The ABC Test applies three factors (A, B, and C) for determining a worker’s employment status. To be considered an “independent contractor,” an individual must meet all three of the following factors:
A. The individual must be free from direction and control (work independently) in connection with the performance of the service, both under his or her contract of hire and in fact;
B. The individual’s service must be performed either outside the usual course of business of the employer or outside all the employer’s places of business; and
C. The individual must be customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as the service performed

In the Standard Oil case, the employer is challenging the findings on various elements of this test. One of them – Part B , the “places of business” — is potentially far-reaching, according to the briefs filed in the case.  The issue is whether the customers’ homes are “places of business”; if they are, then the consultant cannot be said to be performing services “outside” the employer’s places of business.  The employer argued that viewing customers’ homes as places of business “does nothing to further the Act’s purpose and its practical implications are damning to Connecticut industry….”

Indeed, the employer argues that “it will be impossible for [the employer]-or any Connecticut business–to ever utilize the services of an independent contractor.”

Continue Reading The Real Battle over Independent Contractors and the ABC Test In Connecticut

IMG_7496 (2)Did you enjoy the fireworks last week?

I’m not talking about the real Independence Day fireworks; rather, it’s a new Second Circuit decision that should have employment lawyers popping this morning.

For a while, we’ve been talking about interns.  Indeed, back in 2013, I talked about how a wage/hour case involving interns on the movie “Black Swan” had the potential to change how employers use interns.

In that case, a federal district court judge essentially adopted a six-factor test used by the U.S. Department of Labor to determine if an intern was really an employee.

Flash forward to last Thursday.  In somewhat of a surprise, the Second Circuit — which covers cases in Connecticut — reversed that federal district court court’s decision and rejected the DOL’s six-factor approach.

In its place, the court adopted what Jon Hyman properly termed, a “more flexible and nuanced primary-benefit test.”

[T]he proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. The primary beneficiary test has two salient features. First, it focuses on what the intern receives in exchange for his work.… Second, it also accords courts the flexibility to examine the economic reality as it exists between the intern and the employer.…

In the context of unpaid internships we think a non‐exhaustive set of considerations should include:

1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee—and vice versa.

2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an educational environment, including the clinical and other hands‐on training provided by educational institutions.

3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit.

4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar.

5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial learning.

6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern.

7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship.…

Continue Reading DOL’s Internship Test Rejected by Second Circuit Creating Conflict with New Connecticut Law

aslWhat does it really mean to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee who has a disability?

That’s a question I talk about a bunch with clients.  The employee may request one thing but the employer may think that another accommodation can accomplish close to the same thing, perhaps at a lower cost.  Who wins?

It’s not a new question; I’ve talked about it before here on the blog too.

But a recent case by the Second Circuit adds some layering to that discussion.  The case, Noll v. IBM, isn’t one that you’ll see on the front page of The New York Times.  I found out about it from the always reliable (and underrated) Wait a Second Blog.

That blog’s recap is appropriate here:

Noll worked in Poughkeepsie, N.Y., but IBM is a huge corporation for which internal communication were broadcast over a company-wide intranet. Noll asked for captioning of certain intranet videos or transcripts of audio files. Instead, as noted above, IBM gave him transcripts and access to ASL interpreters. Noll said these alternatives were not good enough it was “confusing and tiring” to look back and forth between the video and the ASL interpreter. Also, it sometimes took five days or longer for transcripts to be made available to Noll, and links to the transcripts were sometimes broken.

The IBM Media Library stores over 46,000 video files (!), only 100 of which were captioned.  As for live meetings, IBM provided him with ASL interpreters and Noll found those to be “effective.”  But he didn’t like the interpreters for the videos because he found it “confusing and tiring.”

The Second Circuit noted that determinations of the reasonableness of accommodations are typically fact-specific, but summary judgment can be granted to an employer if the accommodations are “plainly reasonable.”  (Pro tip: If the court is setting forth this standard, you can figure out where it is headed.)

This is an important point to emphasize and the court seems to be setting forth a standard that hasn’t been utilized much before in discussions. “In other words, the plain reasonableness of the existing accommodation ends the analysis. There is no need to engage in further burden‐shifting to consider whether the employee’s requested accommodation would have been reasonable.”

Reasonable accommodation can take many forms, but must be “effective”, the court said.  And, at the same time, employers are not required to provide the “perfect” accommodation or even the “very accommodation most strongly preferred” by the employee.  “All that is required is effectiveness.” 

Here, the court found that the accommodations from IBM were indeed “effective”.  While Noll said the interpreters were not as effective as captioning and that it was “tiring” to watch it, that objection is not enough to get him to a jury trial, let alone victory.

This disadvantage does not render interpretive services ineffective. A person who is deaf necessarily receives auditory information from other senses (principally sight); so it can be expected that many accommodations of deafness — ASL interpretive services as well as captioning — will tax visual attention to some degree. An accommodation for deafness therefore cannot be rendered ineffective by the need to divide visual attention, without more.

For employers, this is an important case to consider. IBM here had access to many more resources than most employers. And even with all the services it provided, it was sued for still not doing enough. The Second Circuit put an end to that — no doubt after IBM spent significant sums to defend itself.  Smaller employers may not be so fortunate.

Still, for employers, showing that you have entered into the interactive process with employees and provided what it believes to be an “effective” reasonable accommodation can still provide a path to success if sued.

As I said before, the notion that this might be a quiet year for employment law legislation at the Connecticut General Assembly has long since left the train station.

Indeed, we’ve appear to be swinging completely in the opposite direction. Anything and everything appears up discussion and possible passage this year — including items that really stood no chance in prior years.

GA2I’ll leave it for the political pundits to analyze the why and the politics of it all. But for employers, some of these proposals are going to be very challenging, at best, if passed.

One such bill, which appeared this week on the “GO” list (meaning its ready for considering by both houses) is House Bill 6850, titled “An Act on Pay Equity and Fairness”.  Of course, you won’t find those words in the bill itself which is odd.  There is nothing about pay equity in the bill; indeed, it is much much broader than that.

It stands in contrast to, say, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which tried to tackle gender discrimination in pay directly.

This bill would make it illegal for employers to do three things. If passed, no employer (no matter how big or small) could:

  • Prohibit an employee from disclosing, inquiring about or discussing the amount of his or her wages or the wages of another employee;
  • Require an employee to sign a waiver or other document that purports to deny the employee his or her right to disclose, inquire 1about or discuss the amount of his or her wages or the wages of  another employee; or
  • Discharge, discipline, discriminate against, retaliate against or otherwise penalize any employee who discloses, inquires about or discusses the amount of his or her wages or the wages of another employee.

You might be wondering: Isn’t this first bill duplicative of federal law? And the answer is yes, and then it goes beyond it.  Federal labor law (the National Labor Relations Act) already protects two or more employees discussing improving their pay as a “protected concerted activity”.  It’s been on the books for nearly 80 years. So, as noted in an NPR article:

Under a nearly 80-year-old federal labor law, employees already can talk about their salaries at work, and employers are generally prohibited from imposing “pay secrecy” policies, whether or not they do business with the federal government.

This provision goes beyond that by making it improper for an employer to prohibit an employee from even disclosing another employee’s pay.

Continue Reading “Pay Secrecy” Bill Goes Above and Beyond Other Proposals

DontWorryBeYesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the EEOC has a duty to conciliate that has go a bit beyond words before filing suit as a party.  In the case, EEOC v. Mach Mining (download here), the employer argued that the EEOC cannot just say that it has tried to resolve the matter through conciliation; the Supreme Court agreed, but barely, saying that in many cases, an affidavit from the EEOC attesting to its efforts is going to be sufficient. And even if it isn’t, the EEOC can get a do-over (my words, not the courts) if a court finds that its conciliation efforts did not meet the statutory minimum.

To some, this decision is a huge deal: “The implications for employers as a result of this decision cannot be overstated.”  Why? Because the EEOC will have to revisit its litigation strategy and focus on being able to show its conciliation efforts before a “third party”.

To others, the decision is disappointing “because the Court declined to authorize dismissal of the EEOC’s lawsuits if conciliation efforts were not undertaken.”

What are the implications though for Connecticut employers?

For the overwhelming majority of Connecticut employers, my take is different from both of these and is essentially the title to a Bobby McFerrin song: Don’t Worry, Be Happy. 

Sure, be happy that the Court agreed that the EEOC cannot pay lip service to conciliation efforts.  It’s a small “victory” for employers.  It could be worse.

But don’t worry about this decision because you’re very likely to never have to deal with this issue.

Why? Because in Connecticut, the state agency — the Connecticut Commission of Human Rights and Opportunities — mainly calls the shots.  Indeed, in the last ten years since April 2005, the EEOC has brought suit only five times against Connecticut employers in federal court here (though, 3 of those suits are in the last 2 years).

Quite simply, the EEOC plays a very very small role in how employment laws in this state are enforced.  Thus, any decision that affects how the EEOC handles the small numbers of cases it brings against employers is going to have just a minimal impact in Connecticut.

To be sure, in the unlikely event you end up being the subject of an EEOC investigation, you should take your efforts to conciliate with the EEOC seriously and document them. But most employers here will never have that happen. Indeed, you’re much more likely to get a lawsuit by an employee.

So, read the decision if you must. But focus on other areas of compliance instead of getting caught up in the latest and greatest from the Supreme Court.

And feel free to whistle with the earworm that is “Don’t Worry Be Happy” below.