Late yesterday, various press reports signaled what could be the beginning of the end for 2011 Department of Labor guidance that had greatly expanded legal claims against restaurants.

The 2011 rule barred businesses (mainly restaurants) from including nontipped workers in their tip pools.  That practice – if done involuntarily – then entitles the servers or waitstaff who have contributed those tips to the tip pool to minimum wage for their hours (not the tip-credit minimum wage.)

As of this morning, the DOL had not released its’ rule publicly, but according to a Law 360 report the description “suggests it would roll back the DOL’s 2011 rule amending its interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act to blog businesses from giving a portion of service employees’ tips to traditionally nontipped workers, such as kitchen staff.”

The attack on this 2011 guidance is also making its way through the courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to decide soon whether to review a case out of the Ninth Circuit that upheld the tip pooling rule.

The timing of the DOL’s expected rollback is unclear, but it could have a significant impact on many cases pending in the court systems or being threatened now.  At the current rate, a change could be expected in the first quarter of 2018.

For restaurants and other employers such as hotels that have tipped employees, this change ought to be closely followed.  Until we see the scope of the proposed rule change, it is unclear what the full impact on existing cases will be but given past practices on situations like this, but it might just evaporate a whole host of lawsuits that have popped up.

Stay tuned.

Back in 2011, I discussed a titillating case of strip club dancers (or, a decision says, “performers”, “entertainers”, “dancers” or even “exotic dancers” — although not “strippers”) who were trying to claim wages for the time they worked at a popular strip club in Connecticut.

The story at the time was that they were compelled to arbitrate their claims. 

So private arbitration should mean end of the public story, right?

Well, as it turns out, no. And the analysis of the case has some very real practical implications for employers.

I’ve been going to back through some older posts to do some followups. And in doing so, I discovered that this case had a public ending — except for the fact no one reported on it.

It seems that the dancers won big in an arbitration proceeding and then asked the court to “confirm” the award — making the whole thing public.  (You can read the arbitrator’s award here.)

And as a result, we get a revealing look at the efforts one club made to try to avoid having strippers be deemed “employees” and how it ultimately failed.

The strip club  — sorry, “adult entertainment establishment” as it called itself — had the strippers sign leases “renting” out the poles and space of the strip club. In doing so, the Club argued that these dancers were no more than tenants, and therefore, not entitled to wages, benefits or any of the normal protections that come with being an employee.

Under the “lease”, according to the decision, the dancers agreed to perform “semi-nude (topless) and/or nude dance entertainment” at the Club.”

In doing this work, dancers agreed to “perform consistent with the industry standards of a professional exotic dancer.”

(Aside: Professional exotic dancers have INDUSTRY standards?)

The Lease also provided that there will be set fees (called “entertainment fees”) for certain performances, “such  as couch and table dances,” and that dancers “may not charge more than the set fees.”

Oh, and they wouldn’t be paid any wages.

And here’s where it gets REALLY interesting.

If they ever DID claim wages, the lease provided that they would forfeit all of the entertainment fees they previously earned. And, to top it all off, should the dancers claim to be employees, they will also be liable for any attorneys’  fees, costs, or other damages incurred by the Club as a result of that claim.

But the arbitrator was having none of it.

He detailed the requirements of the strippers saying that there were four principal ways a dancer can “perform” — all of which indicated that they were tied to the Club (and therefore employees).

  • A “stage set”, in which the only income is the tips the customers choose to give her.
  • A “private dance” or “booth dance”, in which the Club sets the “mandatory entertainment fees”.  (A booth dance here cost $25, of which the dancer keeps $20 and pays $5 to the Club.)  Tips encouraged.
  • A “VIP” area in which the fee for that performance is $100 for 15 minutes, $200 for 30 minutes and $300 for an hour and in which the entire fee goes to the Club.  Tips encouraged as well.
  • A “Champagne Room” performance, in which the customer is charged $110 for one half hour and in which the entire fee goes to the Club.  Customer is free to tip the dancer.

At the end of a shift, the dancer must pay “rent” to the Club of $20 and a tip to the DJ.

The arbitrator said that the dancers were employees and therefore entitled to the protections under state and federal law.  Minimum wage was owed, for example. Moreover, the “lease” violated state law because it called for a refund of wages under Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 31-73.  

The arbitrator noted that while employers and employees have “wide latitude” to enter into wage agreements, that latitude does not extend to permitting parties to override or ignore the requirements of Connecticut law.

The arbitrator took particular note of the paragraphs that required the dancers to return “all” entertainment fees if they challenged their employment status.  These provisions are “clearly designed to penalize the employee for exercising her right to insist upon proper classification.  The inherent purpose of the Lease is to violate the law.”

The decision goes on to analyze the proper penalties and set-offs in such a case.  Here, the arbitrator again was not sympathetic to the employer — and for good reason.  The employer failed to prove it acted “in good faith” — and therefore the dancers were entitled to liquidated (or double) damages.

How much? Nearly $130,000 in damages for two strippers — plus attorneys’ fees.

The case is a great example of what happens on the fringes of wage and hour law. The vast majority of employers in this state play by the rules and wouldn’t even dream of cooking up a “lease” for its employees to sign.

But the law exists to protect the dancers too and here, there’s little doubt that justice has been well-served by the award here.

“Joe, in response to all this NFL stuff, we want you to display U.S. flags at your workstation.”

“No.”

“Well, then you’re fired.”

Don’t think that can happen? Then you haven’t heard about the Cotto v. United Technologies Corp. case — a long-forgotten Connecticut Supreme Court case from 20 years ago that has particular meaning in today’s environment where standing for the national anthem has become front page news.

Is this patriotic too?

The basic facts are as I described them above:

  • The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was employed on a full-time basis by the defendant for approximately twelve years.
  • In April 1991, the employer distributed American flags to employees in the plaintiff’s department and it was expected that all employees would display American flags at their workstations.
  • The plaintiff declined to display the American flag and further gave his opinion on the propriety of coercing or exerting pressure on employees to display the American flag.
  • After a suspension, he was fired by his employer on or about May 16, 1992.

The Supreme Court had two things to say on this. First, the Court held that the employee could raise a claim under a state law that an employee’s free speech claims were being violated. Again, i talked more about this law in a post last month.

But that’s only part of the decision. In the other half of the decision, the Court was asked to decide whether the employee actually had a free speech claim.

The Court reminds us first that not everything is a federal or even state case.  “As a statutory matter, a statute that protects constitutional rights in the workplace should not be construed so as to transform every dispute about working conditions into a constitutional question.”

And then the court reminds us, in language that has direct implications for the discussion we’ve been having about standing for the national anthem, that the Complaint was missing a few essential aspects to rise to that level.

Significantly, the plaintiff has not alleged that:  (1) he was directed to manifest his patriotism by saluting the flag or otherwise affirming his allegiance thereto;  (2) he was directed to affix the flag to his person or to his private property;  or (3) he was indirectly directed to associate himself with the symbolism of the flag because the location of his workstation was such that members of the public, or his fellow employees, reasonably could have attributed that symbolism to him personally.

Instead, the claim rested on the requirement for the Plaintiff to affix the flag to the workstation. The Court saw no meaningful difference to that act, versus an employer who did it for the employee — which would not violate the First Amendment.

A direction to the plaintiff to affix a flag to his workstation did not require him either to manifest or to clarify his personal political beliefs.   Because a flag was to be affixed to  each workstation, and because the plaintiff’s workstation was not exposed to public scrutiny, he was not required to assume the risk that others might attribute to him any political beliefs about the flag that he did not share.   In other words, the direction to the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not a “coercion of belief.”

Hmmm.

Now, if you’ve been paying attention, you’ve been seeing press reports that the NFL and its teams may require its players to stand at the national anthem.  Let’s suppose that happened in Connecticut too and that a paid employee was fired for refusing.

Given the language in Cotto, could the employee allege that he “was directed to manifest his patriotism by saluting the flag or otherwise affirming his allegiance thereto” — a fact that was missing in the Cotto case?

That obviously is an unanswered question, but it just goes to show that you can learn a lot through your history.

An applicant for a job posting in education lists his most recent relevant experience as occurring in 1973.  You don’t bring him in for an interview.

Is it gender discrimination?

Beyond that, if he says that he is the most qualified candidate — do you have to hire him?

And if you don’t hire the most qualified person, is that evidence of gender discrimination?

No to all three, says one recent federal court decision.

The decision by the court was quietly released late last month and might otherwise go unnoticed, but it underscores an important point for employers.

In the matter, the Plaintiff argued that the employer discriminated against him because of his gender by denying him the opportunity for a job interview.   The employer chose four female and two male candidates for interviews.

The Plaintiff argued that he was more qualified than the female candidates who were interviewed and ultimately hired by the employer.

The court said, however, that the mere fact that the employer hired people of a different gender does not suggest that it failed to hire the Plaintiff “on account of his gender”.

Indeed, the employer had various reasons as to why the Plaintiff was not interviewed:

  • he hadn’t filled out the entire job application and didn’t answer whether he had any criminal offenses in the last ten years.
  • his resume was “perceived to be outdated, as the most recent job listing in education was from 1973.”

So, you might not think much of the case.

But the court’s decision is notable because it contains language that will be helpful in other cases for employers.  Says the court: “[T]here is no legal requirement that the most qualified candidate be hired.”

In doing so, the quote revisits a quote from an 1980 decision.

Title VII does not require that the candidate whom a court considers most qualified for a particular position be awarded that position; it requires only that the decision among candidates not be discriminatory. When a decision to hire, promote, or grant tenure to one person rather than another is reasonably attributable to an honest even though partially subjective evaluation of their qualifications, no inference of discrimination can be drawn. Indeed, to infer discrimination from a comparison among candidates is to risk a serious infringement of first amendment values. A university’s prerogative to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach is an important part of our long tradition of academic freedom.

All that being said, employers should have SOME rational basis for their decisions. Even if the candidate is “more qualified”, the employer may determine that there are other reasons why the employee should not be hired; maybe the employee’s qualifications cannot overcome a bad job interview, etc.

Keeping bias out of your decision-making process is central to employers.  But it’s nice to know that employers don’t have to be perfect in its determinations of qualifications either.

The Dialogue – an occasional discussion between myself and a prominent employee-side attorney, Nina Pirrotti returns today after a late summer hiatus. Today’s chat focuses on employee separations and severance agreements.  Share your own tips or observations in the comments below. As always, my thanks to Nina for sharing her insights here.

Dan: Hi Nina! How was your summer? Mine was fine except I can’t stop hearing news about President Trump.

It seems to drown out everything else going on and I think I have a headache from it all. But let’s give it a try, shall we?

I know I’m often confronted with having to fashion separation and settlement agreements for employers.   

What do you find are the items in agreements that you think both sides ought to be paying attention to?

Nina: Drowning in Trump-related noise.  The image is horrifying!  My husband and I were chatting the other day about an old Saturday night live weekend update skit.  As we recall it (it was decades ago), the news media was focused on other events when all of a sudden the character playing Kim Jong Un pops into the screen, holds both arms out and complains:  “What do I have to do to get attention around here?!” 

In the age of Trump that glib remark becomes bone-chilling. 

The art of crafting a fair and balanced settlement agreement isn’t the most riveting of topics in our world but it is among the most important.  

One key strategy I use in evaluating them is to put myself in the position of the employer to ensure I understand company’s (reasonable) priorities. 

Clearly the company seeks to contain the dispute itself, keep the fact that it is settling it confidential, and do everything possible to obtain closure.    If the settlement terms go beyond meeting those priorities, a red flag goes up for me and I scrutinize those terms closely.  

In light of the company’s priorities in containing the dispute and keeping it confidential, I expect to see a confidentiality provision, limiting the disclosure of the settlement agreement to those on a need to know basis (typically immediate family members, financial/tax advisor and lawyer). 

I am also not surprised by a non-disparagement provision which prevents the employee from spreading ill will about the former employer. 

Since I generally advise my client that it rarely reflects well on an employee to speak negatively about his/her former employer (no matter how justified the employee might be in doing so) I usually do not oppose such provisions. 

I will often, of course, make them mutual so that key employees at the company also commit to not disparaging my client. 

In light of the company’s priority in seeking closure, I do not have a one-size fits all response to no re-hire provision.  I understand the company’s concern that should the employee who has settled claims for discrimination apply for a position down the road and the company (for legitimate reasons) declines to hire that employee, it nonetheless remains exposed to a potential retaliation lawsuit by the employee. 

No re-rehire provisions in certain situations can be appropriate but only if they are narrowly tailored to the company itself.  Alarm bells go off for me, therefore, if the employer is large and has numerous affiliates and subsidiaries and the employer insists on including them within the scope of the no-rehire provision. 

In such cases, no-rehire provisions can be tantamount to mini-restrictive covenants and, where they hamper my client’s ability to find comparable work, I will reject them as untenable. 

Speaking of restrictive covenant  provisions, it irks me to no end when an employer tries to slip one into a settlement agreement where the employer was not bound by one during the course of his/her employment!   Such provisions are generally a non-starter for me, absent considerable additional compensation for them. 

Finally, as we discussed in an interview you conducted with me many years ago, I do not abide by liquidated damages provisions. 

If a court determines that my client has breached the agreement, even if that breach is deemed a material one, the employer should still bear the burden of proving that it has been damaged and, to a reasonable degree of certainty, the monetary amount of that damage. 

What are your thoughts, Dan?   Have I articulated the company’s main priorities well?  Are there others I am missing that I should consider the next go-round?   Do tell and I promise to listen with an open mind!

Dan: Well, one day we could talk about Trump-related employment litigation, if you’d like to really talk more about Trump.

You’ve hit on some of the highlights from an employer perspective. When crafting one for an employer, I will let you in on a “secret” – we have a template.

I know — probably not a big surprise to you since our firms have negotiated enough of them.

As a result, I find that agreements at this point are sometimes more of finessing around the edges, rather than major re-writes.

The problem I see is that there are some employers who are using a form separation agreement handed down to them years ago, without understanding what’s in them.

First off, the agreements — regardless of whether you’re trying to comply with federal law or not — should really be written in “plain English”.

Get rid of the “Whereas” clauses.

Use bold language or simply to understand provisions.

And try not to have it be 15 pages.

Second, the agreements should contain: a) a release of all state and federal claims (and local ones if you’re in places like New York City); b) confidentiality (and if it needs to be mutual, so be it); c) non-disparagement (same).  There’s more of course, but start with the basics.

Third, employers should think about provisions that may actually be helpful: a) What are you going to do about references? Is it “name, rank, serial number” or something more? b) Do you want an arbitration provision for any breach of the separation agreement?

Neither is typically a high priority but taking care of some of these details are important.

A few employers are trying to get the “best” deal and negotiate strongly but I find most employers just want to move on; the termination was probably not something that they wanted to do anyways and putting some distance between the employee and the company is probably a good thing for the business ultimately.

Since you’re not finding separation agreements all that exciting, what about how employers handle the termination or termination meeting itself? I’m sure you’ve heard some stories from clients.

Nina: Wow – you hit the jackpot with that question!   

I was once asked at an ABA conference at which I spoke what was one step management lawyers could take to maximize the chances that a departing employee won’t seek out the counsel of someone like yours truly. 

My answer?  Treat them like human beings when you terminate them.   

Don’t do what one Fortune 500 company did to one of my clients which was to call her as she lay in a hospital bed with her infant daughter who had been born earlier that day and inform her that she need not return to work because her job had been eliminated.

Time and again prospective clients had told me that they would have gone quietly into the good night had their employers treated them with a modicum of respect during the termination process. 

I recently settled a case involving a woman in her mid-60s who had worked for the same company for 20 years and proven time and again that she would do ANYTHING for that company and, indeed, had worn a number of hats over the years, shedding one and donning another as the company’s needs shifted.  In her 20th year, a new CEO was hired and you can guess what happened next.  He terminated her and replaced her with a brand new hire, decades younger, who my client had helped train.   

Doesn’t sound kosher right, but that is not the worst part! 

It was the WAY the company terminated her that prompted this lovely, meek, non-confrontational woman to summon up the courage to pick up the phone and call me. 

Her termination consisted of a three minute meeting in which the CEO informed her she was no longer needed and handed her a severance agreement that provided her with two measly weeks’ pay. 

She was literally sobbing as she signed it then and there after which she was immediately escorted out the door.   She contacted me weeks after she signed her agreement.  Too bad, so sad, right?  Wrong. 

The employer neglected to include in her severance agreement language required by the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), including a 21-day period to consider the agreement and a seven-day revocation period.  She was able to keep her paltry two weeks and I got her many months more on top of that!   

There are so many morals to that story, the least of which is that severance agreements for employees over 40 should comply with the OWBPA.   Employers should be expressing their gratitude to terminated employees who have proven their devotion to the company by providing them with severance that sends the message that they valued that devotion.  

There other ways to go that extra mile to treat such employees with dignity.   Think about how you would want to be treated if you were undergoing one of the worst days of your life and act accordingly.  Thank them for their service, tell them how sorry you are, assure them that you will do everything in your power to facilitate their transition, allow them to say goodbye to their colleagues, hell, even offer to throw them a farewell gathering.  The possibilities are endless.  Sometimes we lawyers get in our own way. 

Dan, I know none of the clients who have had the benefit of your wisdom prior to terminating an employee would succumb to such pitfalls.  But what do you do when you have to clean up after the fact?

Dan: You’ve raised a good question, but I want to address something you said first. 

You said: “Employers should be expressing their gratitude to terminated employees who have proven their devotion to the company by providing them with severance that sends the message that they valued that devotion.”  

It’s that phrase that I think gets to the heart of the issues with severance in 2017. 

When I first started practicing (a few years ago, ahem), there were still many companies that offered severance without ANY release because that just seemed “the right thing to do.”

After all, there was still a bit of an unspoken contract that employers would take care of employees.

Think back to the “Mother Aetna” description of the insurance company.  But as the recessions took their toll and employee mobility took root, that social contract has definitely been frayed over the years.  In part too is the rise of employment litigation. 

Now each employer has to worry: Is THIS going to be the employment termination that leads to a lawsuit?

 I can’t even remember the last time that an employer offered severance without also demanding the employee sign a release. 

In other words, the idea of severance as “gratitude” and “thanks”, has now been replaced with much more of a quid pro quo. 

For employers, the thought ii: If we give you this severance, please don’t sue us. 

And yet for employees, some of them still remember the days when severance was just something companies did without worrying about the lawsuit. And so when the employer demands the release, some employees take offense to it, not realizing that times have changed. 

As a result, I have also seen employers trying to offer less and less; the notion of one week of severance per year of service (with caps) is still strong, but not universal. 

As to being the fixer – yes, sometimes it happens.  The lack of OWBPA provisions is really something that just shouldn’t happen anymore. 

But it’s more that employers go ahead with the termination without thinking about what comes next.  And some employers are moving so fast, that the details such as having two people in the termination meting and having COBRA information available, get lost in the shuffle.

I don’t know of a single employer that has enjoyed firing an employee.  

Even when they catch an employee red-handed, many employers are aware of the consequences that may flow for the employee from a firing. The employee may have a tough time finding a new job, for example. 

But it strikes me that a small subset of terminated employees are LOOKING to bring suit or a payday instead of looking forward to a new time in their life. 

Obviously sometimes past discrimination has to be examined, but what do you think makes employees sue their employers instead of signing severance agreements that are presented to them?

Nina: I think that employer conduct that rises to the level of actionable discrimination and/or retaliation is alive and well, unfortunately. 

The only up side of all of this is that I get to keep my day job, which I love! 

Of course there are those (“small subset” would accurately describe them) who seek to avoid accountability and are looking for a quick pay out of claims. 

Virtually all of those individuals never make it to our front door. 

I say “virtually” because we are human, after all, and one or two may sneak through the cracks in that door. 

But then we have competent lawyers like you for whom we have great respect who (very politely) convince us – – with facts – – that we are being misled. 

That is why I believe that the only situations in which early negotiations are successful are those in which both sides fight their natural inclinations to hold their cards close to their chests and actually share meaningful information from the get go.  

But how to conduct negotiations effectively is a topic worthy of its own separate dialogue, no?

Dan: I think so. Now, I have to save whatever energy I have left to stay up late to watch playoff baseball with the Yankees. Hopefully, it’s a long October filled with lots of late nights and distractions.  Until next time, Nina!  

Update August 16th: Late yesterday, I received further confirmation that the provisions regarding FMLA were withdrawn entirely from the proposed Democrat-led budget bill. Moreover, the General Assembly early this morning voted on a Republican version of the budget implementer, which now goes on to Governor Malloy (who has indicated he will veto the bill). That version did not contain language on the FMLA changes either. So for now, employers can stand down. However, employers should continue to track the changes both this year and next. FMLA changes may make a return at some point.   

Update at 2:06 p.m.: Since publishing this article, I’ve now heard from three people who work at or with the legislature that while they can’t find fault with my analysis of the proposed legislation as described below, the section on FMLA was intended to address a separate issue.   As a result, it appears that the section on CTFMLA changes discussed below may be withdrawn this afternoon.

What the motives were for this language are far beyond the scope of this blog; this blog has always tried to provide an apolitical analysis of the law and legislation.  For employers, just take note that the budget implementer bill language on FMLA is now likely to be withdrawn when the final bill is considered. 

Late this morning, the proposed bill implementing the state’s budget (a so-called “budget implementer”) was finally released. And like years past, the bill contains some nuggets that are seemingly unrelated to a budget.

As the proposal is a monstrous 925 pages (download here), I’m still reviewing it but employers in Connecticut need to be aware immediately about some proposed changes to the state’s FMLA provisions.  First, a caveat: This is still very much a work in progress so employers should keep a close eye and contact their legislators if interested.

  • First, the bill would expand the scope of relationships covered to include siblings and grandparents/grandkids.  Thus, if you needed to take time off to care for a grandparent, that would now be a covered leave.
  • Second, the bill would revise the definition of employer to now include the state, municipalities, public schools and private schools which means the CTFMLA would now apply to all of them.
  • But then things get even a bit more confusing. The bill changes the definition of “eligible employee” presumably to exclude state workers who are subject to collective bargaining. BUT the bill’s language is far more imprecise and would seemingly exclude ALL workers who are subject to collective bargaining (whether private or public).  Specifically, the definition of “eligible employee” would now mean an employee “who is exempt from collective bargaining…” It does not have the qualifier that perhaps the drafters intended, though, given the speed in which this has been prepared, readers take caution.
  • Next. and quite significantly, the bill would seemingly extend the leave parents get upon the birth of a child or for placement of a child for adoption of foster care.  Specifically, it indicates (line 8472!) that:

Leave under subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section may be extended up to sixteen workweeks beyond the expiration of such leave due under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section.

  • Thus, Connecticut employers would seemingly need to provide up to 32 weeks (16 + 16 more) of unpaid leave for new parents.
  • But the bill goes beyond that too — for leaves for birth, adoption placement, care of a family member or self or to serve as a organ or bone marrow donor, the bill expands the leave too.  Specifically, in line 8529:

An eligible employee may extend his or her personal leave provided under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D) or (E) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) for up to twenty-four workweeks after the expiration of any accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave, or medical or sick leave with proper medical certification.

  • In addition, the bill goes on to add in line 8534, that for leaves for serious health conditions of self or family member, or for donor leaves:

The use of sick leave by an eligible employee for leave provided under subparagraph (C), (D) or (E) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall not be deemed an incident or occurrence under an absence control policy.

The changes are coming fast and furious and it is possible that this proposed bill won’t get passed in its current form.  It’s certainly far beyond the paid FMLA program that was originally under discussion by the legislature.  These changes would be effective in two weeks — October 1, 2017 — which doesn’t given employers almost any time to revise their policies or train their employees.

And I must confess that I’m still a bit surprised by the breadth of this and scratch my head as to whether this language was intended to mean what it appears to say.  I’d like to see a the office of legislative research recap this bill too.

In the meantime, I’m still reviewing the remainder of the bill for other changes relevant to private employers.  (It’s 925 pages and 26452 lines long so bear with me.)  Have you spotted anything else? Add it in the comments below.

U.S. Department of Labor Headquarters

A federal district court in Texas yesterday struck down (once and for all?) the changes to the overtime rules proposed by the Obama Administration.  Previously, those rules (affecting the white collar exemptions) had been stayed, but the Court’s ruling suggests that there is a fatal flaw to the proposed rules and barred its implementation.

In doing so, the Court said that the salary-level test that was proposed was too high to determine which workers were exempt from overtime compensation.

Of course, there was little chance that these rules were going to get the go-ahead anyways because the Trump administration has shown no desire to support them either politically or in court.  Indeed, in July, the Department of Labor sought public feedback on ways to revise the proposed rule.

The ruling applies to employers nationwide.

While you’ll see a round of headlines today about how this is a big decision, it really should come as no surprise for those of us who have been following this for many months.

So all that guidance last year about how to comply with the new rules? Forget about it for now.

Keep calm and carry on.

 

It never seems to fail; I go on vacation and the Connecticut Supreme Court issues one of the few employment law decisions it issues every year during that week.

Fortunately for all of us, it concerns the fluctuating work week method of overtime computation which most employers in the state consciously either avoid or try not to understand.  (In very basic terms, the formula calculates a pay rate based on the number of hours an employee actually works in a particular weeks.)

I’ve previously discussed the “perils of trying to rely on a fluctuating work week.” As recently as 2012, I said that “while it can provide some benefit for employers, it must be done properly and must not be raised after the fact.”  And I noted way back in 2008 that employers have to jump through a variety of hoops to make sure they are compliant.

Add to this cautionary tale the latest Connecticut Supreme Court case of Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc. 

The court held that overtime pay for retail employees who receive commission cannot be calculated using the federal fluctuating workweek formula.

And beyond that, the court raised two important principles.  

First, it said that Connecticut law does not prohibit the use of the fluctuating method in general. Thus, for most employers and most employees, the use of the fluctuating work week is definitely in play.

Second, and perhaps most critical here, the Court said that Connecticut Department of Labor regulations that govern overtime pay for retail employees do prohibit the use of the fluctuating method for those employees:

By setting forth its own formula for mercantile employers to use when computing overtime pay, one that requires them to divide pay by the usual hours worked to calculate the regular hourly rate, the wage [regulation] leaves no room for an alternative calculation method….The wage order’s command to use a divide by usual hours method therefore precludes use of the fluctuating method’s divide by actual hours method, except, of course, when an employee’s actual hours match his usual hours.

It should be noted as well that while the case concerned retail employees, the regulation at issue applies to all businesses in the “mercantile trade.”

For employers that rely on the fluctuating workweek method of calculating overtime in Connecticut, this case is a good reminder to revisit those practices now to make sure they comply with this new Connecticut case. Seeking the advice of your trusted counsel to look at your particular circumstances is critical given the court’s decision.

Like many of you, I long for vacations.  I like to plan them out in advance and then spend the intervening weeks and months plotting and scheming.

What restaurants and new foods should we try? What attractions should we try to visit? And while that private tour my Facebook friend recommended sounds neat and all, what can we really afford to do?

Having just returned from a trip overseas, I can attest that vacations are good for the soul too.  They provide time with friends and family and a much needed perspective.  There is simply more to life than the constant barrage of news that seems to infiltrate our lives nowadays.

But where do vacations fit in the legal schemes employers set up in Connecticut?

Well, for one thing, vacations are not mandated by any state or federal law.  Employers are free to decide whether or not they want to give their employees any vacation days.  But many employers recognize that offering vacation days makes jobs more attractive and also leads to happier employees in the long run too.

That said, Connecticut law basically leaves it to the employers to set up policies — and then requires them to follow them.  The point this truly becomes an issue occurs when an employee leaves employment and still has vacation days that have accrued.

The key law here is Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 31-76k, which states:

If an employer policy or collective bargaining agreement provides for the payment of accrued fringe benefits upon termination, including but not limited to paid vacations, holidays, sick days and earned leave, and an employee is terminated without having received such accrued fringe benefits, such employee shall be compensated for such accrued fringe benefits exclusive of normal pension benefits in the form of wages in accordance with such agreement or policy but in no case less than the earned average rate for the accrual period pursuant to sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive.

In plain English, the law dictates that employers follow their policies and practices.  Don’t want to pay your employees accrued vacation time upon termination? The law says that is ok, but only if your policies say that in advance.

As you craft your vacation policies, here are some other questions for an employer to consider:

  • Do your policies require employees to seek time off in advance?
  • Do you require employees to coordinate with other vacation schedules?
  • Do you have a “use it or lose it” policy on vacations, where employees are required to use vacation time by the end of the year, or do you allow for some carryover? If so, how much?
  • Do you have employees vacation time on a pro-rata basis? In other words, do employees get a day vacation for each month during the year worked?
  • Do your policies dictate that if the employee does take vacation time that has not accrued, what the penalties are?

Vacations are great. Encourage your employees to use them.  Just make sure your company’s policies are clear enough that you won’t be dealing with headaches later on.

My law partner, Gabe Jiran, talks today about whether it’s all that easy to change the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.  Is it just as easy as a vote? Or does it require something more? The answer has implications for all employers.  

With all of the talk about the financial difficulties faced by the government, I, and others in here, sometimes get the question of whether the State of Connecticut or other states might try to change the laws on collective bargaining or try to pass legislation to alter the terms of its existing collective bargaining agreements.

Other states have started down this road, but it is not that easy.

Recently, the Connecticut Attorney General was asked to opine on whether the General Assembly could statutorily change the contracts covering State employees to address the fiscal crisis.  A link to the opinion is here.

The short answer is that the State could do so, such as by passing a statute that wage increases be delayed or eliminated in State contracts.

However, the United States Constitution imposes a pretty heavy burden on the State to justify any such changes.

The relevant factors are:

  1. the severity of the fiscal crisis;
  2. the nature and duration of the contractual changes;
  3. the extent that the State has attempted to implement other alternatives in the past;
  4. the extent to which the State has studied and made findings about the feasibility of other alternatives;
  5. whether these alternatives would be a less dramatic option;
  6. the extent to which the fiscal crisis existed or was foreseeable when the State entered into the existing contract; and
  7. the State’s representations during negotiations for the existing contract.

Based on cases utilizing some or all of these factors, the State would face an uphill battle if it wanted to change an existing contract.

For example, a federal appeals court struck down the State of New York’s plan to delay wage increases for employees because New York had alternatives such as raising taxes or shifting money around in its budget.  In another New York case, the same court found that a $1 billion deficit was not a dire enough fiscal crisis to justify a delayed wage increase.

However, one case found that the City of Buffalo was able to impose a wage freeze when it was undeniable that Buffalo was in a fiscal emergency and that the wage freeze was a last resort after looking at other options.

In discussing the matters with others here, we expect that Connecticut and other states will continue to look for creative options to address their financial situations with employees.

However, it is doubtful that these options will involve changes to existing contracts without negotiation with the unions involved.  In addition, any State attempts to change contracts in the private sector would be almost certain to fail.